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'EC PRESIDENTS VISIT U.S.  .  . 
Preventing new Trade War and Cold War? 
DAVID BUCHAN, Washington correspondent for The Financial Times 
THE  PRESIDENTS  OF  ALL  THREE  EUROPEAN  COMMUN-
ity institutions- Roy Jenkins of the Commission, Fran-
cesco Cossiga, Prime Minister of Italy and current head 
of the EC Council of Ministers, and, last but not least, 
Simone Veil of the European Parliament-came to 
Washington in quick succession early in the new year. 
The visits, at a time of unusually fraught US-European 
relations  as  Washington  looked long  and hard to  its 
friends and allies for concerted support in the twin crises 
of Iran and Afghanistan, carried the potential for both 
profit and pitfall. 
US attention was guaranteed: Americans were all ears 
for the European view of and response to these foreign 
policy crises. But there was an equal danger that more 
would be  expected of the EC  leaders than they could 
deliver.  The  Carter  Administration  has,  to  its  credit, 
attached greater importance to the European Commu-
nity as  the focal point of Europe than its  predecessors 
did-making it more difficult for EC leaders in a foreign 
crisis  during which the Community's nine component 
governments are highly inclined to go  their separate 
ways. 
In fact, the danger never materialized. True, Europe 
has not earned itself the spontaneous outburst of Amer-
ican gratitude that Canada has done by daringly helping 
the six American diplomats escape from Tehran. No one 
has been hanging "Merci, Europe" signs out of Wash-
ington buildings. But the complexities and nuances of 
the Europeans' position were successfully put across by 
the EC trio to the Administration and the Congress. 
In the case of Iran, Europe's first thoughts had become 
the  US  Administration's  second  thoughts.  Arguments 
from European capitals that coordinated economic sanc-
tions  against  the  Khomeini  Government might prove 
counterproductive to getting the h, ostages out-as well 
as hurting oil-dependent Europe more than subsistence-
level Iran - began to make sense to the Carter Admin-
istration, as  the implications of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan sunk in.  Thus, Jenkins, Cossiga, and Veil 
found no pressure in Washington for Europe to follow 
the US  line in blocking exports to, and financial trans-
actions with, Iran, and indeed found some questioning 
about the wisdom of these US  moves in the first  place. 
The nature of the challenge flung down by the Rus-
sians in Afghanistan, and how to meet it, proved much 
harder to get agreement on.  EC governments and the 
European Parliament roundly condemned the Russian 
action-as they had done Iran's seizure of the hostages. 
In  concrete terms, they agreed not to undercut the US 
restrictions on grain and high-technology sales  to the 
Soviet  Union  by  selling  extra to  Moscow themselves. 
Further than that they did not then want to go. 
The basic message the EC leaders brought to Wash-
ington was that Europe wants to stand up to the Russians 
but does not want the carefully nurtured plant of detente 
with Moscow cut off at the roots. The formidable Si-
mone Veil took advantage of her White House talks to 
bend the ear of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's 
in-house hardliner, saying, "Many European countries 
want to adopt positions different from the United States 
so as not to put an end to all dialogue with the  Soviet 
Union." And, so she said, Brzezinski quite accepted this. 
Jenkins found in his  earlier talks that the only area 
in which the US Administration wanted the Community 
to move further was on export credit to the Soviet Union. 
It has been an old gripe of the United States that some 
European governments subsidize their export credit in-
terest rates below internationally agreed guidelines. (In 
fact, US officials say France is the only current offender 
here.) Now, the United States evidently wants to use the 
Afghan crisis to get this cleared up. 
BUT  THE BURNING QUESTION of the Moscow Olympic 
Games could not be ducked; and with both Jenkins and 
Cossiga assuming a fairly low public profile here, it was 
left to Veil to address it. She did so, most publicly, before 
an enthusiastic lunch gathering at the  National  Press 
Club. Noting that a majority of the European Parliament 
had recently urged the Games organizers to reconsider 
holding them in Moscow if the Russian occupation of 
Afghanistan continued, she reminded her audience that 
the Olympics and politics had always been mixed. She 
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recalled how Demosthenes had tried to block the Ma-
cedonians' taking part in  an Olympiad because Alex-
ander the Great had broken a truce with Athens.  Re-
flecting perhaps what she said was the one frustration 
of her present job - "as President of the Parliament, 
one cannot be a man or woman of action" - she  did 
not issue an outright call for a boycott of the games. 
That came later at a press conference when she  con-
ceded,  "I personally would today be  against going  to 
Moscow."  She  urged,  however,  procrastination  on a 
decision until the last possible moment - in the  hope 
that the situation in Afghanistan could change. 
But what Veil said at the Press Club was quite enough 
for her audience, which gave her a big hand. It was also 
more  than  enough  for  one  member  of the  23-strong 
European Parliament delegation, Maurice Martin, a 
French Communist, who resigned from the  delegation 
in a huff, citing Veil's "grave and inadmissible" behavior 
in straying into an area in which the Community had 
no established competence. As  Veil, a  former  health 
minister in the Giscard Government and introduced at 
the Press Club as the "future Thatcher" of France, knew 
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well,  the Olympics issue is  deeply controversial in her 
own country. 
The broad issues of East-West relations and detente 
with the Soviet Union were also explored more widely 
in  the  three  meetings  between  the  delegations  of the 
Parliament and US Congress- the latter chaired jointly 
by  Representatives  Don Pease  (0-0hio), Larry Winn 
(R-Kansas), and Sam Gibbons (0-Florida). Other topics 
included the related issue of human rights (the internal 
exile of Andrei Sakharov was much on people's minds), 
the international narcotics traffic, and policies towards 
the Third World (which through the various Lome Con-
vention aid programs figures high on the EC agenda). 
Although this was the sixteenth US-EC parliamentary 
exchange - two a year since 1972 - it was the  first 
since last summer's direct elections to the European Par-
liament. Striking was the increased standing that the US 
Congressmen  (and Senators)  now  accorded  their  Eu-
ropean counterparts, representing 260 million Europe-
ans.  As  Pease  put it in  his  weekly newsletter to Ohio 
constituents, the European Parliament is  now in Amer-
ican eyes "an increasingly important factor" in the trans-atlantic dialogue, and its members now "have the self-
confidence that comes from having been elected in their 
own right." 
Not lost on Congress was the keen European interest 
in seeing  the  United  States  develop  a  more thorough 
energy conservation and alternative fuel  policy.  Veil 
bluntly reminded Americans that they used twice as 
much  energy  per head  as  Europeans - admittedly a 
refrain taken up by many EC officials passing through 
Washington. That the message was aimed at Congress 
was  pertinent,  however,  because  Congress  has  yet to 
give final approval to some of President Carter's energy 
projects. 
The more mundane, "bread-and-butter" EC-US trade 
issues are always present- Iran-Afghanistan or no-
and Jenkins and the US officials he conferred with (from 
President Carter to Reub  in Askew, the US  trade nego-
tiator, and Philip Klutznick, the US commerce secretary) 
agreed that the free-trade impetus from last year's sue-
Italian Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga, also current head of the EC 
Council, was one of  three Europeans to meet with President Carter in jan-
uary. © UPI 
Speaker of  the House Thomas P.  O'Neill Jr.  with President of  the Euro-
pean Parliament Simone Veil.  Photo by  Vince  Finnigan &  Associates 
cessful General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade nego-
tiations had to be  continued into the difficult year of 
1980, with US  Presidential elections and slower growth 
in the international economy giving possibly freer vent 
to protectionism. 
Important to preserving this impetus were the high-
level  trade talks Askew  was to hold later in  Brussels. 
Basically, each side had one big complaint. US steel com-
panies loudly criticized their inadequate protection against 
what they saw as cut-price European steel imports and 
threatened anti-dumping suits in the courts.  European 
artificial fiber  manufacturers had, for  their part, been 
shouting about the rise of US fiber exports to the Com-
munity,  helped,  they  argued,  by  the  cheaper and still 
controlled US  domestic oil  and gas  prices',  basic  feed-
stocks for the industry. The Community had threatened 
to impose countervailing duties on US  fibers. 
Time  will  tell  whether  these  mutual  grievances  are 
susceptible to a  classic Brussels  "horse trade" or not. 
But both Washington and Brussels need to avoid a dam-
aging  trade war when the greater issue  of the  West's 
political cohesion is  at stake. 
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Afghan crisis tests Atlantic alliance 
STEPHEN MILLIGAN, Brussels correspondent for  The Economist 
"WILL  YOU  BE  WITH  US  WHEN  THE  WAR  STARTS?" THAT 
was the question an American Congressman put to as-
tonished EC Commission President Roy Jenkins during 
a  visit to Washington just after the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan. Jenkins was  astonished  because  most 
Europeans-although shocked by the invasion-did not 
imagine that Word War III was just around the corner. 
And there was not the same degree of alarm in European 
capitals as in  Washington about the consequences of the 
brutal Soviet moves. 
Europe's interest in relations with Russia are some-
what different from those of the United States and justify 
a somewhat different response. But the initial reaction 
in  Europe was  both slow and,  as  an editorial in  The 
Times  of London put it, "bloody wet." The feeling  in 
many European capitals that US President Jimmy Carter 
had exaggerated the crisis for electoral reasons blinded 
some policymakers to the true dimensions of the crisis. 
The Community itself is  not a military organization, 
but it has important political and economic power. And 
its  collective  reaction  to  the  invasion  was  slow.  The 
Community is run like a railway timetable, and no dis-
aster can change its schedule of meetings. Over Christ-
mas and the New Year, EC institutions close down and 
work does not usually resume until mid-January.  The 
head of one EC delegation was holidaying in Dorset in 
southern England when he heard the news  of the  in-
vasion. He immediately cabled Brussels to see if he should 
return and was told that there was no  need  to  panic: 
No meeting of EC foreign ministers was planned for two 
weeks. So  he returned to his fireside. 
Although a  political  cooperation network links  the 
EC  Nine's foreign  offices,  no  one suggested an emer-
gency meeting of European leaders to discuss how best 
to react to the Soviet  aggression.  The result was  that 
governments reacted in very different ways, at first. Brit-
ain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher gave  her  full 
backing to President Carter's policy, while French Pres-
ident Valery Giscard d'Estaing and German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt,  although  condemning  the  Invasion, 
hinted that it should not end detente. 
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It  was not until mid-January that the EC Commission 
in Brussels took the initiative by proposing limits on EC 
food  exports  to  the  Soviet  Union  to  ensure  that  EC 
farmers did not fill  the gap left by  the American grain 
embargo. At the same time, under the aegis of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European al-
lies  began considering American suggestions for  sanc-
tions on exports of high technology and curbs on cheap 
loans to the Soviets. 
Seen from Brussels, two depressing things about Eu-
rope's reaction were that it was so  delayed and that all 
the debate was about how far the Community should 
go in supporting the Americans. The real question is  not 
whether the Community should support the Americans, 
but how it should best react to a grave threat to its own 
security. 
For the Soviet invasion is  a much bigger immediate 
threat to Europe than to the United States. No American 
city is surrounded on all sides by Soviets like Berlin. And 
if  the Soviets  moved into Iran or other  oil-producing 
states in the Gulf, Europe-with its far higher depend-
ence on oil imports than the United States-would be 
the first  to suffer.  So  Europe has  every  reason to  get 
tough  with  the  Kremlin,  quite  apart from  its  ties  of 
loyalty with the United States. 
UNFORTUNATELY THE THREE BIGGEST POWERS IN EUROPE-
Britain, France, and Germany-all have rather different 
views of the problem. Britain sees it in almost identical 
terms to the United States. The new Thatcher Govern-
ment was already growing skeptical about detente, and 
Thatcher is proud of her reputation as the "Iron Lady." 
In any case, despite its entry into the Community, Britain 
has remained the most pro-American state of the Nine. 
So there was no surprise when the British followed Pres-
ident Carter's lead and called for tough reprisals against 
the Russians, including a boycott of the Olympic Games. 
The  French  Government has  always  pursued  a  more 
independent policy toward Russia than others.  France 
likes to pride itself on its independence from the super-
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the NATO alliance.  France also does considerable trade 
with the Soviet Union and in  late January-following 
the completion of a pipeline-began to import its  first 
load of Russian gas.  (Indeed, a  ceremony to celebrate 
the first French village to be connected to the  Russian 
gas line had to be abruptly canceled.) France, like Ger-
many,  is  already importing considerable  quantities  of 
Russian oil:  6  million  tons in  1979, or 5  per cent of 
France's total oil imports. And although the Soviet Union 
is  only France's tenth biggest customer, taking a  mere 
2 per cent of French exports, trade has been expanding 
fast.  In 1979 French exports to the Soviets rose 42 per 
cent-in line  with the deal  between  President Giscard 
and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in June  1977, 
when they agreed to triple trade within four years.  So 
France is  naturally unenthusiastic for a trade war-not 
to mention any other kind of war. 
Germany's Soviet trade is even bigger, and its exports 
to all Eastern bloc countries are six times more impor-
tant, relative to gross national product, than America's 
exports to the same countries. But this is  not the main 
reason for German hesitations about how to react to the 
new Soviet aggression. Chancellor Schmidt has strongly 
advocated a  policy of detente with the East for  more 
than 15 years-dating back to the Ostpolitik launched 
b-y  then Chancellor Willy Brandt. Many countries have 
grown cynical about detente, because it has brought no 
concrete r.esults. But Germany is  one country that has 
seen  concrete benefits.  Trade between  East  and West 
Germany has become far easier, and many East Germans 
have been able to rejoin their families in the West. An-
other 200,000 ethnic Germans from  elsewhere  in  the 
Eastern bloc have been allowed to return to the German 
Federal Republic over the past seven years. And Berlin 
has ceased to be a focus of international tension. So  it 
was no wonder that Schmidt did not want to sabotage 
all these hard won benefits in an overly hasty reaction 
to events in Afghanistan. 
It was for these reasons that Europe's first  reactions 
were so confused and shaky. But uncertain governments 
then began to feel the pressure of European public opinion 
and of members of parliament, who demanded a tough 
reaction to the Soviets. So European opinion grew both 
tougher and more united. Thus: 
•  EC foreign ministers in mid-January launched a bitter 
verbal attack on the Russians. They described the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan as: "A flagrant interference 
in  the internal affairs of a nonaligned country ... and 
... a threat to peace, security, and stability in a region, 
including the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, and 
the Arab world." And they urged "the immediate  and 
unconditional withdrawal of all  foreign troops from 
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EC Commission to control all EC cereal exports to the 
Russians to ensure that European farmers did not raise 
their  exports  to  fill  the  gap  caused  by  the American 
embargo. And they suspended guaranteed butter sub-
sidies for exports to Russia. 
•  The European Parliament adopted a resolution at the 
same time condemning the Soviet action and requesting 
the EC Commission to review immediately all economic 
relations  between  the  Soviet  Union  and the Commu-
nity-especially in  the  field  of high  technology,  agri-
cultural products, and anti-dumping practices. It called 
on the international Olympic committee to reconsider 
whether the summer Olympic Games should take place 
in Moscow if the occupation of Afghanistan continued. 
•  Helmut Schmidt and Valery Giscard d'Estaing held 
a special summit in Paris in early February and agreed 
to a strongly worded denunciation of the Soviets: They 
called for an immediate withdrawal of troops from Af-
ghanistan and warned that if the Soviets continued an 
aggressive policy, detente would be destroyed. 
Thus, despite the slowness in reacting, most EC coun-
tries-including the independent-minded French-took 
a similar position to the United States. The Europeans 
are reluctant to completely junk detente;  for  the Ger-
mans  that would be unthinkable. But as  Italy's. Prime 
'  Minister Francesco Cossiga, the current president of the 
EC  Council,  put it,  "We want to  pursue a  policy  of 
aggressive  detente"  -for instance, showing up  the So-
viets' failures to keep agreements while still  indicating 
that Western Europe would prefer detente to a cold war. 
Moreover, the failure  of the Community to make a 
swifter response to the crisis inspired a British initiative 
by Foreign Minister Lord Carrington to seek to strengthen 
the Community's political cooperation network.  Lord 
Carrington wants to ensure that in a future crisis there 
would be automatic and immediate consultation among 
EC foreign ministers. 
At the time of writing, only two EC  governments-
the British and the Dutch-had come out for a boycott 
of the Olympics. Most others were hesitating, waiting 
to see what everyone else was going to do. The Germans, 
Belgians, and Italians said they would all back a boycott 
if  all  European  countries  joined in.  The  French were 
against a boycott-and a Paris Match opinion poll showed 
that 65  per cent of French  people thought the  games 
should go ahead in Moscow. But even in France, opinion 
was changing-especially since the arrest of Andrei Sak-
harov, the Soviet dissident.  European Parliament Pres-
ident Simone Veil, who is  French, announced during a 
visit to Washington that she personally favored an Olym-
pics boycott. Michel Rocard, the rival to  Fran~ois Mit-
terrand, leader of the French Socialists, suggested that 
EC Diplomatic Initiative 
The EC foreign ministers, at their February 19 
"political cooperation" meeting in Rome, pro-
posed "a neutral Afghanistan" that would "stay 
away from big power rivalry." 
US  Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, arriving in 
Europe the same day for consultations, responded 
favorably to the EC Nine's proposal. Earlier, at a 
Washington press conference, President Jimmy 
Carter had stated that "we would like to have a 
neutral Afghanistan." 
British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, who 
had suggested the EC strategy, said that guaran-· 
teeing Afghanistan's neutrality would enable the 
Soviets to withdraw without losing face  and that 
the Soviets should welcome such an opportunity if 
they were truthful in their claims that "they are 
occupying Afghanistan only to guarantee their 
own security." 
A proposed ministerial statement that would 
have favorably noted the European Parliament's 
resolution to boycott the Olympics was rejected. 
The Parliament's resolution of February 15 
asked not only the EC member countries to boy-
cott the Moscow Olympics but also the EC Com-
mission to embargo all exports of surplus com-
modities to the Soviet Union. A related resolution 
condemned measures taken against Soviet dissi-
dent Andrei Sakharov. 
"We beseech the nine [EC]  governments to 
show their disapproval in the face of Soviet 
oppression and aggression in Afghanistan by 
counseling their national Olympic committees to 
ask their teams and their athletes not to partici-
pate in the Moscow Olympic Games," the Parlia-
ment's resolution said. 
Present during the parliamentary debate was 
Commission Vice President Wilhelm Haferkamp, 
who restated the Commission's unstinting con-
demnation of Soviet aggression and support of 
basic human rights. Speaking personally and not 
officially (since the Olympics falls  outside the 
Commission's competence), Haferkamp recalled 
that in 1936, when the Games were held in Berlin, 
he was a schoolboy. In 1945, after the War, he 
met many Germans older than himself who had 
been persecuted by the Nazis. They told him that 
immediately after 1933 they still had hopes of 
support from the outside world to bring changes 
in the regime, but their hopes were annihilated in 
1936 when the world went to Berlin. 
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Afghan crisis. 
the Socialists ought to rethink their decision to oppose 
a  boycott. In Germany public opinion was moving in 
favor of a  boycott, supported by leaders of the oppo-
sition Christian Democrat Party. 
WHATEVER  HAPPENS  ABOUT  THE  OLYMPIC  GAMES,  many 
German leaders felt that there were more important ways 
in which the Community could act to limit Soviet power 
in the Middle East. The first reaction of Helmut Schmidt, 
on hearing the news of the Soviet invasion, was:  "This 
means we must do more to cement our links with Third 
World countries in the area." 
The Germans are naturally reluctant to send  troops 
abroad. Because of historical links  with  the Nazi era, 
no one is keen that the Germans should lead any military 
response to the Soviets. But the Germans are willing to 
provide increased economic aid to Western allies in the 
so-called "arc of crisis" around Afghanistan-and they 
may be  willing to provide more troops and arms  for 
NATO's defense of Germany in order to let American and 
British troops be redeployed in the Middle East. 
For  the  moment,  the  Germans  are  strongly  urging 
more EC links with countries that border the  Persian 
Gulf,  such as  Iran and Kuwait, and with Turkey and 
Yugoslavia. German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich 
Genscher recently completed a tour of the Gulf states, 
and he has proposed a special EC-Gulf economic agree-
ment, modeled on a recent deal between the Community 
and states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
10  EUR O PE March-April 1980 
(ASEAN). The agreement might, for example, provide for 
joint investment guarantees.  The EC countries would 
promise never to freeze  Gulf assets  in  Europe  (as  the 
United States froze Iranian assets in response to the hos-
tages  crisis).  In return, the Gulf states would promise 
not to nationalize EC investments in their countries. In 
addition, the two regions would try to strengthen po-
litical ties. 
The Germans are also pushing strongly for better EC 
links with Turkey. Back in  1963 the Turks signed an 
association agreement with the Community providing 
for trade and aid cooperation and leading to eventual 
membership in the Community. But the Turks felt that 
the agreement was getting too one-sided, as  the Com-
munity piled up a huge surplus in its trade with Turkey. 
And  EC  countries-notably Germany-grew  increas-
ingly reluctant to fulfill the Community's pledge to allow 
free  movement of Turkish workers in  the  Communi~y, 
when unemployment was rising fast. So for the last three 
years  the agreement has been  frozen.  The Turks have 
refused to cut tariffs  as  planned, and the Community 
has refused to remove barriers to Turkish immigration. 
Now  both  sides  are  trying to  mend  fences.  The new 
Turkish Government, led by Siileyman Demirel, is eager 
to restore relations with Europe, and the Europeans are 
anxious to stop Turkey from drifting into Soviet clutches 
after the invasion of Afghanistan. 
In early February Turkish and EC leaders met in Brus-
sels  and promised to open negotiations to restore  the 
association. The Community also indicated to the Turks 
that it would be willing to consult them on the  Com-
munity's political cooperation network when Balkan or 
Middle East policy  was  discussed.  And following  the 
sweeping economic reforms and the devaluation of the 
Turkish  currency  announced  by  the  Demirel  Govern-
ment, EC governments promised to consider new finan-
cial aid for Turkey. 
The Community is  also doing its  best to improve its 
ties with Yugoslavia. The fears about Marshal Josip Broz 
Tito's health-and the speculation that if he died, the 
Russians might seize the chance to invade the country-
have prompted the Community to move fast to sign  a 
new trade-and-aid deal with Yugoslavia. The deal  was 
bogged down for  months  because of argy-bargy  over 
imports of beef and other trivial issues. But the political 
urgency to keep  Yugoslavia attached to the West  has 
now dwarfed such trade worries. 
Seen  through  American  eyes,  these  EC  moves  may 
seem small beer.  But the Community is  not a  military 
organization-and has no troops at its  command. The 
Community is  primarily an economic grouping. But in 
today's world, economics and trade can be as powerful 
weapons as  cruise missiles-as the Organization of Pe-
troleum Exporting Countries has already shown. "THE ENDURING ATLANTIC 
FRIENDSHIP" 
SIR NICHOLAS HENDERSON, British Ambassador to the United States 
One of the  fears  that  the  European  Community  had 
when it first debated Britain's entry was that she would 
be little more than a "Trojan horse" for the Americans. 
Maybe  Britain,  the  argument  went,  was  too  wedded 
culturally and historically to the United States;  maybe 
those shared triumphs during the Second World War 
made it impossible, psychologically, for Britain to break 
that bond and force herself to turn toward an emerging 
Western Europe. 
That fear  was quickly  buried.  Britain  is  now  irrev-
ocably committed to the Community, yet at the  same 
time has maintained her Atlantic links-to the  benefit 
of all  the Community. Far from being a Trojan horse, 
Britain  has  used  her  traditional  relations  with  North 
America to strengthen and complement the links of the 
other Community countries. But then, the whole worry 
of an American economic domination of Europe, often 
voiced in the 1960's, seems an unnecessary one from the 
present perspective. What has happened is exactly what 
the founding fathers of Europe expected to happen: that 
Europe would make a spectacular postwar recovery and 
eventually begin to challenge the United States in eco-
nomic strength. 
There  have  been  some  voices  raised  in  the  United 
States about the Community becoming too strong eco-
nomically, but there is  a widespread recognition that an 
equalization of power is  in  the interests of both-and 
an awareness that cooperation is  essential  in  a  world 
that proves, yet again, to be perilous and unpredictable. 
Americans know full well that it is impossible for them 
to retreat into isolationism. Their decade of introspec-
tion is  over. On the one hand their international trade 
has increased dramatically;  on the other, they  are  for 
the first time in their history dependent on outsiders for 
a crucial raw material. A nation that has built a society 
in which a  car is  a  necessity is  reminded at every visit 
to the gasoline pump that it now imports nearly half of 
all  the oil it needs. Americans are having to develop  a 
seismic sensitivity to every rumble of discontent in every 
nook of the globe. The clerk working for a British in-
surance company in Wisconsin, the machinist in Georgia 
Britain's former Ambassador to Bonn and Paris and known for  his "Euro-
pean" views, Sir Nicholas Henderson was called out of retirement by 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to represent her new Government to 
Washington.  Courtesy British Embassy 
making zippers for a Japanese company, the engine maker 
involved in a contract with Airbus Industrie-all depend 
on foreigners for their jobs. 
What Winston Churchill wrote about the United States 
at the turn of the century-"to remain detached  from 
the preoccupations of others was rapidly becoming im-
possible"-and what Franklin D.  Roosevelt was to say 
in 1938-"we in the Americas are no longer a  faraway 
continent to which the eddies of controversies beyond 
the  seas  could  bring  no  interest  or no  harm"-were 
repeated by Margaret Thatcher last year:  "The Middle 
East and the Middle West," she put it,  "have become 
neighbors  and  will  remain  so,  uncomfortable  though 
they may on occasion find it." 
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Europe's share of rDe Nero defense budget has doubled in the last 10 years. Hete, NATO forces moue through
September.  a uvt
Oermany,  during war games  last
air; they and their allies outnumber us in Europe; their
men, their ships, and their arccraft appear even more
regularly in parts of the world where they have never
been seen before." r\nd this was said before the invasion
of Afghanistan, a supreme example of the kind of ad-
venturism  she feared, with the Soviets gambling on the
inability of the 'West to respond effectively.
IF THE sovIETS ARE GETTING MoRE wEAPoNS  and using
them on their neighbors, it would be folly for the West
not to produce more weapons and to modernize, par-
ticularly its long-range theater nuclear weapons.  There
has been a large increase in defense spending by the
European powers-in the last 10 years Europe's share
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's  (unro) de-
fense budget doubled from 20 per cent to 40 per cent.
This, maybe, is not widely enough known yet in the
United States-the fact that Europeans  are doing more
and more to defend themselves  and that a strong Europe
contributes to the securiry of the United States as well
as Europe itself. The present British Government, while
determined to cut back on government  expenditure gen-
erally, has increased its spending on defense.
Britain, the one European  member of NRro that com-
mits nuclear forces to the Atlantic alliance, will maintain
its strategic deterrent. It is important to Anglo-American
relations that both partners are involved in making de-
cisions when it comes to nuclear forces. It is also im-
portant to wider European-US military relations that
Western Europe should remain strong industrially  and
technologically, and should be able to Sell its military
and other advanced equipment in the American market.
With the increasing possibility of more Soviet expansion,
it is inevitable that the United States will find herself
Even in the Middle West, that fortunate part of the
nation where the inhabitants  are blessed with a rich soil
and a rich economy-where  if you say the word "depres-
sion," they used to ioke that you must be talking about
a low part on the plains-isolationism finally died with
the growth of the grain rrade with the Soviet union.
Individualism, certainly, is still a characteristic,  but
Americans show a sophisticated  awareness that more
and more, their incomes and their quality of life may
come to depend on a curt handshake in a distant capital,
gunfire at the Khyber Pass, or the second coming (or
third or fourth) of the Mahdi.
In this kind of world, Americans and Europeans' to-
gerher with other allies such as the Canadians and the
Japanese,  have to confer and cooperate, whether it be
about Afghanistan and East-West relations, the world
monetary system, energy' nonproliferation,  or the ne-
cessity of keeping all markets nonprotectionist.
The American pubtic hasbecome more knowledgeable
about the European Community, but, after the usual
polite questions, it is obvious that defense is the issue
that concerns them most about Western Europe. George
F. Kennan wrote in 1951 that the Russians look forward
to a "duel of infinite duration" and that the Americans'
response musr be that of a "long-term, patient but firm,
vigilant containment  of Russian expansive  tendencies."
Thatcher has continually  emphasized that-that the
military balance of power has shifted in Europe because
of the increased spending  by the Soviets. In October of
last year she warned that the Soviet armies in Europe
were organized  and trained for attack, and two months
later in a speech in New York warned again that the
Soviets "expand their armed forces on land, sea, and
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On NATO's geopolitical flank, armed Soviet troops repair their ieep on a Kabul street during the military invasion of Afghanistan.<  UP! 
even  more  tightly  involved  with  the  Community and 
other NATO members. 
The gains the Community has made are appreciated 
in Washington. Americans are sometimes impatient with 
its slow-moving nature; it takes too long making deci-
sions and often seems to spend too much time disputing 
the  "butter mountain," the fate  of sheepmeat, or  the 
amount of money each member puts into the Com-
munity  budget.  We  remind  the  Americans,  gently  of 
course, that sometimes their legislation takes an age 
before a compromise is  reached, and point out that in-
ternal disagreements are inevitable-important, cer-
tainly, but they must be seen only as family arguments. 
It is  understood that the  Community is  often able  to 
forge a common approach to foreign  policy, yet at the 
same time there is  no question of Europe becoming a 
super-state. "Centralization has been the thing most for-
eign  to the English  temperament," wrote John  Stuart 
Mill, and the present Conservative Government would 
only add "Amen." 
The concept of a  European  Parliament is  one that 
Americans instantly respond to-sensing that it  is  a 
movement  in  the  direction  of "real"  democracy.  We 
point out, gracefully of course, that it took the Americans 
136 years before they got around to electing their sen-
ators  directly,  while  it  only  took West  Europeans 26 
years to create a directly elected Parliament. 
That the enlargement of the  Community to include 
Spain, Portugal, and Greece, as well as being politically 
astute, enriches, enlivens, and adds flavor to the  orga-
nization is  also understood in  the United States.  Spain 
and Portugal, two nations which have historically looked 
westward and whose influence in  the Western  Hemi-
sphere was muted for so long, should, as full  EC  mem-
bers,  be  able  to  act as  sympathetic  brokers  to  Latin 
America-a continent within  the  American  sphere  of 
influence but whose peoples are also increasingly eager 
for contacts with Europe. Greece, that "small rocky is-
land at the far end of southeastern Europe," as  Helen 
Vlachos, the Athenian publisher, calls it, which has "never 
belonged to any family of nations, to any ethnic group" 
is now prepared to take a deep breath and join one. And 
don't forget,  she reminds us,  that about 30 years ago, 
the United States came with arms, with money, and with 
moral support and "saved us from sliding into the misery 
of Soviet domination." (See Europe, November-Decem-
ber 1979, No. 216.) 
The need for closeness between the United States and 
the Community is  apparent at every turn. Both are vul-
nerable because we depend on others for raw materials. 
Both can at times suffer from similar social weaknesses-
inflation,  terrorism,  public  dissension  that can  some-
times weaken the political w'ill.  But we share the same 
strengths, too, that run strong and deep. Both are stable, 
both sturdily democratic,  both are  able to  respond to 
the needs of the people and to change when necessary 
without revolution and convulsions. Both are strong 
economically.  Both  have  journalists  and  broadcasters 
who put out "real" news as  objectively as  possible and 
who are allowed to investigate and criticize.  Both are 
genuinely concerned to use their assets for the good of 
other countries and peoples.  Both realize  that  friends 
may differ, but that a different approach sometimes has 
benefits. Both know that one of the greatest bulwarks 
against dangers that we share is  the enduring Atlantic 
friendship. 
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disagree on virtually 
everything. 
With one 
notable exception. 
Rub two French minds together, and 
you're apt to spark an argument. That's true 
whether the subject is economic theory. 
political parties, fine food, wine, or love. 
Understanding this, it's astonishing that 
9S'o of the French working population agree 
on anything?" But they do. 
Nineteen of every twenty agree that 
Le Monde is France's most interesting 
newspaper. 
What's true for the masses of French 
readers is true for the classes, as well. 95'o 
of all French opinion leaders also name 
Le Monde as France's most interesting 
newspaper. 
These stunning statistics underline a 
point understood by knowledgeable media 
planners. That Le Monde is, in a sense, far 
more than a national newspaper. It is a 
national institution. With impact and influ-
ence seldom achieved by any publication in 
any nation. 
Small wonder Le Monde is the first choice 
of financial advertisers. With overwhehning 
acceptance at every level of French life. and 
with nearly 60'o of the paper's 1.4 million 
readers concentrated in Paris, Le Monde is the 
obvious way to cover the French financial 
community effectively and efficiently. 
Now it's easy to place your finan<;ial 
advertising in Le Monde, whether you're if) 
New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, or any other 
world capital. Simply call your nearest DJIMS 
office. And we'll handle all the details for you. 
Remember, there have been five French 
republics. 
But only one Le Monde. 
Represented by DJIMS/Dow Jones International Marketing Services. 
IN THEUS  22 Cortlandt Street. New York NY 10007. (212) 285-5472: 514 Shatto Place. Los Angeles CA 90020. 
(213} 385-4351: 220 Battery Street. San Francisco CA 94111 . (415) 433-3200; advert1s1ng representatives 1n other maJor 
c1t1es throughout the world 
*Excluding those Jiving in rural areas and unskilled workers.  Source: Corporate Advertising in France, 1976. Copyright, Dow J~nes & Company, Inc. 1979. All rights reserved. ESSAY 
EUROPE ASTRAY: PART II 
WALTER LAQUEUR 
The first part of the author's essay appeared in  the previous (january/Feb-
ruary 1980) issue of Europe. Walter Laqueur divides his time between 
Washington, as  chairman of the International Research Council of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, 
and London, as director of the Institute of Contemporary History and 
Wiener Library. 
WHAT  MAKES  EUROPE'S  FOREIGN  POLICY PROBLEMS  SO 
difficult  to  tackle  is  not the  enormity of the  military 
threat, but the lack of a sense of urgency when facing a 
clear threat to survival. Some Americans have advised 
their  European  friends,  echoing  President Franklin 
Roosevelt, that they have little to fear but fear itself. Such 
reassurance has its value in international relations, as in 
psychotherapy, although not everything is simply a mat-
ter of perception. If, for instance, a patient happens to 
have a broken leg, psychological assurance alone will not 
make him walk. Given West·  European proclivities, the 
advice  of benign neglect with regard to  defense  is  the 
worst possible advice  that Europe could receive  at the 
present time-with the possible exception of the counsel 
not to save energy. 
To select at random two of the voices  against mag-
nifying the dangers: George Kennan has admonished his 
European friends that "the assumptions with relation to 
Soviet strength are as exaggerated as are those that relate 
to Western European weakness. The belief that stronger 
powers dominate weaker ones and dictate terms to them 
simply by the possession of superior military force, or by 
demands placed under threat of the use of such force, has 
extremely  slender  support in  histori~al experience." 
Another but similar  message  has  been conveyed  by 
others:·  "If  you paint the Russians as 10 feet tall, you have 
accomplished the basic purpose of Soviet foreign policy 
without them having to  lift a  finger." It is  useful,  no 
doubt, to be reminded from time to time that the Russians 
are not 10 feet tall, but they still have a lot of tanks and 
other hardware and continue their buildup at a consid-
erably faster rate than the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO). Or, to put it differently, the core of the 
problem is not Soviet power, but Europe's lack of it; the 
Russians may be only six feet tall, but the Europeans are 
even shorter. 
Concerning the danger of Finlandization, however, it 
might be  argued with some justification that as long as 
there is  NATO, and as long as the United States does not 
fall too far behind the Soviet Union, Western Europe will 
not be subjected to strong Soviet pressure, nor will it lose 
Photo by Ricarda Schwerin, Jerusalem 
its freedom and independence. As  for the "slender his-
torical evidence"  -that  stronger powers do not dominate 
weaker ones-it  would be wise not to put it to a test. It  is, 
of course, perfectly true that the United States has not 
dominated Cuba for the last 20 years. But then Cuba had 
a  determined  leadership  and a  reliable  and powerful 
protector,  and faced  a weak,  confused,  and irresolute 
America. It is  unlikely, to provide an illustration, that a 
Soviet minister would have welcomed European military 
intervention  in  Angola  as  a  positive  contribution  to 
stabilizing the situation. 
It could be  argued, furthermore,  that even a neutral 
Europe  would remain  independent,  provided  its  neu-
trality  is  credible  and  based  on  strength  rather  than 
weakness. But this would involve much closer coopera-
tion among the countries of Europe and also  a  much 
greater defense effort. The problem again is not the mag-
nitude  of the  threat,  but the  mixture  of lethargy  and 
hypochondria that has afflicted Europe in the 1970's, the 
centrifugal pressures, the constant emphasis on national 
intere~t narrowly interpreted, which has its corollary in a 
lack of courage and moral fiber. In recent years whenever 
Europe has had to face a challenge or an external threat, 
there has been impotent handwriting-but little action. 
To put it mildly and not to use  the ugly term "appease-
ment," there are many signs of a mood of accommoda-
tion in Europe. 
It may be  said that while such behavior is  not very 
courageous, the policy of "accommodation," of taking a 
low profile, is applied by European governments toward 
the  Organization of Petroleum Exporting  Countries 
(OPEC)  no less  than vis-a-vis  the  Eastern bloc; the mo-
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facing British or French foreign policy are discussed, the 
argument that  recurs,  all  too  often,  is  that countries 
whose economic  survival  depends  on the  goodwill of 
others have to adjust their policies accordingly; they have 
to be morally neutral and should not wait for a threat or 
an ultimatum, but rather shape their policies in such a 
way as to prevent the occurrence of these situations. Such 
behavior has occurred at all times among many people, 
and it would perhaps be  easier to  accept if the fear of 
angering a powerful neighbor or a wealthy client did not 
appear behind a mask of superior political wisdom and 
even self-righteousness. 
WHAT HAS  BEEN  ~AID ABOUT EUROPEAN ATTITUDES vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union and the danger of Finlandization 
also  applies,  of course,  mutatis  mutandis  to  Europe's 
position vis-a-vis the United States and to its dependence 
on the oil-producing countries. There is  no good reason 
why European foreign  policy  should  be  made  in  the 
White House and the State Department, or why Euro-
pean defense  policy  should  depend  on the  Pentagon. 
There is  something profoundly unhealthy in such a re-
lationship. Even if Europe  is  not able  to  defend itself 
entirely without American help, the extent of Europe's 
dependence could be substantially reduced. 
Such dependence was, of course, inevitable in the im-
mediate postwar period when much of Europe was in 
ruins. More than three decades after the end of the war, 
with  more  manpower at its  disposal  than the  United 
States, and greater industrial production, there is no ob-
jective  reason why Europe should be  so  vulnerable to 
pressure  from  outside  and so  dependent on America, 
except, of course,  the belief in Europe that the Conti-
nent's constitution is not robust enough to undergo such 
intolerable exertions. Alternatively,  it has  been argued 
that it should not even try, for Europe's mission is not in 
the  field  of power politics,  rather  it  is  to  be  a  great 
"civilian power." 
If it  tried  to  emulate the  two superpowers,  Europe 
would lose its soul; if,  on the other hand, it works for 
peace and greater social justice, it can be a beacon of hope 
for all mankind. These are noble sentiments, but out of 
place in a  sinful world in which political and military 
power is still decisive. For unless Europe can defend itself 
and regain a greater degree of independence, it will never 
be in a position to carry out its mission. All past experi-
ence shows that dynamic, self-confident societies are ca-
pable of coping with their domestic and foreign problems 
at one and the same time. Those who claim that societies 
would collapse under the burden, that domestic reform 
programs can be undertaken or expanded only if defense 
spending is radically cut, are either looking for an alibi for 
inaction or want to reduce defense spending for political 
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reasons. No striking social reforms, no selfless help for 
poor "Third World" countries should be expected them. 
These manifestations of weakness, it has been argued, 
are unpleasant, but how dangerous are they? At the pres-
ent time direct foreign interference in the domestic affairs 
of any European country would not be tolerated. Euro-
pean political parties and their leaders do not need the 
stamp of Soviet approval; and, seen in this light, Europe 
has not been Finlandized yet, nor has it,been bought by 
the owners of the new wealth. But time does not stand 
still and what is  true today will not necessarily be  true 
some years hence. If  Europe's decline continues, the ten-
dency  towards  accommodation  may  turn  into  full-
fledged appeasement, or worse. 
Optimists will  argue that since  a  military attack on 
Europe is highly improbable, and the imposition of direct 
political control not much more likely,  all  that can be 
expected is more of the same-an even lower European 
profile,  and frequent professions of friendship  toward 
those who threaten Europe. Such optimism rests on the 
assumption that the distintegration of Europe will  not 
proceed beyond a certain point, and that, in any case, 
there will still be the American safety net on which to fall 
back. And if such a  state of affairs lasts long enough, 
perhaps  the  threats  may  diminish  or  disappear  al-
together, for those threatening Europe from the outside 
are not immune to political and economic upheaval. 
These suppositions may be borne out by future events, 
but not one of them can be taken for granted. At the very 
least, such speculation is  dangerous. Only professional 
gamblers would bet on their own survival against such 
odds.  Most human beings would make every  possible 
exertion to reduce the risks. Yet what is true of  Europeans 
as individuals does not apparently apply to them collec-
tively. The laws of individual psychology are not those of 
crowd psychology; hence the willingness to take unac-
ceptable risks, the willingness to let things slide instead of 
making the effort to reduce the risks to the survival of free 
institutions in Europe. 
These,  in  brief,  were  the  long-term  prospects  for 
Europe as  the Seventies ended, and little  has changed. 
There have been certain ups and downs, and if the rise of 
European currencies in comparison with the dollar were 
a true yardstick of Europe's ability to stand on its own 
feet and to defend itself if necessary, there would be much' 
ground for self-congratulation. Unfortunately, Europe is 
as vulnerable as ever before in many respects-its energy 
supply is just one example, yet no common energy policy 
has emerged. The issue at stake is not, of  course, Europe's 
survival, but survival on what level of in<1ependence and 
self-respect? Most of the weaknesses of liurope are self-
inflicted, the problems facing it are not insurmountable, 
the solution does not involve rare wisdom and superhu-
man efforts, only common sense and political will. NEW ISSUES 
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EXPORTING ETHICS 
U.S.  seeks to internationalize its Corrupt Practices Act 
SANDRA FEUSTEL, assistant editor of the New York-based newsletter Business International 
HOW MUCH  GREASE  MUST  CROSS  THE  PALM  OF  A  GOV-
ernment official  before a  corporate executive is  called 
on the carpet for offering a bribe? When the brother of 
a  Gulf sheikh  demands a  large  commission  before he 
okays a contract, does that constitute extortion?  Does 
a duck a  !'orange at Maxim's tempt a government official 
to sign on the dotted line, and will  a new gold  watch 
at today's prices persuade a sluggish bureaucrat to cut 
that extra length of red tape? 
The issue of corporate bribery and extortion is rapidly 
becoming one of the most troublesome intangibles  of 
international business. The United States views such 
questionable practices  as  criminal  activities  subject  to 
prosecution, while many Europeans say  that publicity 
and scandal are enough to deter the most flagrant wrong-
doers. So sensitive is the topic that a crop of euphemisms 
have sprung up to describe  this  whole gray  area.  De-
pending on who you are and what country or interna-
tional organization you represent, bribery and extortion 
can be termed anything from grease, questionable pay-
ments,  foreign  corrupt practices,  secret  commissions, 
illicit payments, and the most innocuous tag of them all, 
added incentives. 
Public tales of corporate bribery first came to the fore 
with reports of International Telegraph and Telephone's 
(ITT)  influence in Chile and Lockheed's improper deal-
ings in Japan and Iran. But even though over 300 US 
companies have since  admitted to taking or receiving 
bribes in the course of their international transactions, 
such revelations have not received the public attention 
they once did. This is  because most US  firms  have  in-
stituted stricter internal accounting procedures to mon-
itor these payments in response to a US law, the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which makes it a criminal 
offense to engage in such activities. 
The spotlight has since  shifted  across  the ocean  to 
Europe, where high-level government officials have been 
chastised for  doling out millions of dollars in  payoffs 
to ensure foreign contracts. One of the most prominent 
of these cases  occurred last summer and involved  the 
brother of King  Baudouin of Belgium,  Prince  Albert. 
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Newspapers linked the Prince with a hospital project in 
Saudi Arabia. A Belgian  firm  with which he  was con-
nected, Eurosystem Hospitalier, was accused of paying 
a Saudi over $200 million in order to secure the contract. 
More recently another European firm, the Italian state-
owned Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi  (ENI)  also  became 
embroiled in a scandal with the Saudis, and paid for it 
dearly.  When  Italian  newspapers  learned  that an  un-
authorized commission had been  paid by  an ENI  exec-
utive  to a  high-level  official  of the Saudi  oil  firm,  Pe-
tromin, the disclosure so  angered the Saudis that they 
canceled a sizable oil supply contract with Italy, leaving 
it to scramble for alternate supplies. 
The US  Government would like to export its  brand 
of morality, the FCPA, to Europe- but not because  it 
is  altruistically motivated to stamp out bribery around 
the world. The United States has found that by standing 
alone on this issue, American firms are losing out com-
petitively to European firms  which  are  not so  queasy 
about the fine  distinctions between a bribe and a com-
mtsston. 
Many US  companies  contend  that they  are  not  as 
troubled with the idea of upgrading US  standards on 
bribery - some say the  FCPA has cut down the snow-
balling of such  payments in  a  bidding situation - as 
they are with the ambiguity of the act. No one is  quite 
clear  what constitutes  a  foreign  corrupt practice  and 
who is  accountable. For instance, it is  taboo to pay a 
"public officer" a  fee  for his services  as  a third  party, 
but lower-level bureaucrats are thought to be exempt. 
In some cases,  corporate executives are accountable if 
they have "reason to know" of an illegal payment. Com-
pany accountants are plagued with requirements to  re-
port any gifts "of value," which could mean anything 
from a  $200,000 check to a set of gold cuff links. To 
further compound the confusion, two different govern-
ment entities, the Department of Justice
1 
and the Secu-
rities  and  Exchange  Commission,  are  ~iven equal  re-
sponsibility for enforcement but interpret the law 
differently. Proposed legislation would attempt to clear 
up the act's ambiguities without watering down its con-tents. At present the stakes for violation of the FCPA are 
high-up to $1 million in fines and five years in prison. 
The most bitter complaints come from  the US  con-
struction and aviation industries. They claim  that the 
act creates real problems in those countries that require 
the use of an agent or third party to secure a contract. 
In  some  Middle  Eastern  countries  the  only  available 
agents  are  connected  with  the  royal  families  - thus 
technically "public officials" and off-limits to US  busi-
nessmen. Such complaints lump the FCPA together with 
a  whole  bundle  of US  export disincentives  including 
foreign tax laws, anti-boycott legislation, and the short-
age of export financing credits-which precipitated the 
parent alternative open to the United States is  to push 
other countries to adopt its same tough standards. It has 
thus embarked on a strategy of exporting the FCPA by 
promoting the  drafting of an  international  treaty  on 
illicit payments under the auspices of the United Nations. 
Europeans who have seen this kind of missionary ac-
tivity directed toward them before in the guise of anti-
trust laws  and environmental-impact statements have 
so far managed to hold such negotiations in rhetorical 
limbo. They see the US  attempt to internationalize the 
FCPA as  part of a growing American pattern of extra-
territorial encroachment: Once the US  Congress legis-
lates some tough regulations  for  American companies 
Treasury Secretary C. William  Miller (le(t)-at the center of controuersy regarding his  former company's ouerseas  payments-talks with Senate Banking 
Committee  Chairman Sen.  William  Proxmire. , !';  Ul'l 
US  plunge to fifth and sixth place in such lucrative mar-
kets as the Middle East and Asia. Because of the sensitive 
nature of these  allegations, however, few  companies 
have stepped forward to offer any concrete proof that 
the FCPA  has actually cost them business. 
US OFFICIALS ARE FACED WITH A DILEMMA. Other countries 
do not have the same attitude internally on the issue of 
foreign  bribery nor the same drive  to bring such  pay-
ments under the heading of a criminal offense.  At  the 
same time  Congress finds  it politically  impalatable to 
drop a bill banning corruption. Therefore  the only ap-
and their foreign affiliates to follow,  the State Depart-
ment feels  compelled to try to do the same so US  com-
panies are not penalized competitively. 
The United States has  pushed hard for  a  treaty  for 
about three years. Europeans have given their tacit sup-
port but, nonetheless, have reservations about wharshould 
be  included.  The  French  proposed that the  treaty  be 
somewhat limited in its  jurisdiction and follow the pat-
tern of the aviation, hijacking, and sabotage conventions 
of 1970 and 1971. Such  treaties stress the  extradition 
of offenders, rather than setting standards for national 
EUR O PE March-April1980  19 criminal legislation. The United Kingdom felt that both 
sides,  the company and  the  public  official,  should be 
held responsible for a crime, and feared that if it pros-
ecuted on its end, some developing countries would not 
follow suit. 
Indeed the question of who initiates the wrongdoing 
became sticky in the course of the United Nations (UN) 
negotiations. Much debate centered on the definition of 
a  public official  and who should be  held  responsible. 
The developing countries resisted the notion that anyone 
besides multinational corporations should be liable for 
an infraction and last summer employed a stalling tactic 
to link  the  illicit  payments treaty with  progress  on  a 
slower-moving general code of conduct governing a wide 
range of multinational business activities. The Europe-
ans supported the move, and the illicit payments treaty 
now lies on the back burner of the UN agenda. 
So  now the United States  is  trying,  thus  far  unsuc-
cessfully,  to promote international action through the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
merit (  OECD). The OECD has had a voluntary set of guide-
lines for companies to follow in the areas of international 
investment and labor relations since  1976, but has  so 
far steered clear of the issue of bribery and corruption. 
Some companies feel  that in the long run the contro-
versy  over illicit payments will  die  down and become 
a non-issue. In support of this view, they cite a number 
of new developments:  On the corporate side, internal 
monitoring and individual corporate codes of ethics will 
increasingly rule out the practice of offering a bribe to 
get  the  edge  on  a  lucrative  deal.  In  some  developing 
countries, particularly those where Islamic influence is 
on the rise, government officials will be keeping a close 
watch on these activities - disclosure of graft in  high 
places can spell  the demise of a  national leader or his 
cabinet. As a result, say these optimists, companies will 
instead turn to innovative financing schemes and other 
lures to make sure they come out on top. Some already 
negotiated agreements call  for  future exploration and 
development of sectors that a country wishes to exploit. 
Others include long-term loans at concessionary rates. 
Since governments can naturally offer more than private 
firms in this area, it is now foreign governments growing 
support of their companies' exports that US  firms con-
sider to be the most questionable practice of all. 
ITT lobbyist Dita Beard (hospital /Jed right) testifies  before a Senate Judiciary sulJCommittee in  Denver during  197  2 investigations of ITT's "influence-
peddling'' in  Chile.  •0  UPI 
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Increasing importance raises economic.  and political questions 
HOWARD BANKS, West Coast correspondent for  The Economist 
EVERY  SECOND  OR THIRD  DAY,  A  PURPOSE-BUILT  CAR 
transporter slips under the Golden Gate Bridge into San 
Francisco Bay and disgorges another load of brand new 
Toyotas, Datsuns, or some other Japanese car import. 
It happens at the same sort of rate in Los Angeles.  In 
the first nine months of 1979, two new Japanese cars 
were sold in California for every three new American-
made ones. Toyota sold almost as  many cars in Cali-
fornia in that time as  near-broke Chrysler. 
No, this·  is  not another discussion of the wonders of 
the Japanese car industry.  Rather, it is  an  illustration 
that from the West Coast of America, the will-o'-the-
wisp concept of the Pacific Basin as  a trading area has 
some apparent substance. It doesn't really exist, of course. 
There is  too great a diversity in the countries involved 
- from  the United  States  to  Indonesia,  for  example 
- and a  vast geographical spread. It is  further  from 
Wellington, New Zealand, to Anchorage, Alaska, than 
it is  from. Tokyo to Brussels.  And in. more ways than 
one. 
The Pacific Basin concept is a convenient way of par-
celing a growing trade problem for the world's indus-
trialized nations, however, as pointed out at a recent EC 
seminar by Tony Albrecht, who runs the East Asian and 
Pacific Bureau at the US  State Department. By  lumping 
together all  the· nations that are his  bureau's concern, 
he came up with the following startling statistic: In 1978, 
America's  total trade,  imports  plus  exports,  with the 
dozen nations involved exceeded for the first time 
America's total trade with Western Europe. The gap was 
tiny,  but given  the high growth rates - and growing 
populations - of many of the countries in  East Asia, 
the gap cah be  expected to widen.  As  it does,  it  will 
begin to have a profound effect on the foreign relations 
between these countries and the United States  and, 
by implication, on the relative importance of Western 
Europe in American policies. 
What has happened between America and the polyglot 
of nations Albrecht handily lumped together is  broadly 
in line with the changing pattern of trade generally. The  Bulk bales of  tea are sealed and weighed before shipment from West java. 
newly  industrialized  COUntries  (NIC's)  and the less-de- World Bank  Photo  hy Thomas Sennett 
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become more important traders.  In  1978 each of the 
three  big industrialized  groups  of countries  (North 
America,  Western  Europe,  and Japan)  sent a  greater 
proportion of their exports to lesser developed countries 
(NIC's  and LDC's)  than to the other big two groupings 
combined, according to  the latest General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  report. 
What about the European Community's trade with 
the East Asian countries? While trade with the group 
of countries selected by  Albrecht has been growing in 
absolute terms, it still does not outweigh the total EC 
trade with the United States. In 1978 the United States 
-still the Community's single most important trading 
partner - accounted for around 14 per cent of total 
external  trade with  the  Community, while  the  dozen 
countries  in  the  East Asian  group  accounted  for  just 
under 11 per cent. This share of the total EC trade with 
East Asia has not changed much since 1973. 
But this obscures some worrying trends for the Com-
munity.  Imports from  the  12 countries have  been  in-
creasing their share of total EC imports. But EC exports 
to them have been decreasing as  a  share of the  Com-
munity's total external exports. Geography may be against 
Europe, but it would seem that the historic links between 
East Asia and European countries (such as  France, the 
Netherlands, and Britain)  are not being taken full  ad-
vantage of. 
There has,  however,  been  a  noticeable  increase  re-
cently in the official interest being paid to East Asia by 
both America and the European Community. This has 
been particularly so for  the burgeoning Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) group. There have been 
high-level  meetings  with  US  Secretary  of State  Cyrus 
Vance, for example. And the Community approved in 
mid-December a cooperation pact with the group, hav-
ing earlier also held top-level meetings of foreign  min-
isters (all nine from the Community and all  five  of the 
Pacific Trade with  U.S. 
Exports  US Trade (in $billions) 
ASEAN countries). The Community also gives preferential 
trade status to many countries in the area as part of its 
general policy toward the developing world. 
ONE DIFFICULTY IN SETTING A BROAD  POLICY for the area 
is the variance in the economic and political development 
of the countries involved. Japan, for  instance, is  well-
established as a global trader comparable to the Com-
munity and dominates trade in the region. Japan is  the 
most important total trading partner of Thailand, In-
donesia,  Malaysia,  and  China;  the  largest  supplier to 
Singapore, the Philippines, South Korea, and Hong Kong; 
the largest customer of Australia. The United States is 
Japan's  largest  single  trading  partner and  the  largest 
customer for the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong,  and Singapore.  The  Community  is  the  largest 
trading partner only of New Zealand. 
There has  been  a  lot of speculation  about China's 
future role as a trading nation since it rejoined the rest 
of the world.  But,  as  last summer's announcement -
that its modernization plans had been slowed down 
- showed, that speculation was premature. China lost 
a generation of technically trained people in the cultural 
revolution. Chinese determination to do things in a Chinese 
fashion  means that industrialization has to wait until 
sufficfent people are trained. So in broad terms the trad-
ing pattern that occurred in 1978, where 70 per cent of 
the Chinese exports went to other Asian nations, seems 
likely to continue. There have been, however, some signs 
of change; for example, American exports to China have 
been increasing: In the first seven months of 1979, they 
were $1  billion, against $874 million for the whole of 
1978. 
Australia and New Zealand are rapidly switching away 
from Europe to trading with their Pacific neighbors. In 
1978 two-thirds of the exports from Australia and over 
half from New Zealand went to other countries in  the 
East Asian-cum-Pacific grouping (including America and 
Canada).  Imports  from  that group  of countries ac-
Imports  US Trade (in $billions) 
With  1978  1977  1  977-78 percentage  1978  1977  1977-78 percentage 
WORLD  143.7  121.2  18.5  172.0  147.6 
EAST ASIA  28.9  22.9  26.0  47.6  37.2 
(ASEAN)  (4.6)  (3.9)  (18.8)  (7.9)  (7.1) 
WESTERN EUROPE  39.9  34.8  15.0  36.5  27.7 
(EC)  (32.1)  (27.1)  (18.3)  (29.0)  (22.2) 
East Asia group here includes: JAPAN,  AUSTRALIA,  NEW ZEALAND,  SOUTH KOREA,  TAIWAN,  HONG KONG,  CHINA, and 
ASEAN (Singapore, Malaysia,  Thailand,  Indonesia,  the  Philippines). 
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The chart, an  extension of  an  original idea  by Battelle Institute Fellow james Huntley, shows that there are none of the formal links (that also allow 
valuable informal contacts) between most of the East Asian countries  and the established industrial world. 
counted for over half the total in 1978 for both countries. 
The newly industrialized countries  of South  Korea, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong are steadily decreasing their 
dependence on trade with other East Asian nations. Only 
around one-third of the exports of all three now go  to 
other states in the region. This is  a function of the im-
proving quality and sophistication of their products. 
This trend is, so far, less apparent for Singapore, also 
now classed as  an NIC; 45  per cent of its  exports still 
go  to other East Asian nations. Singapore is  the most 
industrially developed member of the ASEAN group. Its 
other four me1nber  countries  (Malaysia, Thailand, In-
donesia, and the Philippines- all LDC's) remain heavily 
dependent on trade within the region. 
The ASEA  group has begun to find  its political feet, 
partly as a result of a successful joint diplomatic attack 
on Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea. Now the grouping 
is  trying  to  pron1ote various  industrial  and trading 
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schemes, including: a privately funded company to pro-
mote industrial development; preferential tariffs on an 
increasing range of goods traded among ASEAN members; 
demanding, and likely getting, offset deals on high-tech-
nology imports like civil jet airliners. 
Accommodating this regionalization is  one of the 
trickiest tasks facing the large industrialized countries. 
One hurdle will  be arranging formal multilateral links 
with the smaller countries in a way that will not look 
patronizing or like disguised protectionism by the bigger 
countries. As an example, it is still a problem for the US 
Administration to persuade its industrialists that trading 
with these fast-growing countries is  good for  them. A 
favorite case Washington uses is  South Korea, where a 
$600 million deficit in 1978 became a surplus of perhaps 
$400 million in 1979. Most often, however, the indus-
trialists'  response is  still  to request greater  protection 
from imports from these agressive upstart exporters. 
There are none of the formal links between most of 
the East Asian countries and the established industrial 
world. One suggestion has been to create an associate 
class of membership in the Organization for Economic 
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Cooperation and Development (OECD). While this seems 
feasible for the ASEAN as a group, or even China, it seems 
to be stretching things to suggest including Taiwan or 
South Korea. 
The United States takes great comfort from  the fact 
that the prosperous countries in East Asia are those that 
have adopted the free  enterprise system. They are also 
the countries with high (  6-9 per cent) growth rates, while 
those  countries  that have  fallen  to  communism  have 
gone into catatonic economic shock. 
This raises questions about defending those nations, 
particularly now that there seems to be once again Cold 
War with Russia.  America has not traditionally based 
its defense policies on where it trades. Might the growing 
importance of trade with vulnerable countries in  Asia 
change this? Moreover, some Japanese are growing rest-
less  at what they perceive is  their country's secondary 
importance to  Europe in  American  defense  planning. 
Might it be that the Europeans will have to get used to 
paying a  larger slice  of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization  (NATO)  bill for their own defense?  And an-
other intriguing question: Will the United States decide 
that China's communism is  less important than its role 
as an ally against the Soviets when it comes to supplying 
high-technology defense items (like computers) that are 
on the banned Council for Economic Mutual Assistance 
(Comecon) trading list? 
The United States is  the Philippines' largest customer. Here, goods await 
shipment. ©  Hubertus Kanus, Photo Researchers, Inc. TRADE FAIRS 
"Battling" for export markets across aisles,  under pavilions 
FREDA GREENE, freelance  correspondent working out of California and London 
"THE  EXTENSION  OF  TRADE  IS  A  MATTER  OF  TAR-
iffs  rather than of war," wrote Havelock Ellis  in  the 
1930's. That was when the world's foreign trade aggre-
gate yearly turnover was running about $23 billion. But 
these days there is a full-scale metaphorical battle being 
waged at international trade  fairs  and exhibitions  for 
prime shares in the foreign trade spoils. Hardly surprising 
with 1978 figures topping $1,189 billion. 
Flags stream above the trade fair pavilions. The bellige-
rents' glittering ranks confront one another across  the 
aisles.  Gaily  colored  buses  shuttle  buyers  from  one 
exhibition  hall  to  the  next.  From  Birmingham  to 
Baghdad, Tokyo  to  Tel  Aviv,  Warsaw to Wellington, 
nearly 100 cities host biannual, yearly, or biennial trade 
shows. Virtually every industry, trade, or craft·can find 
an opportunity to display its products to domestic and 
foreign buyers. 
Traditionally, fairs and exhibitions have provided the 
business  world with  economic  barometers-"a given 
exhibition reflecting the prevailing economic climate," 
says  Dr.  Werner Eckert,  of the  German Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce in London. He sees the fairs also 
functioning  as  stimulating competition. A survey  con-
ducted at the 1976 Hanover Fair showed that 80 per cent 
of the participating exhibitors regard trade fairs  as  an 
integral part of their marketing mix. As for buyers, 64 per 
cent of those questioned felt the fairs provide a general 
picture of what industry offers.  Additionally,  the  fairs 
prove to be  a fulcrum for the export-import balance of 
trade. 
Struggling to keep pace with the resultant demands for 
exhibition space,  trade fair  organizers are  forced  con-
stantly to enlarge their arenas. At Milan's Autumn 1979 
MACEF,  although  1,000 additional  square  metres  had 
been added to the existing 11 0,000-square-metre exhibi-
tion area, 500 applicants were reluctantly refused. 
Defeating Hanover in a fierce drive for the favors of a 
centralized, permanent exhibition of German tableware, 
Frankfurt International Fair triumphantly displayed its 
prize in spring 1979. Buyers flocked to the newly con-
structed,  multi-storied  "Messehaus West"  Tableware 
Pavilion,  where exhibitors  needed  only  to  change  the 
decorations of their stands for the autumn show. But by 
fall another entire floor had to be made available to house 
the influx of companies anxious to share this successful 
shop window. 
"Latecomers will have to hurry if they want to partici-
pate in ISF '80," warned organizers of Britain's Interna-
tional Spring Fair at Birmingham. This despite one addi-
tional exhibition hall recently opened and another to be 
completed by  1981. 
Usually, domestic manufacturers predominate at local 
events. Frankfurt-based lnterstoff Textile Fair, however, 
has foreign exhibitors outnumbering the Germans, says 
Michael Lehmann, (managing  director of the  German-
American Chamber of Commerce in Los Angeles.  Sur-
prisingly, many foreign exhibitors point out that the main 
share of their business is  not conducted with domestic 
buyers, but with those from other countries, including 
their own. 
THE  FRENETICALLY GROWING WORLDWIDE  INTEREST in 
trade fairs  is  matched by  rapidly increasing audiences. 
Hanover's  1979 Fair drew 540,000 buyers,  of whom 
45,000 were from foreign countries. It  was reported that 
one out of every 11  visitors signed an average of three 
contracts. Not all trade fairs are alike, nor do they carry 
the same economic clout. "Some are not worth our par-
ticipation because they are too broad in scope, appealing 
to the curiosity-seeking general public rather than to the 
serious businessman," says US  International Marketing 
Center  (IMC)  Director James  W.  Goodsell,  based  in 
Milan. Other so-called international trade fairs, usually 
in  the  less  developed  countries,  are  "staged more  for 
national prestige and image." Although the US  Depart-
ment of Commerce avoids these two types of shows, it is 
increasing its participation in the worthwhile fairs, "most 
of them in Europe." 
How  are  these  trade  fairs  operated?  The  National 
Exhibition Center in Birmingham, now the site for Brit-
ain's major trade shows, is owned by the city of Birming-
ham. Fairgrounds at Frankfurt, home of 10 of the most 
important German trade shows, are owned jointly by the 
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city  and state of Hessen.  Hanover's facilities  are  also 
state-owned, and operated by a specially created corpo-
ration. Corporate shares are issued through a national 
holding system, although the fairs held at Hanover are 
run as if they were privately controlled, on a profit-and-
loss basis. A few international fairs are run as nonprofit. 
It is  the municipal bodies that lease  their exhibition 
facilities to trade fair and exhibition organizers. But the 
responsibility  for  attracting exhibitors  and buyers,  to 
ensure success of the shows, rests squarely on the shoul-
ders of the organizers. These are frequently public rela-
tions firms  specializing in trade shows, with their own 
sales forces. They arrange with the fair owners dates for a 
show and press coverage; they supply visitor information 
and host trade delegations. They set up the advertising 
campaigns to reach exhibitors and buyers, allocate stand 
space,  and  provide  interpreter  services.  Occasionally, 
they assist in arranging the exhibits. 
Sometimes  a  wholesale  or trade  association  acts  as 
organizer for its own shows. More often, however, these 
associations provide advisory boards and committees to 
liaise with the organizers. 
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A number of freight-forwarding agents also act as or-
ganizers. These shipping firms have a built-in clientele for 
the trade shows, which fair owners appreciate. "Not only 
are we able to transport the exhibits for a manufacturer 
or agent to the fair,  but also we can handle the export 
aspects efficiently once the exhibitor has made successful 
contacts at the exhibition," points out the representative 
of one such shipping company. 
Major manufacturers can and do finance  their own 
exhibitions. Fees for stand space vary but are not exorbi-
tant. The largest expenditure is  for building and deco-
rating the stands and transporting goods and personnel, 
says Gunther Reymann, press and public relations officer 
for Frankfurt International Fair. 
For the  middle-sized or small  firm  with insufficient 
funds to handle such an enterprise, there is an invaluable 
helping hand-the joint ventures sponsored by most gov-
ernments. The UK program, for instance, is  handled by 
the British Overseas Trade Board. The US version comes 
under the  aegis  of the  Department of Commerce, and 
operates as  International Marketing Centers in various 
exhibitions cities. Manufacturers in the United States can find  out these  locations  through 42 US-based  district 
offices. 
The IMC in Milan, for example, covers shows for Italy, 
Spain,  Portugal,  Yugoslavia,  Greece,  Switzerland,  and 
France. In addition to individual exhibitions put on for 
manufacturers on IMC premises, for a nominal $100 per 
day fee, the IMC also arranges for participation in major 
shows. For a "new-to-market" company, the participa-
tion fee  is  $2,000; for an established company, $3,500. 
This charge is in addition to the cost per square foot or 
metre for the stand space. The IMC designs, builds, and 
furnishes  the  stands  with  everything  from  carpets  to 
phones. The IMC gets exhibits through customs and onto 
the  fairgrounds,  sets  up  the  stands,  if  necessary,  and 
provides photo blowups of products. At the same time, 
the exhibitor has access to the US  agent distributor ser-
vice.  Three prescreened agents or distributors familiar 
with the exhibitor's product are provided at a small fee. 
Additionally, the exhibitor is  given market research to 
verify that there are potential markets in various coun-
tries for his product. 
HOW SUCCESSFUL THE EUROPEAN PROGRAM has proved 
for US businesses is seen from the report by IMC director 
Goodsell  that, "of 454 US  companies participating in 
eight major exhibitions, 17  6 were entering the European 
market for the first time with our [IMC] help. These 176 
new-to-market  companies  had  on-the-spot  sales  of 
$27,728,770 and forecast  an additional  $369  million 
sales during their first year in the new export market." A 
total of 31,275 brand new sales leads were generated by 
both old- and new-to-market participating companies. 
One old-to-market company that exhibited in the 1979 
Graphic Arts  Trade Show in Milan wrote to  its  con-
gressman stating, "We export approximately 70 per cent 
of our products as  compared to 5  per cent before we 
started attending these Commerce Department shows." 
At first glance this appears to indicate that the United 
States is  well represented in the European marketplace. 
Not so, say some members of the Department of Com-
merce: "Everyone agrees with the statement that Ameri-
can firms  are  losing  opportunities in the  export race, 
because of the previous lack of interest by our manufac-
turers." 
These  are  some  exceptions,  however,  namely  those 
companies involved in the fields of energy and comput-
ers,  in which US  firms have traditionally held a strong 
suit. Calvin Berlin, Counselor in the US Embassy in Lon-
don, says that although American companies still are not 
sufficiently export-conscious, "in electronics even small 
firms are aware of the tremendous potential of the over-
seas  market." But he  cautions those firms  that are ex-
periencing difficulties in their home markets not to expect 
to find a panacea for their problems, which too often are 
inherently managerial, from the export area. 
MACEF,  considered  Italy's  primary  trade  show  for 
housewares,  tableware,  and hardware/tools,  is  a  good 
gauge of us interest. MACEF Director Massimo Martini 
says, "We have only had 10 requests from US exhibitors 
in  the  past four  years."  Autumn 1979  MACEF  hosted 
94,000 visiting buyers and agents, with 2,295 manufac-
turers represented. 
In the  final  analysis,  do  trade fairs  and exhibitions 
really  boost exports? A representative of the fairs  and 
promotions branch of the British Overseas Trade Board 
says that it is difficult to evaluate. "Frequently manufac-
turers go to these fairs as much to see what their competi-
tion is doing.as to sell. However·, we can say that there has 
been  a  gradual  affirmative  response  over  the  last  10 
years." 
The  Secretary-General  of Milan  International  Fairs 
says that some exhibitors are reluctant to reveal the ac-
tual amount of business transacted, which "makes it very 
difficult to demonstrate factually how much exports are 
increased. But when you consider the number of foreign 
participants at our 50 fairs,  it is  easy  to  realize  what 
prompts  attendance  in  such  numbers."  For  instance, 
there were 2,420 foreign exhibitors at the 1978 Furniture 
Fair. There were 27,000 foreign buyers from 122 coun-
tries,  out of a  total of 115,000. Each year more than 
200,000 foreign buyers have come to the Milan events. 
In the case of trade fairs and exhibitions, it is  surely 
possible to say that the numbers don't lie. 
A view of the silver exhibition area at the Milan trade show in  1979.  Photo 
by  Freda Greene 
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Embraces 
Simone Veil 
A welcoming kiss from  the Speaker of the House, 
Thomas P.  O'Neill, Jr.  Photos by  Cashen/Stout Simone Veil, President of the European Parliamenr,.
led a 23-member delegation to meer with colleagues
in the US Congress  January 28-31. It was the six-
teenth such exchange between  members of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the US House of Representarives
since 1972-but the first since the Parliament was di-
rectly elected last June . . . and the first since Simone
Veil was elected its President. The new President of
the new Parliament, one of Europe's most popular
public figures, became for a few days one of Washing-
ton's.
Simone Veil dnd National  I'ress Club President Drew Von Bercen.
Veil at d press EC delegation in Washington. conference  giuen at the
Bergen.
French  Ambassador Franqois de Laboulaye  tdlks witb fellow citizen Veil.
.l
Chairman  of the European parliamentary delegation, Eua'Wilhelmsson
Gredal (Socialist, Denmark),and Veil confer.
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I:.uropean  parlianrcntarittn  Sir Dduid  Nicr.,/sr.,r (Euroltt,tut  I)t,ntocril, I)rit-
ain) and Lady Nit'rilson tuitlt Veil.
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PAUL BETTS, Rome correspondent for  The Financial Times 
TO  JUDGE  FROM  RECENT  NEWSPAPER  HEADLINES  AND 
television broadcasts, Italy appears to be  in  a state of 
permanent crisis.  Political  violence,  kidnappings,  and 
kneecappings of prominent industrial and political fig-
ures  by  extreme left-wing groups  are  seemingly  daily 
events. Italian governments during the past decade have 
lasted on average barely a year; and as  soon as  a  new 
one is  formed, there is  already widespread speculation 
that it is about to fall. The economy is equally eternally 
described as being in a state of near collapse, with some 
of the country's major industrial groups posting losses 
and accumulated debts that would make a pocket cal-
culator explode. 
Yet foreign visitors, and indeed most Italians, are gen-
erally surprised to find that the reality they read about 
everyday  is  often very  different  from  the  reality they 
actually see. If  the politicians and trade unions seemingly 
have an endless capacity for arguing, and the economy 
is  depicted in  the best Italian melodramatic tradition, 
via Condotti in Rome or via Monte Napoleone in Milan 
.  are nonetheless marginally more opulent than the rue 
du  faubourg  Saint  Honore  in  Paris or Bond Street  in 
London. The standard of living is generally high in Italy, 
which to all  intents is  perhaps one of the largest con-
sumer-oriented societies in the West. 
In a sense Italy has increasingly been regarded as the 
"sick man of Europe," and in a sense the country's own 
peculiar problems, exacerbated by the worsening inter-
national outlook, are perhaps more acute than those of 
its EC partners. But it would be equally misleading to 
underestimate the real strength of a  country that has 
shown a remarkable resilience in the face of its countless 
problems and an extraordinary capacity for survival. 
Italy is now once again at the center of world attention. 
It now holds the Presidency of the European Community 
for  a  crucial six  months (January-June  1980) when it 
will  have  to  mediate  a  delicate  compromise  over  the 
current d.ire problems splitting the Nine, including Brit-
ain's demands for cuts in its budgetary contribution to 
the Community and the institutional crisis between the 
Community and the recently elected European Parlia-
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ment. Italy will further play host in Venice in June to 
the key summit of industrialized nations at a time when 
the world economic and political situation is undergoing 
one of its most difficult crises. As  a country that is  an 
old hand at tackling international crises, Italy could well 
play a decisive role in the international scene during the 
next six months. 
© W.  G.  Shuster, Hatboro, Pennsylvania But world attention is  also focused on Italy  because 
of the country's particular strategic position in the mid-
dle of the Mediterranean and as a geographical frontier 
with the communist world as well as  a crossroads with 
the oil-producing countries of the Middle East. It also 
has the biggest Communist Party in  the West, which, 
since Italy is a member of the Atlantic alliance, is  bound 
to raise a whole series of complex problems. 
The presence of an electorally large Communist Party, 
which currently accounts for as much as 30 per cent of 
the popular vote, is undoubtedly the main conditioning 
factor of the present Italian situation. The "Communist 
question" has dominated Italian political and social life 
for  the past decade.  It is  at the root of the country's 
political uncertainty,  as  the  Communist Party has in-
creasingly insisted that Italy can only be governed stably 
through a broad governing alliance including the Com-
munists. 
The fact is  that Italy has failed  so  far to produce a 
lasting political compromise between the right and the 
left - as  other democracies have had for many gener-
ations - enabling the political  parties to alternate in 
power or to  join  in  emergency  coalitions  at times  of 
serious difficulties. Instead, Italy, since the Constitution 
of the Republic after the last war more than 30 years 
ago, has effectively had one single ruling party, the Chris-
tian Democrats. But in recent years the Christian Dem-
ocrats through lack of any solid opposition have inev-
itably tended to abuse their position of power and have 
been solidly stuck at around 3 8 per cent of the national 
vote.  In turn, this  has .  forced  Italy  to be  governed by 
unsatisfactory and weak Christian Democrat-led coali-
tions, including the country's myriad of smaller parties 
and excluding. the  Communists,  the  country's second 
largest party. 
The Christian Democrats have rejected the direct par-
ticipation of the Communists in government. For their 
part the Communists have repeatedly stated that they 
would only  agree  to support a  coalition if they were 
directly part of it with Communist ministers in the Cab-A Cornmunist  rally in Milan. o Marc Riboud, MaSlnum
inet. It is, in essence, their old idea of the "historic com-
promise," or grand alliance of all the country's  demo-
cratic parties, to give Italy a stable government  to enable
it to tackle its increasing  economic  and social problems.
In the last few years the political parties have tried all
kinds of formulae to get round the problem. But none
has had any lasting effect, and the issue has inevitably
returned to square one. The current minority Govern-
ment of Christian Democrat  Prime Minister Francesco
Cossiga was hastily formed last summer as a temporary
solution. The internal political situation has been made
all the more tense by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and the fears over the health of the veteran President of
Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip BroZ Tito.
ALTHOUGH  THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST  PARTY hAS tTAditiON-
ally been the spearhead  of the so-called Eurocommunist
movement,  and the Italian party has repeatedly pro-
claimed its independence from Moscow, its position is
nonetheless still seen as ambiguous. This has given rise
to what Italian political scientists refer to as the "K
factor" in Italian politics - 
alluding to the Russian links
of the Italian Communist  Party.
Last December all the main Italian parties except the
Communists  approved the decision for the construction
and site of a new generation of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization  (Nero) nuclear missiles to offset the ap-
parent arms advantage of the Soviet Union. This gave
rise to further debate in Italy over the Communist Party's
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continuing links with Moscow. Following the Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan, the Italian Communists openly
condemned  the Soviet move, but at the same time crit-
icized President Jimmy Carter's retaliatory measures.
Again, this was generally interpreted in Italy as a sign
of the Communist Party's difficulties  to break altogether
with Moscow - 
forcing an ambiguous position on key
international  issues.
As long as the K factor persists, it is difficult to see
either the dominant Catholic party of the Christian Dem-
ocrats or the smaller Italian lay parties accepting an
alliance with the Communists that would make them
partners of government. Pietro Longo, leader of the Ital-
ian centrist Social Democrat Party, recently said that the
Communist Party's links with Moscow made it "inter-
nationally impossible" for the party to enter the gov-
ernment of a Nero member country like Italy.
Yet it is quite clear that without the collaboration of
the Communists,  who have a key hold on the Italian
trade union movement,  Italy is practically ungovernable.
It is equally true, as Claudio Signorile, the Socialist Party
deputy secretary general, pointed out, that there would
be a real risk for Italy if the Communists were increas-
ingly isolated from the other main parties in opposition.
"The Communists in Italy have repeatedly demonstrated
that they have embraced a Western outlook. We must
encourage them in this difficult process, or we risk seeing
them gradually  transformed  into a Moscow  poodle like
the French Communist Party." Signorile added that it
was in the interest not only of Italy, but indeed of theWest at large, to encourage this "Westernization" of the 
Italian Communists. 
In large measure this was the thesis of the late Aldo 
Moro, the undisputed leader of the ruling Christian 
Democrat Party,  kidnapped  and  brutally  assassinated 
by  the extreme left-wing terrorist movement, the  Red 
Brigades, ahnost two years ago. Moro saw the need for 
collaboration between the country's two main parties 
- the Christian Democrats and Communists - to  en-
able the Communists to gradually break completely with 
the Soviet Union. His death interrupted this process, sent 
the ruling party into a state of complete disarray out of 
which it is  still  struggling to  emerge,  and, in  general, 
provoked more instability in Italy's delicate political 
equilibrium. 
kidnapped and subsequently murdered Aldo Moro, the 
Christian Democrat leader, they seemingly saw Moro's 
attempts to reach a lasting accord with the Communists 
and the Communist Party's openness to such a dialogue 
as a betrayal of the Communist Party's "revolutionary" 
ideologies.  In the same way rightist extremist groups, 
particularly active in the early 1970's, apparently sought 
to  destabilize  the  country to  provoke a  massive .  anti-
Communist reaction. 
The country's difficulties in finding a political formula 
for stable governn1ent are in large measure behind Italy's 
acute social and econon1ic problems. The rise of political 
terrorism - both on the right and on the left - has 
coincided  with  the  growth of the  Communist Party's 
electoral strength. It has coincided too with the end of 
Italy's "economic n1iracle" of the Fifties and Sixties that 
led to the country's dramatically swift industrial trans-
formation.  And  political  violence  has  inevitably  been 
interconnected with the parallel rise in ordinary crime, 
especially kidnapping. 
The peculiar success of terrorist groups is also to some 
extent the result of the lack of authority on the part of 
the state, or rather the main political parties that have 
been unable to reach consensus to tackle the growth of 
terrorist violence.  While all  the main parties generally 
agree on the need to  implement effectively emergency 
anti-terrorist measures, when it actually comes to voting 
them in parliament, they are often split. In a sense this 
is  perhaps a  reflection of an obsessive attitude toward 
"democracy" and a still strongly felt  after-effect of the 
Fascist rule under Mussolini. 
BUT THERE ARE ALSO  DEEP-ROOTED SOCiAL PROBLEMS be-
hind the rise in political violence in Italy. The economic 
tniracle of the Fifties  and Sixties left  the country with 
huge illusions  and great expectations.  But  the  rift  be-
tween the rich industrial north and the depressed south 
- two poles cotnpletely apart not only geographically  In the spring of 1978, when Red Brigades extremists 
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EUROPE March-April1980  35 but also  socially,  culturally,  and economically ~  has 
continued to grow. Mass migrations from the south to 
the factories of the north have brought with them prob-
lems that the northern cities were never in a position to 
cope with effectively. 
In the same way unemployment, currently running at 
an annual rate of 7.5  per cent with nearly 25  per cent 
of the jobless young people aged under 25, has, as  the 
chronic state of the country's university system, proved 
a  fertile  breeding ground for  discontent.  And this dis-
content, in the face of an apparently weak political es-
tablishment, has increasingly been translated into viol-
ence- sometimes criminal, often politically motivated. 
Since the early 1970's Italy's economic problems have 
steadily grown, particularly in  the  depressed  south of 
the country, with obvious social and political repercus-
sions.  Once again  the  lack  of stable  government  and 
broad consensus among the political parties has contin-
ued to undermine the economy. At the same time, cloying 
political interference, especially in the state sector of the 
economy, has further weakened the economy at large, 
afflicted,  among other things,  by  regular  scandals  of 
varying proportions. 
Yet  Italy in  general has  been  much  more successful 
in running its economy than its political system. For a 
country handicapped  by  scarce  indigenous  energy  re-
sources and forced to import nearly 99  per cent of its 
annual crude oil needs, it has so far tackled the oil crisis 
with considerable skill. After the last major Italian cur-
rency crisis in 1976, when the monetary authorities were 
forced to introduce a barrage of restrictive measures to 
protect the lira, there has been a spectacular turnaround. 
Italy last year posted a substantial balance of payments 
surplus of some 1,  700 billion lire; its receipts from tour-
ism reached a record 6,500 billion lire; gross domestic 
product (GDP) grew by nearly 5 per cent; and the Bank 
of Italy's official net reserves are now standing at around 
$40 billion. As  for the lira, despite entry into the rela-
tively rigid discipline of the European Monetary System, 
it has remained on the whole stable so far. 
Against this, the outlook for coming years is  increas-
ingly  gloomy.  The underlying rate of inflation is  now 
running at an annual rate of 20 per cent, or twice  the 
average of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (  OECD) countries. The country's ever-
expanding, enlarged  public  sector  borrowing require-
ment is continuing to grow-preventing a stable process 
of growth and capital accumulation. The country's main 
state sector industries are now suffering from an acute 
financial crisis that could clearly have severe  repercus-
sions on an already high rate of unemployment. Inter-
national factors  like  the dramatic rise  in  raw material 
prices and the general contraction in world trade could 
have a major dampening effect on Italian exports. Growth 
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forecasts for this year are equally worrying with an es-
timated GDP increase of barely 1.5 per cent in  1980. 
In  these  circumstances it  is  generally  regarded  that 
Italy can no longer hope to cope with its  longer-term 
economic problems by  relying on day-to-day policies, 
monetary mechanisms, and the country's intricate net-
work of small and medium-size industries, which have 
continued to represent one of the more profitable and 
dynamic ends of the Italian  economy at large.  Senior 
monetary officials  claim  there is  now urgent need  for 
a medium- to long-term recovery program to tackle at 
last the fundamental weaknesses of the economic system. 
For the past two years the political parties and the trade 
unions have repeatedly called for the implementation of 
a major economic recovery program. Despite this broad 
consensus, however, repeated and revised economic plans 
have never been translated into practice. This has largely 
been the result of uncertainties by  the political parties 
and the union leadership  in  adopting what inevitably 
would be unpopular measures. 
But time is now clearly running out. To reduce Italy's 
rapidly accelerating retail price inflation, measures will 
have  to be  taken to  reduce the  country's huge  public 
sector deficit and modifications made to the highly in-
flationary  automatic wage  indexation  system,  the so-
called scala mobile or moving ladder. The scala mobile 
has in fact been largely responsible for the high increase 
in Italian labor costs which now threatens export com-
petitiveness  at a  time  of rising  interest rates  and raw 
material prices.  But so  far  the unions, which have in-
dicated they would be prepared to adopt more moderate 
labor policies, have nonetheless stated that the indexa-
tion mechanism was not to be touched. 
Yet consensus on economic policies - including the 
country's recently drawn up  1980-90 energy  plan en-
visaging the construction of five nuclear power stations 
- can only be achieved by agreement among the main · 
political parties. And su-ch  agreement is  dependent on 
the eventual clarification of the country's present con-
fused, complex, and intricate political situation. In the 
end, any solution can only come from a dialogue between 
the  Communists and the  Christian Democrats. 
So one has reached a full circle. At the core of Italy's 
problems is the country's peculiar political situation that 
has made Italy in the last 10 years increasingly ungov-
ernable and conditioned the country's social, cultural, 
and economic life.  But one should equally not under-
estimate  the  country's  resilience  and  capacity  for  in-
venting the most ingenious devices  to get itself out of 
seemingly impossible jams. Italians, in general, have be-
come accustomed to live without government. And they 
do what the Romans have always done- if there is  no 
government to take care of your problems, use  a little 
fantasy and solve them yourself. ~~ 
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That's what the Italian businessman pays for his copy 
of II Sole 24 Ore. 
300 lire. At the current rate of exchange, about thirty-
six cents. 
What he gets for his investment is the most com-
prehensive and reliable business and financial news in 
Italy. From Italy's only national business daily. 
But when you buy II Sole, you get even more: The 
big decision-makers of Italian big business, industry 
and finance. 
Precisely the people your advertising must reach if 
you're reaching for a bigger share of the Italian business 
market. 
And II Sole reaches more of them more efficiently than 
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And II Sole is read throughout Italy. It's the only 
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any personal luxury item or service on the market. 
If you're seeking to expand your share of the Italian 
business market, consider an advertising investment in 
II Sole 24 Ore. Your DJIMS representative will show you 
how even a modest investment can yield enormous divi-
dends. And how advertising can be placed easily and 
conveniently. With  free translation into Italian provided. 
Of course II Sole 24 Ore's advertising rates are a bit 
higher than its newsstand price. But compared to the 
changes you can make in your market, it's small change 
indeed. 
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The first anniversary for EMS 
R 0 BERT GERALD LIVINGS T 0  N, president of  the German Marshall Fund iniW ashington and author of-numerous articles on European issues 
In mid-March the European Monetary Sys-
tem (EMS)  is one year old. Technical and com-
plex in nature, the EMS  is  little understood 
for what it most importantly is:  a  political 
act whose chances of success are good pre-
cisely because it is grounded on political real-
ities. Created as a direct challenge to the role 
of the  dollar,  it signals  a  more self-reliant 
European Community;  may portend a 
stronger, more cohesive, and internationally 
more influential one; and at a minimum com-
pels closer US-European cooperation in mon-
etary and economic policies. 
Economists,  central  bankers,  and techni-
cians greeted the EMS  with much skepticism 
a  year ago.  But it has  worked well  so  far, 
giving the individual European currencies a 
greater measure of stability than before. The 
timely and smooth manner in which currency 
rates  were  adjusted  slightly  last September 
against the  German  mark or in  which the 
Danish  krone was devalued at the end of 
November suggests that the  EMS  is  designed 
with sufficient flexibility to enable it to sur-
vive a good deal of pressure. 
From a technical point of view, the EMS  is 
simply  a  three-part  arrangement  that links 
eight European currencies - those of all the 
Community countries except Britain - by 
permitting their exchange rates to  fluctuate 
only slightly against each other (plus or minus 
2.25 per cent); establishes an embryonic Eu-
ropean Monetary Fund, which will  issue re-
serves denominated in a new unit called the 
European currency unit (Ecu); and provides 
new credit facilities to help EMS members avoid 
balance of payments difficulties. It resurrects 
in much strengthened form the European cur-
rency "snake" of the early 1970's, which had 
degenerated into a deutsche mark zone link-
ing the minor currencies of northern Europe 
to the German. 
It is the political elements of the EMS,  how-
ever, that lift it out of the technical realm and 
make it a  significant force  for  the  unity of 
Europe.  National governments have volun-
tarily tied their hands for non-market reasons 
in a key area of traditional economic policy. 
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The EMS is  partly a function of the renewal of  a strong Franco-German alignment, evidenced by the 
personal affinity of German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French  President Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing.  ©  UPI 
Relinquishing  some  control  over national 
monetary policy  initially  generated opposi-
tion by most European central bankers, but 
the political  leaders prevailed.  They argued 
and expect that the  EMS  will  drive  govern-
ments to coordinate their policies on budgets, 
capital movements, taxation, regional devel-
opment, and industrial and agricultural sub-
sidization - thus promoting the larger aim 
of Community cohesion. 
It  is politics, too, that make the EMS's chance 
of success  much  greater than  was  the  case 
with its  abortive predecessor, the European 
Monetary Union of 1970-72. Creation of the 
new  system  was a  response to  an outside 
threat, always a  most efficient midwife to 
unification efforts-the threat being viewed 
in  Europe  as  Washington's  irresponsibility 
during 1978 in monetary and energy policies 
and its  blindness to the worldwide political 
consequences of the dollar's weakness. The 
EMS  is  also  a  function  of the renewal  of a 
strong Franco-German alignment, which has 
always been the core relationship of the Eu-
ropean  Community.  And,  finally,  it  grows 
out of very specific domestic political situa-
tions in those two countries especially. 
THE  CLOSE  WORKING  RELATIONSHIP,  per-
sonal rapport, and common political ideology 
and approach of German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt and French President Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing, self-confident former finance min-
isters, has lent new force to the Franco-Ger-
man combination. The personal affinity rein-
forces a relationship that is based on intensive 
economic links and mutually beneficial com-
promises: France and Germany are each the 
other's biggest trading partner. Transfrontier 
investments, industrial cooperation, and joint 
ventures in  all  fields,  including particularly 
high-technology fields such as weapons, air-
craft,  and  nuclear  power,  have  created  a 
seamless economic web. The basic Commu-
nity deal of the 1950's, whereby benefits for 
French  agriculture  were  traded  off for  ad-
vantages for German industry, has developed 
into  one  that  brings  solid  advantages  for 
modern French manufacturers and for  inef-
ficient German farmers as well. 
Lest these benefits wither, France and Ger-
many have a standing interest in  maintaining 
close ties within a cohesive Community, which 
is itself the embodiment of their advantageous 
postwar rapprochement. The powerful German Bundesbank feared losing control ouer domestic money supplies through  EMS  interuention.  Courtesy German Information Center 
But Germany's surging economic power 
has continued to threaten to upset the French-
German balance and surfaced fears  of Ger-
man political dominance. And the anticipated 
addition of new members whose economies 
and political systems are weak - Greece, 
Spain, and Portugal - have made plain the 
need to reinforce the Community's economic 
strength so it could better accommodate the 
burdens that the newcomers would bring with 
them. That Schmidt and Giscard selected the 
EMS  as a mechanism to strengthen the Com-
munity had less to do with its economic vir-
tues, however, than with politics in Germany 
and France. 
Helmut Schmidt is  the strongest and most 
popular Chancellor since Adenauer and per-
haps since Otto von Bismarck. He runs well 
ahead of his  Social  Democratic  Party  (sPD) 
in all polls and, like Giscard, is utterly certain 
of his ability to deal with fiscal and monetary 
issues without having to defer to his finance 
or economic ministers, much less bankers or 
academic economists.  Unlike  most Western 
political leaders - but again like Giscard 
- he plans an active role in both the making 
and the management of economic policies. 
To a  greater extent than his  predecessor, 
Willy Brandt, Schmidt maintains close links 
with and is generally supported by Germany's 
businessmen and shares their worries about 
appreciation of the mark.  The monetarist 
approach typified by the EMS,  rather than the 
Keynesian demand management that has tra-
ditionally  been  a  favorite  economic  instru-
ment of the  left,  is  compatible with  Ger-
many's market economy orientation, con-
genial to Schmidt, and agreeable to the pro-
business Free Democratic Party (FDP), the jun-
ior coalition party upon which the  survival 
of his Government depends. 
Selecting a "European" vehicle has brought 
Schmidt other advantages. The EMS initiative 
in cooperation with France can preempt the 
opposition Christian Democratic Union/ 
Christian Social Union's (  cnu/scu) tend-
ency to present itself as  the sole heir to the 
Western European orientation for Germany 
established by cou Chancellor Adenauer -
a claim that Schmidt's dynamic new rival, the 
Catholic Bavarian Franz Josef Strauss, has 
sought to arrogate from time to time. Within 
the sro, such a Westpolitik is Schmidt's coun-
terpart to Brandt's Ostpolitik of the  early 
1970's. Internationally also, the EMS  fits the 
more traditional mold of Germany's foreign 
policy:  a  German initiative - and there  is 
little doubt that it was Schmidt who initiated 
and pushed for the EMS  - presented to the 
world as a "European" policy formulated by 
France. 
Evidence of the depth of Schmidt's political 
commitment to the EMS  was his  willingness 
to confront a formidable bastion of opposi-
tion, the Bundesbank. Second only to the US 
Federal  Reserve  among central banks in  its 
statutory autonomy and its  power, it is sec-
ond to none in its devotion to monetary sta-
bility and its capacity to control the domestic 
money supply. Its doughty President Otmar 
Emminger initially saw both endangered by 
an EMS whose automaticism provisions would 
trigger large-scale interventions on the money 
markets by  the Bundesbank, thus depriving 
it  of an  element of its  cherished  control. 
Schmidt was evidently able to drag the bank 
along  by  muting previous opposition to its 
tight interest rate policies and by cleverly ne-
gotiating Emminger's succession last year by 
a Bundesbank vice president, Karl-Otto Pohl, 
who had previously served  in  the SPD-run 
Chancellery and Finance Ministry in key po-
sitions. 
Paying less  and less  attention to the cau-
tious but still potentially expensive program 
of social reforms described in his 1976 book 
Democratie fram;aise,  Giscard began empha-
sizing  domestic  monetarist and free-market 
economic policies  similar  to Schmidt's.  He 
linked his political fortunes with an economic 
plan devised by Prime Minister Raymond Barre 
to stabilize the franc internationally, cut in-
flation,  revitalize French industry, and in-
crease  French  export  competitiveness.  Gis-
card continuously exhorted Frenchmen to 
make France's economic performance match 
Germany's. And he turned to Schmidt's EMS 
as a force from outside the country to compel 
domestic economic discipline, utilizing the 
unfettered authority of a French President to 
make and manage foreign policy in order to 
consummate  the  necessary  deals  with  the 
German Chancellor. 
To link the franc to the powerful and stable 
mark was a gamble, but one hedged politi-
cally. The hope was that business confidence 
resulting from the  1978 National Assembly 
elections victory and two years of franc sta-
bility would induce investment in  a new in-
dustrial plant, keep  French exports increas-
ing,  and propel the economy to  new levels 
of prosperity that would garner both middle 
and working class votes for Giscard's re-elec-
tion in  1981. The hedge is  that should the 
outside discipline  of the  EMS  fail,  inflation 
continue, and unemployment rise excessively, 
Giscard remains free  to fire  the Prime Min-
ister whose name the plan bears well in  ad-
vance of the Presidential elections. 
Utilizing a  European mold for domestic 
economic purposes has been a frequent strat-
egy  for French presidents, allowing them to 
appear simultaneously as leaders of Europe 
and defenders of  national-self-interest. Schmidt, 
like less prideful predecessors as Chancellor, 
has been content to cooperate with this strat-
egy and give credit to Giscard. 
By  the nature of the  French  Presidential 
system,  institutional opposition to the  EMS 
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de France is no Bundesbank and fell into line. 
Many elements of the powerful civil  service 
were opposed but in the end easily won over. 
For 20 years  now the  best of France's  ad-
ministrators have been sent to serve tours in 
the  Community  apparatus in  Brussels,  and 
this  seems  to  have generated  more pro-
European attitudes among them than is com-
monly realized in  France. 
Even  with a political hedge, the  EMS  rep-
resents a considerable risk for Giscard. The 
system  could  generate  such  inexorable do-
mestic pressures that France would be com-
pelled to withdraw - as  it did  twice  from 
the European monetary arrangements of the 
early  1970's, at a  time  when  Giscard  was 
finance minister. Such a setback could dam-
age his personal prestige and his 19 81 election 
prospects, perhaps fatally. Jacques Chirac, his 
Gaullist rival within the Government coali-
tion, has branded France's entry into the EMS 
as  a "capital error" that will end in  "catas-
trophe." 
Throughout the often suspenseful negoti-
ationS that lasted from July 1978 until March 
1979, the German-French  alignment re-
mained decisive.  Britain alone among Com-
munity members  refused to join  the system 
fully.  Anti-Europe currents within Cal-
laghan's Labour Government, demands 
thereafter by  Thatcher's Conservative Gov-
ernment to negotiate down Britain's share of 
the EC budget, and the strength and fluctua-
tions of the pound sterling have kept the Brit-
ish outside. All  the other EC  member coun-
tries  were  brought in  by  a  combination  of 
pressures and incentives. Italy's lira was per-
mitted a broader (  6 per cent instead of 2.25 
per cent) band of fluctuation. Both Italy and 
Ireland  received  pledges  of assistance  from 
the European Investment Bank. The Benelux 
countries - traditionally the strongest sup-
porters of the European idea and, with Den-
mark, members of the mark-zone-accepted 
the new system easily. 
THE EMS HAS WORKED WELL SO FAR, in part 
because the government and central  bank 
technicians  have  introduced,  operated, and 
fine-tuned the system without causing ripples 
in the economy that can be traced directly to 
the EMS as such. True enough, the system has 
not been  severely  tested  yet.  It faces  many 
hazards, notably divergences in inflation rates 
that make it difficult for  members  to coor-
dinate their economic policies. American 
economists  notably  have  been  pessimistic 
about the  chances  for  the  system's success 
-arguing  that it looks insufficiently flexible. 
Since its creation there has existed a com-
bination of favorable factors that may be for-
tuitous. The dollar has been relatively stable 
since last summer. If it declines drastically, 
that could destroy the system. Absence of a 
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pound sterling newly  buoyed by North Sea 
oil  has  also  helped.  A  rare  deficit  in  Ger-
many's balance of payments last year has 
worked against a drastic appreciation of the 
mark, which constitutes the greatest inherent 
threat to  EMS  unity.  Furthermore,  political 
decisions  on  when  to  proceed  to  the  next 
stage - creation of a real European Mone-
tary  Fund with permanent gold  and dollar 
reserves, and transformation of the Ecu into 
a genuine reserve asset-have been deferred. 
The chances of the EMS surviving these and 
other tests  are good, however,  because it is 
basically pragmatic, not programmatic. Con-
ceived by politicians and a few of their court-
ier economists, its goals are flexible, modest, 
and practical  rather than the lofty  and  de-
claratory ones of "union soon" that the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union of the early 1970's 
set for itself.  Such goals are fully  in the tra-
ditipn of Jean Monnet, the skilled operator 
who fathered  and nurtured the  European 
Community  in  the  1950's.  Since  Monnet's 
day, a European framework has  developed, 
onto which the EMS has been simply grafted. 
The  EMS  is  a  quintessential  European in-
stitution, operated by a small corps of tech-
nicians and bankers sharing the same elitist 
values  and little  influenced  by  the  public's 
views on what are in any case highly abstruse 
issues. Initially opposed by most bureaucrats, 
economists,  and bankers,  especially  central 
bankers, it is ironic testimony to the adroit-
ness  of the  politicians  who  brought it into 
being  that the  system is  now being imple-
mented so well- by the very groups of tech-
nicians who were against it originally. 
In  the long term the system's viability de-
pends above all on Germany's political will. 
This is  the  first  crucial factor.  Germany -
specifically its Bundesbank - has taken on 
the  major burdens. It has  assumed  respon-
sibility  for  fighting  at least one and a  half 
currency wars simultaneously in  Europe -
that is, for intervening simultaneously to sup-
port one major currency such as  the French 
franc  and  one  minor currency.  It will  also 
have to be willing, if the need arises, to trans-
fer  aid to the weaker economies on a  large 
scale.  In  making such implicit commitments 
to help establish the EMS, Schmidt faced down 
the Bundesbank and assumed for his country 
a larger measure of obligation that might have 
been expected from a man who has not been 
reluctant to voice  his  displeasure at other 
European  countries'  automatic  assumption 
that "always the Germans will pay." Cloaked 
as  it may be in a European garb and an en-
tente cordiale with France, the EMS represents 
a widening of Germany's influence and po-
tential role. 
In launching the EMS the Europeans posed 
a challenge to US  economic policies. As the 
Community's external tariff has for 20 years 
provided an instrument to influence US tariff 
policy, the EMS will provide greater leverage 
over US  monetary policy.  In  this  sense  the 
system represents yet another example of the 
growing ability of foreign countries to influ-
ence the American domestic economy. At the 
same time the EMS cannot survive without US 
cooperation. Germany alone or together with 
France cannot make it succeed, since the dol-
lar still  accounts  for  about 75  per  cent  of 
the world's official currency reserves. The EMS 
would have died aborning had it not been for 
Treasury  Secretary  Michael  Blumenthal's 
November 1978 dollar rescue package. It could 
not have  taken wing in  1979 without Paul 
Volcker's strong commitment to a dollar sta-
bilization  policy  following  his  accession  as 
chairman of the Federal  Reserve Board last 
summer. 
A stable dollar helps the EMS overcome its 
internal pressures, but the EMS in turn drives 
the United States toward even more frequent 
and complete monetary and economic policy 
coordination with the Europeans. Evolution 
of the Ecu into a reserve currency alongside 
the dollar is not inconceivable and would be 
helpful  to the world monetary system  as  a 
whole. It could lead to a sharing of respon-
sibility  between  the  Europeans  and Ameri-
cans (and perhaps the Japanese too) in jointly 
managing a world system with several reserve 
assets. 
It is  very  much to the  United States' ad-
vantage to have the  EMS  succeed:  Not only 
because the economic performances of some 
of Europe's weaker economies, like those of 
Italy or the United Kingdom, would improve 
toward Germany's performance. And not only 
because Germany would remain closely tied 
to France and the West. But also because it 
embodies the Community's new confidence 
in  ways  that can  be.  advantageous  for  the 
United States beyond the economic realm and 
outside Europe. 
The EC  member states are gradually out-
growing the "regionalist" label once pinned 
on them by US statesmen. They are engaging 
themselves economically and politically out-
side the Community. In the cases of the new 
candidates for EC  membership - Greece, 
Spain, and Portugal - that has been evident 
for  several  years.  It is  now true  at  several 
African  crisis  points and may soori  become 
clear in the Near East and Persian GuH. 
As  long as  European countries lacked the 
leadership  and a  strong sense  of comnton 
purposes, US talk about "partnership," "grand 
designs," or "years of Europe" were rhetoric; 
the disparity in power was too great. The EMS 
is one aspect of a redressing of this disparity 
-an  adjustment that should be welcome as 
a better basis for true partnership than a rhe-
torical patronization that has often marked 
US  policies toward Europe. 1h1k to us if you 
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France has no respite from elections. 
There've been almost one a year since 
1972, and 1979 was supposed to be a 
year off. Instead, in December a rather 
special portion of the electorate went to 
the polls. This time the vote was for the 
prud'hommes, or local labor courts which 
settle labor disputes and represent employ-
ers and workers equally. Eor the first time 
almost the entire work force outside the 
public sector, some 13  million, could vote. 
Participation was unusually high and the 
results, which came squarely out for the 
most moderate trade union groups, sur-
prised everyone. 
The elections were the outcome of a 
wide-ranging reform designed to modernize 
the prud'hommes. Old trades, which have 
disappeared since the last court overhaul at 
the turn of the century, were scratched 
from the list, and new ones related to high 
technology industries were added. The 
number of courts was increased to speed 
up rulings. Most important, the elections 
took place, not on a Sunday as in  the past, 
but on a work day. Employers were re-
quired to give workers time off to vote. 
They also had to furnish the names of all 
employees to town halls, rather than mak-
ing voters register individually, a deterrent 
to voter turnout. 
Beyond modernizing the system, what 
made the elections unusual was that work-
ers chose candidates who had to identify 
themselves with specific trade union organi-
zations. The vote thus became a sort of 
popularity contest that supplied the first 
reading on relative trade union strength in 
France since the last comparable poll in 
1962. 
Not all of the five  largest trade union 
confederations were enthusiastic about the 
opportunity. The moderate, apolitical Force 
ouvriere (FO), whose main strength is  in 
the government administration, worried 
about a poor showing in  an election where 
civil servants could not vote. FO has histor-
ically pursued a conciliatory line-insisting 
that negotiations produce more results for 
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workers than confrontation and than the 
one-day mass marches in  Paris that have 
been standard fare  for the Communist-
dominated Confederation generale du trav-
ail (CGT), France's largest union group. 
Since the defeat of the left in the 1978 leg-
islative elections, the Socialist-leaning 
Confederation fram;aise  democratique du 
travail (CFDT), long an unconditional part-
ner of the CGT, has swung in  behind the 
FO's position. The CFDT now wants "tangi-
ble" results, is  responsible for some imagi-
native propositions in  recent labor-manage-
ment negotiations, and has taken its 
distance from the Socialist Party. 
Force  ouvriere did spectacularly well, al-
most doubling its percentage of the vote. 
The CFDT came in comfortably ahead of the 
share it had hoped to get, which helped si-
lence internal criticism of the leadership's 
change of tactics. To most everyone's relief, 
the CGT dropped several points but still  re-
mains far and away France's first trade 
union organization. The outcome was a 
clear sign of worker approval for the 
unions which have supported dialogue and 
are refusing to tie their futures to a particu-
lar political party. 
But anyone who thought that the results 
would translate into concessions at the bar-
gaining table was bound to be disap-
pointed. The first labor-management en-
counter of the new year -- on the 
reduction of work hours - ended in  fail-
ure. Discussions of the issue had been un-
derway for  18  months, and in the January 
session no plans were made for future 
meetings. But this time, the fault was by no 
means just because the divided trade union 
movement could not agree. Management, 
in the form of the National Employers 
Confederation, again refused to concede 
any important points, a fact Prime Minister 
Raymond Barre deplored in a speech to 
businessmen soon after. French business 
leaders have been remarkably slow to con-
clude that one way to reduce the power of 
the intransigent CGT would be to give the 
more moderate unions some concrete re-
sults to show their supporters as  proof that 
dialogue pays off.  -PATRICIA  H.  PAINTON 
Bonn 
Germans stand to face an explosion in  the 
amount of television programming offered 
in the coming years, and even before the 
fact much of the country seems to be com-
ing down with a case of media indigestion. 
The discussion centers around the question 
of  whether commercial television stations 
should be admitted to supplement the pres-
ent state-owned system. A second issue is 
the constantly smoldering partisan battle 
over whether the present stations are main-
taining their commitment to represent the 
views of all  political colorations, or have 
been co-opted, as conservative political 
leaders repeatedly claim, by left-leaning po-
litical commentators. 
The demand for private television in  Ger-
many is  not new, but new technology-
such as  cable television and direct transmis-
sion into homes via satellite (the one al-
ready available, the other on the threshold 
of feasibility)-has kindled the discussion 
once again. Within the last year two Ger-
man states announced plans for private tel-
evision projects. At the same time Radio-
Television Luxembourg (RTL) said it was 
leasing a channel on a planned French-Ger-
man direct transmission television satellite, 
scheduled to go up in  1983, for German 
language broadcasts. After Germany re-
portedly got French assurances that the 
Luxembourg commercial venture would be 
stopped, RTL announced undauntedly that 
it was investigating the possibility of its 
own satellite to crack the German ether. 
Last November talks between three north 
German states to preserve the North Ger-
man Radio (NDR), one of nine regional in-
dependent television stations, broke down. 
One major reason for the station's impend-
ing breakup is  political. The states of 
Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony, 
both governed by the conservative Chris-
tian Democratic Union, canceled their 
J treaty with the state of Hamburg, governed 
by the Social Democratic Party, and ac-
cused Hamburg-where NDR headquarters 
are-of overly slanting programming to the 
left. In January Lower Saxony and Schles-
wig-Holstein announced they would estab-
lish  their own station, independent of 
Hamburg, and Lower Saxony said it would 
admit private television stations. 
Although the issue of whether private 
television is  even legal under Germany's 
constitution must still be decided by the 
constitutional court, the north German de-
cision launched the present debate that is 
sure to continue into Germany's upcoming 
election campaign. Those in favor of 
more-or private-television say it will 
bring much needed variety to the somewhat 
staid and strait-laced offerings of the pres-
ent stations, whose programs are often ac-
cused of being top-heavy with ponderous 
educational and cultural features. 
Critics of the opening of the airwaves say 
commercial or private stations will lead to 
a flood of mindless television entertainment 
spellbinding children, weakening family 
life, and gnawing at the very roots of Ger-
man society. There is  a vocal minority in 
Germany that has long given voice to what 
must be deep-seated misgivings toward the 
electronic invader, television. In Munich, an 
Anti-TV Club works to help members over-
come withdrawal symptoms after giving up 
television for good and strives generally to 
"publicize the harm done by television." 
No one less than Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt has lent the group much needed 
ammunition. Schmidt is  known to be a 
firm critic of an expanded television pro-
gram and last year even called for one tele-
vision-free day each week. 
Yet, public opinion polls show an over-
whelming majority of Germans are in favor 
of opening up the system to commercial 
stations, somewhat along British lines, 
where private stations compete with the 
state-funded British Broadcasting System. 
Business leaders are generally in favor of 
more television. Network employees, on 
the other hand, are staunchly opposed; and 
when talks over the fate of the NDR broke 
down in  December, their union voted by a 
large majority to stage what would have 
been the first strike against the television 
stations. The strike was called off after it 
was ruled illegal by a German court in a 
last-minute decision. 
Meanwhile, German television viewers 
themselves, whose interests everyone in the 
debate claims to represent but whose views 
few  seem to seek out, have been taking the 
battle in stride. They faced the prospect of 
their first television blackout due to the 
planned strike in December fairly stoically, 
especially after programming directors as-
sured the general public that at least an 
emergency program, likely to consist of old 
movies, would in all  events be  broadcast. 
Given the excess of serious viewing fare 
that viewers often have to put up with, 
many of them likely greeted old movies as 
a welcome change. One public opinion poll 
taken shortly before the threatened strike 
pointed out that only 29 per cent of view-
ers said they would even miss television. 
Seventy-one per cent agreed that a tempo-
rary respite from the tube just before the 
holidays  might even be  a good thing. 
-JOHN TAGLIABUE 
Brussels 
Jacques Brel  died more than a year ago, 
but the Brei spirit lives  on in word and mu-
sic.  There can be few  record shop windows 
in Brussels from which an image of his 
haunted minstrel's face  does not stare out 
with pity and sadness. I counted five  differ-
ent books about him in one store-biogra-
phies, critiques, photographs. A show 
based wholly on his songs was staged in 
Brussels just before Christmas, and earlier 
this year a museum put on an exhibition of 
his writings and other personal works. 
Brussels looks on Brei more kindly in 
death than in life, and even the rage di-
rected at some of his songs in recent years 
seemed to acknowledge that his was a ma-
jor talent. He was born into the powerful 
Flemish folk music tradition, but later in 
life turned his scorn against those of his 
own background. Albert-Andre Lheureux, 
producer of the show about him, saw Brel 
as  "halfway between the gray of the north 
and the more extravagant Latin tempera-
ment of the south-a symbol of Belgium." 
Certainly a complex and unpredictable man 
who astonished the musical world by repu-
diating his fame and fleeing to a Pacific is-
land in 1967., where he stayed for most of 
his remaining life. 
Brel was attacked by many for living 
abroad and seeming to lob his musical as-
saults at his Belgian targets from the safety 
of Paris or other foreign cities.  Others re-
vered him because his international acclaim 
never caused him to lose his  fascination 
jacques Brei.  © UP! 
with things Belgian. At the peak of his 
fame he  must have been the world's best-
known living Belgian, not excepting 
Georges Simenon. 
These thoughts have been brought on by 
the present number-one topic of conversa-
tion in Brussels cultural circles, namely the 
future of Maurice Bejart. Bejart has little in 
common with Brel, except perhaps a capri-
cious artistic temperament and a special-
ized, narrow genius that has yet managed 
to command-and often divide-a huge 
public following. But like Brei's, Bejart's 
features are hugely familiar to anyone who 
has lived in Brussels for more than a 
month. And if outside of Belgium, Bejart's 
reputation is  confined to those who follow 
modern ballet, there are those among them 
who would say he is  its most imaginative 
practitioner in the world today. 
While Brel went to Paris to win recogni-
tion and fortune, Bejart left that city to 
find  success in Brussels. Nearly 20 years 
ago he founded the Twentieth Century Bal-
let there, and for his young dancers, mostly 
from abroad, he created dances of stunning 
originality to the music of Bach, Chopin, 
Mahler, Stravinsky, and others. More than 
once I have heard an audience gasp with 
astonishment at the tableaux that Bejart 
unfolded before them. 
But Bejart's contract with the Brussels 
opera house runs out next year, and he has 
already let it be known that he mtends to 
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time. Some suspect·  he is  not wholly serious 
about the Paris project but is  engaging in a 
form of saber-rattling in order to extract 
bigger subsidies from the Brussels authori-
ties for the Twentieth Century Ballet next 
year. But this may be wishful thinking-re-
cent Bejart pronouncements suggest that at 
best he may devote only part of his time to 
Brussels after the current season, although 
apparently at least one newly choreo-
graphed work will be included and the 
Twentieth Century Ballet itself will stay 
here. 
Brel and Bejart apart, what are the dis-
tinctive qualities of modern Belgian 
culture? Americans will have a chance to 
judge for themselves this April when the 
"Belgium Today" event takes place in 
Washington, New York, and San Fran-
cisco. In each city the King of the Belgians 
will formally open the proceedings, which 
are designed to commemorate the 150 
years since the founding of the Belgian 
state. The program runs from ballet, paint-
ing, sculpture, music, and lace-making to 
technology and foreign relations and in-
cludes an item, which may or may not 
command a wide audience, called simply 
"An evening of Belgian television." 
-ALAN OSBORN 
Copenhagen 
Finding a parliamentary majority for any 
kind of legislative policy that gives offense 
to any interest group is  the everyday prob-
lem of all minority governments. But the 
Danish minority Government of Anker 
Joergensen has complicated this task by 
choosing not to define its policy on some 
issues, and defining its policy on other is-
sues as  if the Government had an undis-
puted majority. 
The most vital issue on which Govern-
ment policy lacks profile is  the economy. 
Late last year the Government did try to 
impose a strict price and incomes policy, 
but when the trade unions refused to ac-
cept the incomes policy without "economic 
democracy"-involving obligatory contri-
butions by employers to union-led trust 
funds-and the nonsocialist opposition re-
fused to accept any social experiments of 
this kind, the Government beat a hasty re-
treat. 
The watered-down version of the Gov-
ernment economic policy was sharply criti-
cized by the governor of the National Bank 
of Denmark, Erik Hoffmeyer. He noted 
that Denmark could lose its economic sov-
ereignty in six stages, and that the Danish 
economy is  at present in the third stage of 
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Danish Prime Minister Anker ]oergensen. 
this process. In  the ensuing public debate, 
Hoffmeyer admitted that Denmark can re-
main at this stage for some time, but the 
main point, that the Danish economy is 
rapidly deteriorating and that not enough 
has been done about it, was accepted by 
the Government. New economic measures 
may be  expected in a few  months' time. 
Most observers still expect that these 
new measures will consist of new taxes, 
new attempts at cutting public expenditure, 
and so on. But there is  now for the first 
time a more general feeling among profes-
sional economists that something more 
drastic may be in the works, such as  a very 
large devaluation of the Danish krone, per-
haps with the krone at the same time leav-
ing the European Monetary System for a 
time. Needless to say, this option has not 
been commented on by the Government, 
but it is acknowledged that the last deval-
uation of the krone, by 5 per cent in No-
vember last year, was a major shift in Dan-
ish economic policy. 
Another issue on which Government pol-
icy  is  without a clear profile is  energy. In 
late January, the Government confirmed 
that it has strong doubts about nuclear en-
ergy, that it did not expect that Denmark 
would introduce nuclear energy in this cen-
tury. The events in the United States at 
Three  Mile Island seem to have been the 
decisive  factor in this decision, although the 
official policy until now has been that nu-
clear power stations will be built as soon as 
the safety problems were resolved, and that 
a referendum next year would decide the 
ISSUC. 
The Government now seems intent on re-
placing potential.nuclear energy by natural 
gas from  the North Sea.  The Norwegians 
have  found large  new deposits of natural 
gas, and the Danish Government hopes 
that the gas can be piped to Denmark at a 
reasonable price. The Norwegians have al-
ready said that they are interested, al-
though prices have not yet been discussed. 
The Norwegians have said that they might 
be interested in a broader agreement with 
Denmark, covering industry and energy. 
No details are available yet, but a new rela-
tionship between Denmark and Norway, 
and by implication between the Commu-
nity and Norway, is  developing. 
-LEIF BECK FALLESEN 
London 
For Britain's aristocracy it was good news 
and sad news. A new edition of Debrett's 
Peerage altd Baronetage was published in 
time to find its way  beneath many a stately 
home's Christmas tree. The sad part is  that 
it was the last to be edited by Patrick 
Montague-Smith. One of the country's 
most respected authorities on British blood, 
royal and blue, he recently retired as  De-
brett's editor. 
Since  1769  Debrett's  has been one of 
Britain's two celebrated catalogues of the 
aristocracy. The other is  Burke's  Peerage. 
Debrett's is  no contender for a best-seller 
list. It is  too fat:  weight-wise at five  pounds 
and price-wise at about $100. But it is  a 
bible for anyone wanting or needing to 
know a titled person's lineage, where some-
one stands in precedence-genteel for peck-
Patrick Montague-Smith  in  1960. -D  UPI 
ing order-or how to correctly address 
someone in the nobility. 
Montague-Smith rejects suggestions that 
Debrett's is  simply a snob's book. It is,  he 
says, a work of reference and an important 
one at that, for as  long as  the British Mon-
arch gi\'es  titles, there will  be the need to 
record them. Not everyone in  Debrett's  has 
a grand life style. The titles range through 
princes and dukes  to men and women of 
. working class origins doing very ordinary 
jobs and living far from splendor. Being in 
De brett's is  all  many have in  common. Specialist directories like Debrett'  s and 
Burke's are not immune to the hard times 
that have crept up on British publishers. 
Burke's was recently sold to a former Dan-
ish pop singer, the aristocratic Baron Fred-
erick van Pallandt. Debrett's was a money 
loser when some bankers took it over in 
1976 and made an American former jour-
nalist, Harold Brooks-Baker, its managing 
director. Brooks-Baker saved Debrett's by 
starting a small publishing house around it 
that turns a nifty profit specializing in 
practical and nostalgic stuff. One such 
book, titled Debrett's Correct Form,  has 
become an acclaimed reference for social 
and professional etiquette, precedence, and 
protocol. Others have dealt with Edward-
ian shooting parties and yachts. Some light 
and witty tomes about the English gentle-
folk have also proved popular. 
The expansion has not stopped there. 
Debrett's  this summer begins offering 10-
day tours of Britain's stately homes to 
Americans and Canadians. It also runs a 
genealogical service started by Brooks-
Baker on the premise that, after all, every-
one has ancestors and these days people are 
curious about their forebears. Interesting 
snippets are to be found on the fringes of 
aristocratic or royal trees. It seems Queen 
Elizabeth, for example, has distant relatives 
named Jones and Smith. 
Strikes still are as much a part of British 
life as its class structure, despite efforts to 
reduce both. Last year Britain lost 29.1 
million working days because of strikes, the 
highest annual figure since the General 
Strike in 1926. Nor was 1980 greeted with 
wild enthusiasm for work. Many Britons 
stretched their Christmas holiday over 11 
days, leading one concerned citizen to in-
quire of official eminences whether this was 
just another sad example of Britain's indus-
trial decline or an encouraging realization 
that the merits of work are over-rated. 
The question still begs an answer. Then 
the Central Statistical Office announced re-
sults of a survey on British life styles now 
as  against nearly 30 years ago. They re-
vealed another bit of tradition has all but 
vanished-that badge of your proper Eng-
lish gentleman, the bowler hat. It is  rarely 
seen today outside the City, London's fi-
nancial district.  -PETER J.  SHAw 
The Hague 
Despite international politics in  a whirl-
windish turmoil, a large part of the Dutch 
population is  following attentively the 
synod of seven Dutch clergymen that 
started in  Rome in  mid-January:  six bish-
ops and Cardinal Jan Willebrands, Arch-
bishop of Utrecht, seeking to mend the 
Dutch Catholic Church'~ internal rift. The 
Dutch synod is  in disarray itself-with 
Bishop Johannes Gijsen from Roermond 
and Antonius Simonis from Rotterdam 
openly declaring themselves against abor-
tion and advocating excommunication of 
those who have one or encourage it.  Other 
bishops like Johannes Bluyssen of Herto-
genbosch take a more liberal line-even 
tolerating homosexuality on the grounds 
that "no human relationship can be banned 
from the Holy Church if it is  based on seri-
ous love." 
Thirty-five  priests and pastoral workers 
from Rotterdam expressed in a letter to 
Rome their dismay with "the sparse news" 
from the synod and protested against "the 
failure to be informed on the synod, which 
will place you, bishops, in a dangerous iso-
lation and which makes it impossible for us 
in the Netherlands to participate." Before 
the Rome meeting began, 18  leading Ro-
man Catholics in the Netherlands had al-
ready urged in  a message to Rome that the 
Dutch church province should be  made 
more manageable; they also pointed out 
the error of appointments of straitlaced 
bishops such as Gijsen and Simonis. 
So  far the bishops have followed the 
Pope in  endorsing celibacy in the priest-
hood. They also have set up commissions, 
including one outlining directives for a 
priest's training and one to curtail tasks of 
pastoral workers as  well  as  one to examine 
the desirability of creating additional bish-
oprics to the existing seven. No mention 
has been made of birth control, homosex-
uals taking the sacraments, or women be-
coming priests. Presently about 40 women 
assist Dutch priests, but women cannot 
baptize or give the holy sacraments. 
It was because the Vatican felt  that the 
Dutch Catholic Church was becoming too 
permissive that Paul VI  appointed the con-
servative Johannes Gijsen in 1972 as 
Bishop of Roermond. But his conservatism 
has led to open letters by leading Catholics 
blaming Gijsen for driving people out of 
the Church. He is  supported by only a mi-
nority of the Catholic clergy. Gijsen went 
as far as threatening to refuse Communion 
to Roman Catholic parliamentarians who 
supported more liberal abortion legislation. 
About 40 per cent of the Dutch people 
are Catholic and 38  per cent belong to the 
Reformed Church, while the rest are agnos-
tic or atheist. In  1963, 100,000 Catholic 
children took Holy Communion, but the 
number dropped to 80,000 in 1975, and it 
is  likely to be around 50,000 in  1985, ac-
cording to official statistics. One Rotter-
dam priest who closely follows proceedings 
in Rome said, "If this secrecy goes on, we 
may well end up with a conservative ghetto 
church." 
Queen Juliana will abdicate her reign of 
32 years on April 30 in  the Amsterdam 
Palace, while on the same afternoon her 
daughter, Beatrix, will  take the Oath of the 
Dutch Constitution to become the new 
Queen. 
It may take some time until the Dutch 
say of Beatrix, "She is  one of ours," as 
people used to say of Juliana, mused a 
friend of the Royal House. Beatrix is  a 
woman with ready wit and quick answers; 
she learns quickly and will not make mis-
takes for the second time. She is  said to be 
a born organizer and shows remarkable 
poise and control when fulfilling public 
functions. Beatrix has traveled with Prince 
Claus to China, the Soviet Union, the far 
East, Africa, and the United States. She is  a 
sportswoman and loves sailing and skiing. 
Joop den Uyl,  the former Socialist Pre-
mier, said, ''She, in her own way and with 
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mother's footsteps, serving the Dutch soci-
ety." The Dutch will  have to wait and see 
whether, like Queen Juliana, Beatrix will  be 
"one of ours."  -NEL sus 
Rome 
The first of 1980 was a bad time for Ro-
man hospitals. On one side of the capital, 
overworked personnel at the San Giovanni 
public facility staged a protest by  blocking 
the street with the bloodied mattresses, 
rusting beds, and torn sheets on which pa-
tients had been lying. The hospital was 
built to accommodate 900 patients, but by 
mid-January the number had swelled to 
1,450. Beds lined hallways and stairwells 
- every inch of free  space - while basic 
sanitation became impossible to maintain. 
Patients slept in  wards with ants, cock-
roaches, and mice. 
On the other side of town, at the Ma-
donna di Fatima private clinic, a tank of 
carbon dioxide was somehow mistaken for 
oxygen. Two people died when they were 
given the poisonous gas during surgery. 
One was a seven-year-old boy having his 
tonsils removed. The troubles probably 
would have been lost in  the shuffle of daily 
headlines had it not been for their timing: 
Only a  month before, on January 1,  Italy's 
sweeping national health care reform law 
had taken effect. The hospital scares pro-
vided an inauspicious inauguration. 
Behind the reform lay 20 years of discus-
sion and innumerable delays after it was 
officially passed in  1978. Similar to 
Britain's national health plan, Italian law 
#833 sets out to replace a complicated sys-
tem of medical insurance with equal, de-
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centralized, and, most important, free 
health care for all. An estimated 2. 7 million 
Italians too poor to pay doctors and hospi-
tals will no longer have to live  in  fear of an 
illness they cannot afford. 
The law - called by some Italy's first 
true reform act since the Second World 
War and by others the most progressive 
health care system on paper in the world 
- places heavy emphasis on preventive 
medicine. Every Italian is  now required to 
sign up with a  family physician who deter-
mines whether trips to the hospital or spe-
cialists are necessary. Citizens select local 
doctors in  one of 649 health care zones es-
tablished by the law. The bill creates agen-
cies to monitor health conditions at facto-
ries, as well as special health facilities at 
the work places themselves. 
But something is  clearly going wrong. 
The extreme overcrowding at San Giovanni 
is  not much worse than at other Rome 
public hospitals. Among other things, em-
phasis on decentralization and preventive 
care was supposed to ease the burden on 
hospitals. Instead, it was having the oppo-
site effect. Doctors who felt  overworked, or 
who grumbled about relatively low state 
salaries (between about $26,000 and 
$41,000 yearly), or who just could not be 
bothered, were "dumping" patients into 
hospitals. Old people without family care 
or sufficient heat at home found a warm 
bed, if nothing else,  in the public facilities. 
Endless lines formed as citizens scrambled 
to register under the system. 
Progressives charged that the conserva-
tive Christian Democrat Government was 
deliberately trying to thwart a socialized 
health plan it had never really liked. Delays 
in  approving the crucial corollary laws to 
the bill seemed to justify their complaints. 
In  particular, the Cabinet still  has not de-
cided how to divide the tax burden to fi-
nance the program, which is  estimated to 
cost a hefty $19 billion a year. Government 
backing of advertising for private health 
plans brought a storm of protest from the 
left. 
Conservatives, meanwhile, countered that 
the entire law was ill-conceived from the 
start: that in  a free-enterprise system supe-
rior health care is  assured by  competition 
and can be obtained by the majority of 
Italians who can afford medical insurance. 
Before, maintained the conservative daily II 
Tempo of Rome, both the wealthy and the 
insured got decent care at private clinics. 
"Now that insurance has been substituted 
by the national health system, the private 
clinics cure only the wealthy," it said. 
It will  be months before Italians know 
for sure whether the new plan will work or 
become the bureaucratized nightmare of 
mediocre (at best) medicine that conserva-
tives foresee.  "The new plan is  like a train 
in  motion with passengers not knowing if 
they can get off at the scheduled stations. 
But the ticket is  free  and the tracks are in 
place," Rome's left-leaning II  Messaggero 
wrote. If nothing else, 2. 7 million people 
who never had a check-up by  a general 
practitioner, dentist, pediatrician, obstetri-
cian, or optometrist now have the chance 
to sit with the rest of Italy in the waiting 
rooms.  -PAMELA MENDELS 
Luxembourg 
A fine  new building designed as the seat of 
the European Parliament has just been 
opened in Luxembourg, but, alas, it will 
see no members of Parliament until Sep-
tember, and even after that they are likely 
to be  infrequent tenants. Officially Luxem-
bourg is  still  in  the running to be the sole 
seat of the Parliament, and it is  heresy to 
say otherwise in  public. 
Luxembourg, like Strasbourg, maintains 
rightly that the seat can only be changed 
(to Brussels, say) by  unanimous decision of 
the nine EC member governments. But this 
is  a legalistic argument that overlooks the 
growing clamor of the new parliamentari-
ans for a single site with adequate accom-
modations and communications. A major-
ity would probably opt for Brussels, where 
committee meetings are already held. 
Whether or not Prime Minister Pierre 
Werner privately acknowledges that his 
country may be slipping somewhat in  the 
contest (Strasbourg has no greater claim 
but it is  backed by  a bigger purse and more 
shameless wooing), the fact is  that some Luxembourg Prime Minister Pierre Werner. 
Luxembourgers are now openly wondering 
whether the country might not be better off 
chasing a different rabbit-namely the 
headquarters of the proposed new Euro-
pean Monetary Fund that could in time 
grow into a Community central bank. 
Such an institution is  far off yet and even 
at best would hardly be a major employer 
or foreign-exchange earner. But the point is 
that a decision to locate it in Luxembourg 
would amount to a striking declaration of 
trust in  the Grand Duchy with profound 
implications for the growth of the banking 
sector. Indeed it is  not too fanciful to see 
such a move as a kind of official endorse-
ment of Luxembourg as the financial capi-
tal of the Community with an almost auto-
matic claim to new institutions in this area. 
What is  indisputable is  the Government's 
ambition to consolidate and develop Lux-
embourg in the financial world by  revising 
tax structures for banking, negotiating new 
and improved double taxation agreements 
with other countries, and promoting related 
businesses such as insurance, marketing re-
search, data processing, and accountancy. 
lntiatives in all these areas are now official 
policy. 
At present Luxembourg is  the home of 
the EC Audit Court, the European Court of 
Justice, the European Investment Bank, and 
the Statistics Office, besides playing inter-
mittent host to the Council of Ministers 
and of course the Parliament. If the last 
two are conjectural long-term propositions, 
there is  no doubt that the others rank 
among the fastest growing of all EC  de-
partments. 
There is  a tendency among some Luxem-
bourg bankers to disregard all  this as 
chicken feed.  "All that ultimately matters is 
the level of activity in the Eurocurrency 
markets," one expert observer says. At 
present that is  undo11btedly true, but the 
more such markets grow, then the greater 
the probability that the Germans or Ameri-
cans will want to control them by imposing 
reserve requirements or to set up their own 
competitive free-trading zones for  money 
dealing. Hence, according to some far-
seeing observers, the need to fortify Luxem-
bourg's standing and authority in  the fi-
nancial world by all  means available. This 
may be a poor alternative to being the per-
manent full-time seat of the European Par-
liament, but were that to be a lost cause, 
the idea of pressing the financial capital 
cause could certainly bear some thinking 
ab.out.  -ALAN OSBORN 
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FREE  EXHIBITS AVAILABLE 
Free exhibits on the European 
Community are available on loan 
to universities, schools, libraries, 
civic organizations, and other 
interested groups. Shown here is 
the mobile exhibit, 1  0-by-3 feet 
with headboard and lights; shown 
below is the tabletop exhibit. 
Both exhibits can be ordered from 
the European Community 
Information Service,  2100 M 
Street, NW, Suite 707, 
Washington, DC 20037. . 
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increasingly urgent.  • • • '' 
CHARLES HAUGHEY 
In  his  first major speech as  Ireland's Tao-
isedch  (Prime Minister),  Charles  Haughey 
addressed the Ard-Fheis (party conference) 
of his Fianna  Fail Party in  Dublin on Feb-
ruary·17.  Excerpts from  the speech  follow. 
We must all be conscious of the fact that 
even as we gather here, the tragedy of the 
North continues. Violence, suffering, and 
death are a normal part of everyday life. 
There are whole neighborhoods that can 
hardly remember normal conditions and 
where thousands of young people have 
grown up knowing only tension and strife. 
The need for a solution becomes increas-
ingly urgent. Unless one can be brought 
forward soon, the situation could well  be-
come irretrievable. We know from history 
that under such stresses it is  possible for 
society to deteriorate beyond recovery. In 
the view of some observers, Northern Ire-
land may well  be on the verge of such a 
phase. 
The picture is  a depressing one. Agricul-
ture and industry in Northern Ireland now 
produce less than in the early 1970's. The 
population has been static or has fallen. 
Unemployment in  some places is  more than 
20 per cent. 
In  these conditions, feelings of hopeless-
ness, isolation, and despair among individ-
uals and families can become so deep and 
so widespread that the will to restore the 
values and relationships of a normal society 
may well  disappear over large areas and 
leave behind communities that are utterly 
deprived in human and social terms. Surely 
the fine people of Northern Ireland deserve 
better than this. 
All  but a tiny minority understand that 
violence can never bring a solution and 
that it serves only to perpetuate division 
and hatred. 
Let us make it absolutely clear that no 
Irish Government will tolerate any attempt 
by any group to put themselves above the 
law or to arrogate to themselves any of the 
functions of government. 
There is  one army in this state, one po-
lice force,  and one judiciary, appointed un-
der the Constitution, to uphold our laws. 
The Government, acting for the people, · 
will ensure that these laws are effective and 
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are enforced. Democracy will be defended 
and the rule of law upheld. That is  an es-
sential element of national policy. 
For over 60 years now, the situation in 
Northern Ireland has been a source of in-
stability, real or potential, in these islands. 
It has been so because the very entity itself 
is  artificial and has been artificially sus-
tained. In  these conditions, violence and 
repression were inevitable. 
Should the present constitutional confer-
ence help to ensure civil  rights and equality 
for all the people of Northern Ireland and 
to ensure also that security operates impar-
tially, then so  much the better. But the con-
ference itself cannot provide a conclusive 
settlement. We must face  the reality that 
Northern Ireland, as a political entity, has 
failed and that a new beginning is  needed. 
The time has surely come for the two sov-
ereign governments to work together to 
find  a formula and lift the situation on to a 
new plane that will  bring permanent peace 
and stability to the people of these islands. 
No settlement can be contemplated now 
that merely sows the seeds of future dis-
cord. 
There are massive financial, security, and 
constitutional questions to be solved, guar-
antees to be worked out. But a start must 
be  made.  In  my view, a declaration by  the 
British Government of their interest in  en-
couraging the unity of Ireland, by agree-
ment and in  peace, would open the way to-
wards an entirely new situation in  which 
peace, real  and lasting, would become an 
attainable reality. 
For our part, we gladly declare that we 
have no wish to dominate or coerce. The 
evils of domination and coercion at the 
hands of others are too deeply embedded in 
our folk  memory for us  ever to start down 
along that reprehensible road. 
Let me also say that in  any discussion or 
negotiation that may be embarked upon, or 
any settlement that may be proposed, the 
safety and welfare of our fellow country-
men of the protestant faith in Northern Ire-
land would be for me, personally, a special 
priority. I have lived among them as a boy. 
I know their qualities, I admire their vir-
tues, I understand their deeply held convic-
tions. It would be my  concern to ensure 
that their place in  the Ireland of the future 
was secure, that their talents and industry 
were given every opportunity to flourish, 
that their traditions were honored and re-
spected. 
Northern Ireland casts a long, dark 
shadow into every corner of these islands. 
The effects of the violent and unstable situ-
ation there are felt in a hundred different 
ways. 
Because of it, political life in this part of 
the country is  a great deal less fruitful and 
constructive than it would otherwise be. 
We are forced to accept unpalatable meas-
ures, restrictions, and curtailments of free-
dom that are alien to our outlook and our 
character. 
In  the economic situation that confronts 
us, the cost of the security measures di-
rectly attributable to the Northern situa-
tion-about 70 million pounds-is becom-
ing increasingly onerous for  us  to bear. It 
represents an allocation of scarce resources 
that could well be used for  many urgent, 
desirable social purposes. Northern Ireland 
distorts official relations between Britain 
and Ireland. It hinders too the development 
of friendship and cooperation at every level 
between ordinary people in these islands 
who have such a great deal  in  common and 
who have such close personal ties going 
back over many generations. 
Perhaps more than anything else how-
ever, the situation in  the North prevents 
the coming together of all  our cultural tra-
ditions in a full  flowering and the harness-
ing of the energies of all  the people of this 
island in a combined effort for their better-
ment, their welfare, and their happiness. 
We look forward to some new free  and 
open arrangement in  which Irishmen and 
women, on their own, without a British 
presence but with active British good will, 
will  manage the affairs of the whole of Ire-
land in  a constructive partnership within 
the European Community. 
This Government sees Northern Ireland 
as the major national issue and its  peaceful 
solution as our first political priority. The Irish Question 
A British Problem 
JOHN HUME leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party in Northern 
Ireland and member of the European Parliament. 
The current cycle of conflict in Northern Ire-
land began over 11 years ago. As a practicing 
politician in Northern Ireland throughout that 
period, I have taken a particular interest while 
traveling abroad in following the world me-
dia  coverage of the problem.  For the  most 
part, this has been  a  chronicle of atrocities 
reported spasmodically from  London or by 
"firemen" visiting from London. It has struck 
me that, for the outside observer, it must have 
been difficult during these years to avoid the 
impression that Northern Ireland was hope-
lessly ·sunk in incoherence and its people the 
victims of a particularly opaque political pa-
thology.  There have,  it is  true,  been  a  few 
brief interludes when some measure of clarity 
seemed to take hold, only to be swept away 
in the inevitable swirling clouds of violence, 
intransigence and misery - in other words, 
the normal political climate. 
The people of Northern Ireland, however 
divided,  share a  keen  awareness of the  be-
wilderment of outsiders, which occasionally 
finds expression in the mock-heroic couplets 
of the street:  "To Hell with the future  and 
long live the past/May God in His mercy look 
down on Belfast." 
The cynicism and dis.r;nissiveness of the Irish 
style (Churchill's Dunkirk exhortation, "The 
situation is serious but not desperate," is said 
to have  evoked  the somewhat bleary  com-
ment from an  Irish listener, "Over here the 
situation is  always desperate but never seri-
ous") often conceal, as  the readers of Swift 
and Joyce know well, a quite serious desper-
ation.  Nevertheless,  in  its  superficial  mani-
festation the hopeless wit of the people proved 
congenial to those who are currently respon-
sible for the affairs of Northern Ireland, and 
who, of all "outside" observers, often seem 
the most puzzled and wearied by its problem, 
i.e.,  the British political establishment. This 
is  nothing  new.  It  was,  in  fact,  Churchill, 
speaking in the House of Commons in 1922, 
Reprinted by permission from Foreign Affairs, 
Winter 1979-80; Copyright ©  1979 by Council 
on Foreign  Relations, Inc. 
who most eloquently caught this feeling of 
his colleagues, then and since: 
Then came the Great War  .... Every institution, 
almost, in  the world was strained.  Great empires 
have been overturned. The whole map of Europe 
has been changed  ....  The mode of  thought of  men, 
the whole outlook on affairs, the grouping of  par-
ties, all have encountered violent and tremendous 
changes in the deluge of  the world, but  as the deluge 
subsides and the waters fall,  we see the dreary stee-
ples of  Fermanagh and Tyrone emerging once again. 
The  integrity  of their  quarrel  is  one  of the  few 
institutions that have been  unaltered in  the cata-
clysm which has swept the world. 
Other cataclysms  have  since  supervened, 
and are themselves now forgotten, but "their 
quarrel" endures, now in a more grisly form 
then ever. Politically motivated violence is on 
the  increase.  Northern  Ireland  (population 
1.5 million) has two new prisons and a third 
under construction. The skilled and the 
professionally  trained  emigrate  while  the 
economy stagnates, and the semiskilled and 
unskilled swell the unemployment lines  as 
well  as  the  ranks of the paramilitary orga-
nizations. 
It is  my  strong conviction, as  well  as  that 
of my  party, the Social Democratic and La-
bour Party of Northern Ireland, that the pol-
itics of Northern Ireland are not hopelessly 
irrational.  They  do  have  ~ meaning  and a 
structure. The protagonists do act in the light 
of their interests as they perceive them, though 
their perceptions are sometimes mistaken. 
Events  are,  in  fact,  predictable - often,  it 
must be admitted, depressingly so. 
My conviction that there exist structure 
and meaning, and therefore hope, is not based 
simply on Henry Kissinger's moral injunction 
to statesmen that they must at all costs believe 
in  the possibility of solutions to the most in-
tractable  impasses.  I believe,  as  the title  of 
this paper suggests, that the perennial British 
view of the problem as  "their quarrel" and 
not "ours" is  fundamentally wrong: Britain 
is, in fact, included in the quarrel as a central 
protagonist, and must be  centrally involved 
in the solution. 
II 
The problem, as I know from years of talking 
to foreign visitors, is  at first sight a mass of 
contradictions.  Some  of the  contradictions 
are real. London, for its part, exercises a re-
luctant sovereignty in Northern Ireland, while 
Dublin maintains a somewhat reluctant claim 
to that sovereignty. The "loyalists" are those 
proponents of the union with  Britain who, 
while  they  are  avowedly the most patriotic 
of all Her Majesty's s'ubjects, put up the most 
stubborn resistance to her Government's de-
signs. The Provisional wing of the Irish  Re-
publican  Army  believes  Irish  unity  will  be 
secured by  waging war against a British es-
tablishment which clearly has no fundamen-
tal opposition to unity, while they ignore (and, 
in their campaign a·gaihst Britain, further in-
cite) those who must adamantly resist the im-
position of unity, the one million Protestant 
majority. Does this mean things are hopeless? 
The basis of British policy is concealed un-
der layers of good intentions, ingenious ini-
tiatives,  commissions of inquiry,  attempted 
reforms, financial aid, and a good deal of ge-
nial  bewilderment. I do not use  the word 
"concealed" maliciously.  M~ny sincere and 
concerned  British  politicians  and  observers 
have the impression that they have tried 
everything possible to get the Irish to agree 
together: That is  a measure of the extent to 
which the  basic  assumption of their policy 
has become imperceptible to the British them-
selves. 
The ground of their policy is the reiterated 
guarantee that Northern Ireland shall remain 
a part of the United  Kingdom so  long as  a 
majority of the electorate of Northern Ireland 
so desire. That wouid seem, at first  reading, 
to be  an eminently democratic and respon-
sible undertaking. The fact is, however, that 
it has not worked. It has not produced peace 
or stable  government  in  Northern  Ireland. 
Northern Ireland is  a divided community, 
divided not by theological differences but by 
confli<;ting  nationalist aspira,tions.  The 
Unionist majority historically  favor  maintt;-
nance of the  union  with  Britain,  while  the 
one-third Catholic nationalist minority by and 
large favor a united Ireland. In 1921, when 
the overwhelmingly Catholic nationalist Free 
State was established in  the south, the area 
of Northern Ireland was excluded from  the 
arrangement  because  of  British  hesitancy 
(which proved to be an enduring· feature of 
British  policy)  in  the  face  of militant Prot-
estant Unionist resistance. 
"The British guarantee," as  it  is  called, 
proved to be  a  guarantee of permanent ex-
clusive power to one side, the Unionists, and 
a  guarantee of permanent exclusion  from 
power to the other, the Catholic minority. Its 
existence  undermined any  hope of political 
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ern  Ireland.  It  guaranteed the integrity of 
"their" quarrel. While this guarantee exists, 
there  is  no incentive  for  Unionists  to  enter 
into genuine dialogue with those with whom 
they share the islanq of Ireland. 
The many attempts at teform, in which so 
much British as well  as Irish energy was in-
vested,  all  failed.  The one initiative that al-
most succeeded was the Sunningdale Ar-
rangement of 1973 between the British and 
Irish Governments and the principal parties 
in Northern Ireland. This established a power-
sharing  government  containing  representa-
tives  of both sections of the community  in 
Northern Ireland and accepted the principle 
of a Council of Ireland, which would provide 
a forum for north-south cooperation as well 
as  a  means  of expression  for  the  Irish  na-
tionalist aspiration, while  Northern Ireland 
would continue to  be  a  part of the  United 
Kingdom. The establishment of power-shar-
ing was a tribute to the political courage and 
imagination of the last Conservative Govern-
ment in  Britain.  Unfortunately, the  Labour 
Administration, which succeeded it early in 
1974, showed no similar courage, and in May 
of that year,  in  what was one of the  most 
squalid examples of government irresponsi-
bility in  our times, surrendered its  policy in 
the face  of a political strike organized by  a 
paramilitary minority on the  Unionist side. 
As a result, the guarantee was not alone seen 
to be  restored, it was seen  to be reinforced: 
extreme Unionism  or loyalism  was encour-
aged in its belief that it could henceforth resist 
and jettison any British policy for Northern 
Ireland which involved conceding power to 
the minority. 
The politics of Northern Ireland have not 
yet recovered from that setback, and, because 
of it, the problem for the British is even greater 
today than it was in 1973. Will the new Con-
servative Government find  the considerable 
courage it needs to face  this  compounded 
challenge?  My hope is  that Prime  Minister 
Thatcher, in coming to grips with the prob-
lem, will commit all her vaunted capacity to 
reversing the blind momentum of British pub-
lic policy, all her vaunted steadiness of nerve 
in the face of contrary pressure to secure and 
maintain a success. Failure, however, be itthe 
failure  to attempt a serious initiative or the 
failure to sustain an initiative under pressure, 
will  only  reinforce  the difficulty,  and  the 
measure of failure will again be in the spread-
ing field of white crosses in front of city hall 
in  Belfast  commemorating those  who have 
died at the hand of political violence. 
Ill 
The Unionists of Northern Ireland are justly 
proud of their heritage and their contribution 
to the world.  As  many as  eleven American 
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presidents came of their stock. They number 
field  marshals, captains of industry, and co-
lonial governors among their great men. They 
see  themselves  as  a  pragmatic, hardheaded, 
skeptical,  robust people,  and there  is  much 
in  their  history  to  justify  their  view.  They 
have shown a corresponding tendency to re-
gard  their  nationalist  Catholic  neighbors 
throughout the island as a more fanciful and 
less  realistic race,  and indeed there may  be 
much in the history of the dispossession and 
enforced illiteracy of the Catholic community 
to give color to that view. 
History has changed the face and condition 
of Ireland, and these opinions have been ov-
ertaken by events. The south started from a 
platform of no industry and relatively prim-
itive agriculture in 1921, while the north was 
the only part of Ireland seriously affected at 
that time by the Industrial Revolution. Now 
the south has caught up with and will shortly 
overtake the north economically.  Northern 
industry is in decline and is for the most part 
owned by outsiders. The North has no sov-
ereign voice in the world, nor, significantly, 
in the European Community. Unionists 
watched with  envy  tinged  with  resentment 
as Dublin, for the second time, exercises the 
presidency  of the  Council  of the European 
Community during these months.  Unionists 
are, furthermore, dismayed at the decline of 
Britain's greatness to a  point where, most 
galling of all, London must now treat Dublin 
as an equal in the councils of Europe. A hard-
headed people should logically draw the con-
clusion that an arrangement with the south 
is  in  its  best interest.  I have  no  doubt that 
they would do so now were the problem of 
Northern Ireland purely economic. Of course, 
it is  not. 
The Unionists are a majority in Northern 
Ireland, but their political behavior there can 
only be understood if they are seen, as they 
feel themselves to be, as a threatened minority 
on the island of Ireland. Theirs are the politics 
of the besieged. Hence their stubborn refusal 
to share power with the minority in Northern 
Ireland, whom they fear as the Trojan horse 
of the "real" majority in Ireland, the Cath-
olics. Hence, the similarity between their at-
titudes and those of the whites of southern 
Africa. 
Can this attitude be  unfrozen? There are 
some grounds for believing that it can. I have 
mentioned the Sunningdale experiment, the 
most promising attempt so  far  to solve  the 
problem. The main Unionist political group 
at that time, and particularly its leader,  the 
late Mr. Brian Faulkner, showed courage and 
political agility, and the response of most 
Unionists to the experiment was by and large 
benign. The pusillanimity of the Labour Gov-
ernment in  London, in  failing  to resist  the 
predictable destructiveness of the dema-
gogues and paramilitaries on the extremes of 
Unionism,  set  back the  situation almost ir-
remediably; Unionist opinion, it must be ad-
mitted, shifted further to the Righ~ as a result, 
as evidenced by the growing electoral strength 
of Ian Paisley.  Nevertheless, the reality of 
power-sharing did exist, however tenuously. 
Unionists, given the right leadership, were 
seen to be capable of magnanimity. The prob-
lem  now is  to  create  the conditions where 
magnanimity can again take hold, this time 
more securely. 
Now is,  as I have suggested, the moment 
when political leaders in  Northern Ireland, 
in the Republic, and in Britain must radically 
reexamine  their  own  fundamental  assump-
tions. As  I see  it, the two greatest problems 
in Northern Ireland are the British guarantee, 
which inhibits such reexamination, and the 
Unionist dependence on it.  Given economic 
developments in the Republic and the grow-
ing  suspicion  about Britain's  long-term in-
tentions on the part of many Unionists, this 
would seem  a  propitious juncture at which 
to take a serious initiative. Only Britain can 
create the conditions in which Unionists can 
perceive and pursue their true interests. 
I believe that the true interest of Unionists 
depends precisely on the exercise of their tra-
ditional gifts  of self-confidence and self-re-
liance. The time has come for them to believe 
in  themselves  as  their own best guarantors 
in  a future shared with the other people of 
the island of Ireland. 
IV 
As  it is  now, Unionists see  themselves  as  a 
threatened minority on the island of Ireland. 
If you ask a Unionist how real the threat is, 
he or she will tell you of friends or relatives 
who have been murdered or injured by  the 
Provisional IRA. What threat could be  more 
real? That, however, is on:ly a vivid and chill-
ing expression of an even deeper sense of in-
timidation. Unionists fear that they would be 
culturally and racially overwhelmed by  the 
Catholic nationalist majority if they were to 
join with the rest of the island. Would they? 
This is the challenge to Irish nationalism, to 
Dublin, to the nationalist minority in North-
ern Ireland,  and to  the friends  of Irish  na-
tionalism around the world. 
The campaign of violence of the Provi-
sional IRA has, more than any recent devel-
opment, set back and distorted the cause of 
Irish nationalism in the eyes of Unionists, and 
of British and world opinion. It is  clear that 
a majority of the people in Ireland as a whole, 
including a majority of Catholics in Northern 
Ireland, both favor Irish unity as  a solution 
and reject violence as a means of promoting 
that solution. 
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pervious  to the universal  rejection  of their EC Bonds on US Markets 
Cumnt success brings visions for future programs 
Europe's Money, America's Interest 
The first anniversary for  EMS 
ltlll\t' R T <,;FIt ... ll\ li\'IN(, \  ro~ ./~>nt.ln •l• •l tlo ,•( .. ·rm.m \l.u,J•.f/i 11" 1•/m\\  .lil•un:,lo•ll.uto / , l!,tf~,,,.,  >llt"l • ''""~·' ' ' '' ;.-_, '"'  t '""/'<' 
THE SPARTANBURG EXAMPLE 
Haw an old Southern tvwn became "Euroville" 
FRANK VOGL, US  ~cortomics corrnpo•lktlt for 1M Times of Londo,. 
MOU. THAN  4(1 ! UaOPl.AN  COMPANIES  KAV£  INVESTED  what h~  want~  in  Wintnthur in Switudand. With or-
in·  cxcrss of S  1.8 bilhon in Sparunburs. South C.~  ina.  den fr~  hit ficm and with his moourapme:nr  •.  both rt.el 
More than  a~ believed to live 1n chis  Swill Ritter company and Sulttr Brothcn of Wtnterthur 
A NUCLEAR DIFFERENCE 
At stake is Europe's energy supply and/ or the future 
mankind. 
SARAH MILLER, Washington editor for  MrGrtJ!li· H;!/'s  Nudeoni"s Wi!ek 
Special 
Subscription 
Offer 
THERE IS  NO SHOflTAGE OF SUBJECTS ON WHICH  THF.  US  worldwide availability of material easily  made inro nu8 
desire  to  promore  European  unity  d ashes  with other  clear bombs.  Ncarlr rwo and a half years ago work began 
American political or economic goals, particularly where  in  the Senate on  a  bill  w  deal with this  situation, with  you can't get it 
anywhere else 
EUROPE 
2100 M Street, N.W., Suite 707 
Washington, D.C. 20037 
(202) 862-9500 
Subscription Reservation 
Yes! 
Enter my subscription to Europe 
bimonthly for 
D  1 year, $9  D  2 years, $15 
D  3 years, $20 (Best offer) 
D  Payment enclosed  D  Bill me later 
EUROPE is the only American magazine devoted 
exclusively to European affairs. 
Published in the United States by the Commission of 
the European Communities, this bi-monthly magazine 
provides thorough coverage of Europe, the Common 
Market itself, and its impact on America. 
For only $9.00 a year, each issue keeps you up-to-date 
on Europe with: 
•  Analyses by leading journalists and top policy-makers 
•  In-depth special sections on each of the 9 member states 
•  Regular news reports from each of the member state 
capitals 
•  Detailed newsbriefs on Common Market activities 
•  Cataloging of the latest statistical publications about 
Europe 
•  Listings of the newest bo~ks on Europe 
If  you have an interest in Europe, then you need the 
inside story ...  published by the Common Market 
for Americans. 
Take advantage of this introductory offer and sub-
scribe today! There is no need to pay now. We will bill 
you later. 
Nrune ______________________________________________________  _ 
Occupation/Title ----------------------------------------------
Company or Organization ----------------------------------------
Address ____________________________________________  __ 
City----------------State-----Zip-----
please allow 60 days for delivery 
MONEY BACK GUARANTEE:  If  at any time you are not completely satisfied with 
Europe, you may cancel and receive a full refund. methods for a number of reasons. First, they 
are sustained by an extremely simple view of 
the Irish problem, and in this simplicity they 
find  strength and purpose.  For the Provi-
sionals, the Irish problem consists of the Brit-
ish  presence  in  Ireland-nothing more;  re-
move that presence, they claim, and the 
problem will quickly be solved by the estab-
lishment of a unified, independent Irish state. 
This analysis of things not only affords a sim-
ple view of a highly complex situation, but 
it also  provides  the  inspiration  for  violent 
action aimed at inducing British withdrawal. 
The Provisional reading of the problem also 
gains from its clear affinities with the vision 
of  the partially successful, and widely revered, 
insurgents  of the  1916-22 period,  who, in 
their determination to secure freedom for the 
greater part of the Irish people, were under-
standably distracted from the peculiar cir-
cumstances which obtained in the six north-
eastern counties. 
A second factor in  Provisional endurance 
has  been the encouragement which they -
like the loyalist extremists - have been able 
to draw from British weakness and prevari-
cation. That weakness has so shown itself not 
alone in the fact of loyalist intransigence but 
also in the intermittent British dalliance with 
Provisional  "political  spokesmen," whose 
credentials have been forged  by  bombs and 
bullets. 
Third, I believe that the case for Irish na-
tionalism has not been clearly enough ex-
pounded by Irish nationalist leaders. The Pro-
visionals  have  not hesitated  to  exploit the 
ambiguities of policy and the innuendoes of 
the public debate to seek to claim support of, 
or justification for, their actions. 
Fourth, unjustifiable excesses  by  British 
security forces, condemned by the European 
Court of Human Rights as inhuman and de-
grading treatment, created an implacable hos-
tility  to Britain in  the minds  of many who 
were subjected to them. These excesses,  to-
gether with the introduction of internment 
without trial in 1971 (it has since been aban-
doned), did more to gain recruits for the Pro-
visionals than any exhortations to "blood 
sacrifice"  from  the patriarchs of the  move-
ment. 
Fifth, the absence of political activity from 
the life of Northern Ireland has provided both 
an opportunity and an argument to the men 
of violence:  they  can  with some credibility 
play upon the frustrations of the minority in 
the absence of political hope, and they can 
well ask, in the face  of British  immobilism: 
Who but we are doing anything about North-
ern Ireland? 
Finally, it can be seen that the Provisionals 
have hardened into a ruthless terrorist force 
which can compensate in terms of experience 
and technique for what it has lost in political 
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support. It is  a  long time  now since  com-
mentators invoked Mao and predicted that, 
as  the water of popular approval dried up, 
the guerrilla fish would have to abandon the 
struggle to survive. We can now see that the 
fish need less water than we had thought. The 
Provisionals have for several  years  received 
only insignificant support from the popula-
tion  of either Northern Ireland or the  Re-
public; yet they retain the ability to disrupt 
and terrorize. 
Indeed, their activities have descended to 
a level of savagery which has all but numbed 
the capacity of the public to respond  with 
horror to even their inhuman atrocities. Life 
has become cheap--and the entire commu-
nity to some extent dehumanized.  "Is there 
a life  before death?'' asks a piece of anony-
mous graffiti  on a  Belfast  wall,  with  some 
reason.  The writer might also  have asked 
whether there is  any childhood left  for the 
battle-scarred children of the ghettos of that 
city, and of the rest of Northern Ireland. 
Aside from the immorality of its  actions, 
the Provisional IRA campaign has no hope of 
success.  It is,  I suppose, conceivable that it 
might  eventually  frighten  a  feeble  British 
Government out of Northern Ireland before 
any  process  could  begin.  What would  un-
doubtedly follow would be a serious risk of 
a  bloodbath. This would quickly  spread to 
the south, and after thousands of deaths, would 
finally  resolve  itself  by  the  division  of the 
island into two bristling, homogeneous sec-
tarian states, neither stable, both sunk in the 
obscurantism of their most extreme support-
ers. No military victory followed by a polit-
ical settlement is possible in Northern Ireland. 
That is true not for the Provisionals alone but 
for the loyalists and the British Government 
as well. 
The Irish government and most nationalists 
in  Ireland have repeatedly given  convincing 
evidence of their repudiation of the violence 
of the Provisionals-the public  by  its  con-
sistent rejection at the polls of those who sup-
port violence, and the Irish  Government by 
its active pursuit of the men of violence, its 
commitment of additional police  and army 
units to the border areas, and the introduc-
tion  of draconian  legal  measures  to  secure 
convictions in the courts,  Dublin and Irish 
opinion generally clearly intend no threat to 
Unionists; on the contrary, the leaders of Irish-
American opinion, which was generally seen 
by  Unionists to be  hostile to their interests 
and indeed  supportive of violence,  have  in 
recent years repeatedly condemned support 
for violence from the United States. This has 
had the  double effect  of reducing  material 
assistance  for  the  Provisional  IRA from  the 
United States and of going some way toward 
assuaging one source of Unionist anxiety. 
Despite these positive elements, there is an 
important sense in which the principal source 
of Irish nationalist sentiment, i.e., Dublin, has 
not yet fully clarified its intentions. Unionists 
will not be  able  to  bring themselves  to en-
tertain seriously the notion of Irish unity un-
less  Dublin unambiguously spells  out what 
it understands by unity and gives  clear evi-
dence of its commitments. 
The southern state is seen by many Union-
ists (in  varying degrees by the majority) as a 
lay expression of sectarian Catholic values. 
As such, it is unacceptable to them. The real-
ity, as  I encounter it, is  that the Republic is 
a modern state struggling to develop its econ-
omy and society within a ,European frame-
work. The partition of Ireland, 50 years ago, 
created  a  state in  the  south  with  an over-
whelmingly Catholic population. Inevitably, 
Catholic values were enshrined in some areas 
of law, particularly family law, although the 
state is  in  other respects  one of the  least 
confessional in Europe, with no official church. 
Unionists have a right to be  convinced that 
the south is  serious when it declares  its  in-
tention to embody pluralist values in the law 
of the United Ireland to which it aspires. So 
far,  the  evidence  for  these  intentions  is  in-
adequate. 
Even  more  seriously,  those  who  avow  a 
nationalist solution must clarify how they 
would implement this. Statements which con-
tain hints of irredentism, of conquest, of com-
pulsion,  do  not promote a policy  of unity; 
moreover, they give  comfort to the men  of 
violence.  The  Irish  Government  repudiates 
violence  and by  its  action is  seen  to do so. 
It  should, nevertheless, in claiming the ground 
of nationalism, clarify, if  necessary  ad nau-
seam, its commitment to unity by agreement, 
only  by  agreement, and through  reconcilia-
tion. 
One of the difficulties about Northern Ireland 
which  existed  until  recently  was  that the 
problem seemed to matter little, if  at all.  It 
mattered very little to the British. It seemed 
incapable of sustaining the attention of any 
but the most committed fanatics.  Govern-
ments and serious observers, if  they  looked 
at it, had a feeling of impatience with its com-
plexities, its  anthill of competing eccentrici-
ties.  There was a feeling that it ought to be 
like  the pieces  of a  jigsaw,  needing only to 
be placed in a certain arrangement fortran-
quility to ensue. Unfortunately, the pieces did 
not seem  to fit,  and the puzzle quickly  lost 
its interest. 
The time has come for a positive and de-
cisive  initiative.  It  must be  taken  by  both 
Dublin and London acting together. They 
should first  make  it clear that there are no 
longer any unconditional guarantees for any 
section of the northern community. There is only a commitment to achieving a situation 
in which there are guarantees for all. 
Second, they should make it clear that  there 
is  in fact no pat solution as  such,  but only 
a process that will  lead to a solution. They 
should declare themselves committed to such 
a  process,  a process designed to lead to an 
agreed Ireland with positive roles for all. They 
should invite all parties to participate in this 
process, the process of building a new Ireland. 
Some groups will undoubtedly react with an 
initial  refusal,  but the  process  should  con-
tinue without them, leaving the door always 
open for their participation at any stage. 
Indeed, on embarking on ·this process we 
ought to be encouraged by  the  example of 
both the United States  and the  European 
Community. In the United States, in spiteof 
deep  differences  of origin and background, 
they have formed a constitution which is able 
to harness great differences for the common 
good. Yet the Italians remain Italian, the blacks 
are still  black,  and the Irish  still parade on 
St.  Patrick's Day. They have created a unity 
in diversity. 
Europe itself has suffered centuries of bloody 
conflict. In this century alone, the peoples of 
Europe have been locked in the savagery of 
two world wars with a bitterness and slaugh-
ter that goes  far  beyond  anything  that we 
have experienced on this island. Yet 34 years 
after the Second World War, as  a  result of 
an  agreed  process,  they  have  been  able  to. 
create one parliament to represent them, one 
community-and the Germans are still Ger-
mans, the French are still French. They, too, 
have a unity in diversity. 
Is it too much to ask that we on this small 
island do precisely the same thing? Is  it too 
much to ask that these two responsible gov-
ernments begin to declare themselves now in 
favor  of such  a  process?  Can we  too build 
a unity in diversity? 
VI 
One of the few  developments which  has 
cheered  those who believe  that moderation 
and reason must prevail in Northern Ireland 
has been a growing interest in  the  problem 
on the  part of responsible  political  leaders 
outside of Ireland and Britain. This is partic-
ularly  true  of the  United  States,  and,  to  a 
significant  extent,  of the  European  Com-
munity. 
I  believe  that the  friends  of Britain have 
been dismayed at evidence in recent years of 
a  British  retreat from  a  world view.  Many 
have felt  that this contraction of vision  has 
been accompanied by, if it is not symptomatic 
of, a weakening of Britain's political psyche. 
That in  itself,  if true, should concern those 
who hope for a solution to Northern Ireland's 
problems which, as I have argued, will require 
considerable political courage on Britain's part. 
Mrs. Thatcher, in recent speeches and in-
deed  in her post-election approach to the 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  problem,  has  shown 
some willingness to reverse  the decline.  All 
the more reason why she should be serious 
about the problem of Northern Ireland, a 
strategically placed area in the Atlantic ap-
proaches to northwest Europe, potentially ripe 
for subversion if political neglect continues. 
The growing serious unrest of American and 
European leaders reflects, I believe, an aware-
ness of this threat. 
VII 
The interest of the West in the problem is not 
only strategic.  History has  made of Ireland 
one of the most "internationalized" com-
munities in the world. The foundation of her 
relations with the two wings of the Western 
world lies in the emigration of the past cen-
turies: in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies to France and Spain; in the eighteenth, 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to Amer-
ica; and again, more recently, to Britain. The 
basis is  people, the Irish diaspora. 
The situation today is intriguing: the earlier 
links with the continent have been renewed 
but now rest on the solid foundation of the 
treaties of the European Community. The 
links with America  are  founded  on the old 
connections of blood, friendship, and heritage 
between the  four  and a  half million people 
on the island today and upwards of 16 million 
people in the United States. The relationship 
has  deepened and matured as  the  Republic 
has developed politically and economically, 
and as  the Irish in  America have prospered 
and  built  on  their  extraordinary  political 
achievements of the past hundred years. 
These two global relationships have played 
major roles in the fortunes of Ireland in recent 
years.  From America came much of the  in-
dustrial investment which  created the  im-
pressive economic development of the Re-
public in recent years. From Europe have come 
the economic benefits of membership in  the 
Community  which  have  transformed  life, 
particularly in the Republic, and also created 
a  sense  of political  dignity  and statehood, 
again in the Republic, which, prior to mem-
bership, had been stifled by a claustrophobic 
bilateral  relationship  with  the  neighboring 
island. 
Since  the  great  tides  of Irish  emigration 
began to flow  to America in  the  nineteenth 
century, the  Irish  in  America  tried  without 
success  to  interest  Washington  administra-
tions  in  the  "Irish  question."  Great names 
such  as John Devoy, editor of The  Gaelic-
American,  and Eamon De  Valera  were  en-
ergetically involved in this endeavor, but in 
vain. This is  not to fault these men:  It was 
a function of the nature of Irish political power 
in  America  during these generations, which 
was confined to the leadership of some of the 
great cities and states.  It remained largely 
excluded  from  Washington.  That situation 
changed dramatically in 1960 with the Ken-
nedy Presidency. 
VIII 
In  recent  years  the  influence  of powerful 
American leaders of Irish extraction in Wash-
ington, notably Senator Edward Kennedy and 
House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, has brought 
the issue to a point where the Carter Admin-
istration has  taken a  position on Northern 
Ireland. As a result, the support for violence 
from  the United  States  has  been  contained 
and  has  in  fact  dropped.  That this  should 
have  been maintained during the past years 
of political vacuum in Northern Ireland is  an 
extremely extraordinary achievement. There 
are many men, women, and children in North-
ern Ireland who are  alive  today, I am con-
vinced, because of the political courage and 
concern of these men. 
President Carter has committed himself to 
providing economic aid in  the event that a 
solution acceptable to both sides in Northern 
Ireland, and to the British and Irish govern-
ments, can be  found.  That was a generous, 
humane and unprovocative commitment. It 
was welcomed by the Irish and British Gov-
ernments as a major incentive to reconcilia-
tion, and they were both consulted about it. 
The Irish  question has  become  a  legitimate 
and serious issue in the Atlantic relationship 
between London and Washington. 
The responsible interest of American lead-
ers  is  welcome.  Less  welcome is  the exploi-
tation of the issue by a few less distinguished 
politicians. Violent men in Ireland invoke their 
names as  certifying their own respectability 
and as an indication of support for their cause. 
The votes of Americans should not be  pur-
chased at the expense of Irish lives. 
The European Community, because of its 
name,  because of its  primary historic com-
mitment to reconciling the enmities of gen-
erations of Europeans  and averting the  re-
currence of armed conflict, could not stand 
aside  from  the  conflict  between  two of its 
own peoples. Several European leaders have 
expressed concern and interest. It is my hope 
that the European Parliament will soon hold 
a full-scale debate on the issue, and that the 
Community will  match America's generous 
incentive to peace. 
The interest of the United States and of the 
European  Community  in  Northern  Ireland 
is  historically inevitable and perfectly legiti-
mate. This need not involve direct interven-
tion or support for particular partisan poli-
cies. It should be taken as an encouragement 
by  London, by  Dublin,  and by  parties in 
Northern Ireland to have the courage to re-
solve this old quarrel that involves them all. 
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Council President Visits US 
Italian Prime Minister Francesco Cos-
siga spoke with a special voice during 
his late January visit to the United States, 
since Italy currently holds the presi-
dency of the EC Council. 
While  in  Washington  Cossiga  met 
with US  President Jimmy Carter and 
several other high-level officials to dis-
cuss the Afghanistan crisis, as well as 
the international economic and polit-
ical situations. He also met with United 
Nations Secretary-General Kurt Wald-
heim in New York following the Wash-
ington talks. 
Chicken, Turkey Uprisings 
Veterans of chicken and turkey wars, 
EC and US agricultural representatives 
talked in January in Brussels about trade 
problems in poultry products between 
the two sides. 
The United States said it felt export 
refunds for EC chickens were too high. 
There was also concern expressed about 
a Community decision to extend such 
refunds to turkey exports. 
Following the meetings, the EC 
Commission announced that it would 
suspend the  advance fixing  of export 
refunds  for  chickens  while  it  consid-
ered the reduction of such refunds. 
EC  in Support of US  Boycott 
Agricultural mechanisms  are  in  place 
in the Community in support of the US 
grain boycott of the Soviet Union, said 
a spokesman for EC Commission Pres-
ident Roy Jenkins during a January visit 
to Washington. 
Wheat,  barley,  poultry,  and  butter 
cannot be  sold  in  greater than tradi-
tional quantities as  a result of the ag-
ricultural mechanisms.  Therefore, it 
would be  impossible  for  Community 
products to make up for any deficiency 
suffered  in  the  Soviet  Union  because 
of the US  boycott. As for the question 
of the  Olympic Games  to  be  held  in 
Moscow this summer, the Commission 
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spokesman said the  Commission had 
taken no position up to that time. 
While  in  Washington, Jenkins  met 
with US  President Jimmy  Carter and 
other top officials  for  discussions  on 
trade, the Afghanistan and Iranian 
crises,  and other foreign  policy ques-
tions. 
Antidumping Duties Levied 
A 7.2  per cent antidumping duty  on 
imports  from  an American  producer 
of acrylic fibers to the Community was 
announced by  the EC  Commission in 
early  December.  The  US  company  is 
American Cyanamid Co. 
Another firm involved, the American 
subsidiary of a German firm, will not 
be affected by the levy since it agreed 
to raise its prices to the Community. 
The action follows  months of con-
cern about the possible unfair advan-
tage of American competitors in  syn-
thetic fibers because of the low American 
prices on the base petroleum. 
Veil Visits Washington 
European Parliament President Simone 
Veil  went to Washington in  late Jan-
uary with a 23-member delegation from 
the  Parliament.  While  the  delegation 
held its regular inter-parliamentary talks 
with members of the US Congress, Veil 
undertook a whirlwind of visits  with 
US  officials and journalists. 
The White House reported that dur-
ing her visit with President Jimmy 
Carter, Veil discussed the evolution of 
the Parliament and increased prospects 
for its becoming a significant social and 
political force  in  Europe, now that it 
is  directly elected. 
Carter stressed his  admiration for 
the strength and vigor with which the 
European Parliament addresses major 
issues. The two leaders agreed on the 
desirability of intensifying transatlan-
tic cooperation in trade and energy. 
Jenkins Meets US Leaders 
The crises in Afghanistan and Iran were 
discussed when EC  Commission Pres-
ident Roy Jenkins met with President 
Jimmy Carter in  Washington during 
a late January visit. 
A communique following the White 
House meeting said that both sides had 
agreed that the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan should be  met with a  firm 
and united Western response. Jenkins 
later told the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that the Community wanted 
to study the subject of sanctions against 
,Iran more closely to avoid policies that 
would do more harm to Europe than 
to Iran. 
Other topics discussed were trade 
and energy,  EC  contacts with  Yugo-
slavia, Turkey, and the Gulf States. The 
international  nuclear  fuel  security 
studies, the effects of  Spanish entry into 
the  Community,  and  relations  with 
China were also covered. 
In  a  speech  later  to  the  Economic 
Club of New York, Jenkins stressed the 
need  to  work for  implementation  of 
the  new Tokyo  Round  agreements. 
EXTERNAL 
EC  Condemns Soviet Action 
The Community came out strongly in 
mid-January against the Soviet military 
intervention in Afghanistan. The Com-
mission also tried to cooperate with the 
trade and economic actions taken by 
other countries. 
EC foreign ministers said the Soviet 
action represented a "serious violation 
of the principles of international rela-
tions."  Their statement called  Soviet 
explanations "unacceptable" and urged 
"immediate  and  unconditional  with-
drawal of all  foreign  troops from  Af-
ghanistan." The ministers also said the 
Community would examine its policy 
on exports of high-technology equip-
ment and export credits to the Soviet 
Union. 
The European Parliament voted a 
similar resolution urging the Com-
munity to consider additional eco-
nomic sanctions. The same week the 
Commission further  tightened  its  ex-
port surveillance systems on trade with 
the Soviet Union to include most ag-
ricultural products. It had earlier acted 
on the cereals  sector. The new  move 
was said to cover other products such 
as beef, dairy products, and sugar. 
Negotiations Urged On 
EC foreign ministers meeting in  Brus-
sels in January agreed that negotiations 
with  Yugoslavia  on an  economic  ac-
cord should be speeded up. Reports of 
Marshal Josip Broz Tito's grave illness 
contributed to this urgency. 
The talks had lagged because of Yu-
goslavia's reluctance to accept a large 
number of products to be included on 
a list of sensitive products, whose entry 
into  the  Community would  be  re-
stricted. 
EC-ASEAN Talks Concluded 
Negotiations for a cooperation agree-
ment between the Community and the 
Association of South East Asia Nations 
(ASEAN)  were completed late last year, 
and signature was scheduled for early 
March in  Kuala  Lumpur,  the  capital 
of Malaysia. 
The accord is  a five-year nonprefer-
ential cooperation agreement designed 
to promote closer trade and economic 
relations  between the two groups,  as 
well as development of the ASEAN coun-
tries:  Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
A joint cooperation committee will 
be established to promote and review 
activities  and to provide a  forum  for 
consultation between the parties. 
Trade Ties With New State 
EC  foreign  ministers approved a pro-
posal in January that would establish 
a temporary relationship between the 
Community and the new entity of Rho-
desia-Zimbabwe. 
The arrangement, which will last until 
the state's independence after elections 
are conducted there, means that prod-
ucts  from  Rhodesia-Zimbabwe  will 
have free  access  into the Community 
market. 
The Community indicated that it 
would closely monitor the level of to-
bacco, one of Rhodesia's main exports, 
to avoid disruptive import patterns that 
would affect Community domestic 
production. 
The new  link follows  lengthy ne-
gotiations to end 14 years of contro-
versy  in the African state over its  in-
dependence from  status as  a  British 
colony and internal fighting  among 
groups seeking to lead the independent 
state. 
After the election,  the country will 
be  able to decide whether or not it 
wants to become a member of the Lome 
Convention. 
EC, Canada Work on Energy 
An  agreement  to  collaborate  on  the 
further development of Canada's "en-
ergy bus" has been signed by the Com-
munity and Canada. The cooperative 
venture, signed in Brussels, was a high 
point of the third meeting of the EC-
CanadaJoint Cooperation Committee, 
established in 1976. The Canadian en-
ergy audit bus, which conducts on-site 
analysis of energy efficiency in  indus-
try,  was  to  tour several  EC  member 
states with Canadian experts demon-
strating the capabilities of the bus. 
Also at the December meeting of the 
Joint Cooperation Committee, a work 
program for 1980-81 was adopted. The 
committee plans to concentrate on how 
Canada and the Community can take 
full advantage of the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations to further the objectives 
of the association. Both sides will also 
seek to enhance cooperation in energy 
development and conservation issues. 
Tokyo Round Rules Applied 
New "Tokyo Round" rules  for  trade 
and tariffs  were applied in  the  Com-
munity at the beginning of 1980. 
The  first  major components  to  be 
implemented were a  new set of rules 
governing  the  application  of anti-
dumping and anti-subsidies measures. 
This means internationally accepted 
remedies  for  EC  industries  and gov-
ernments that feel  they have  been  in-
jured by  imports benefiting from sub-
sidies or artifically low prices. 
Thus, a new regulation on protection 
against dumped or subsidized imports 
from countries outside the Community 
was  adopted by  the Council of Min-
isters effective January 1, in accordance 
with  the  Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions package. The main innovation of 
the  new  regulation  is  detailed  provi-
sions for  action against subsidized as 
distinct from  dumped imports.  Sec-
ondly, existing rules concerning injury 
to an industry have been  reformed 
abandoning the concept of dumping 
as  a  principle cause.  Now the effects 
of dumping must be  weighed  against other factors. 
More precise rules for the definition 
of injury were also adopted to include 
the threat of injury and injury to  re-
gional markets within the Community. 
Procedural  changes  requiring  that 
Community decisions be explained in 
greater detail were passed. In addition, 
duties may now be  applied retroac-
tively to past violations in certain cases. 
ln addition, a series of codes of ac-
cepted conduct in  a number of areas 
of international trade will  be  applied 
by the Community and most of its major 
trading partners. Most are designed to 
remove nontariff barriers. These in-
clude methods of evaluating custom 
duties,  import  licensing,  government 
purchasing practices, and civilian air-
craft.  Others involve  a  reduction of 
tariffs and agricultural products. 
New Import Controls 
The EC Commission announced in late 
January a new system for  controlling 
and monitoring disruptive imports from 
third  countries once they  reach  the 
Community market. 
The new procedures involve an au-
Community and Finland in  areas of 
mutual interest. 
Terrorism Pact Signed 
A pact aimed at fighting international 
terrorism  was  signed  by  EC  justice 
ministers in Dublin in December. 
The new convention states that acts 
of violence such as  kidnapping or air-
plane hijackings will not be treated as 
political  offenses  and  specifies  that 
member states will either prosecute or 
extradite persons  suspected  of such 
actions. 
Its  far-reaching  implications  elimi-
nate the concept of political asylum or 
immunity from the legal systems of the 
signatories. The past comes into effect 
three months after having been ratified 
by all member states, which is expected 
as early as  1981. 
ECONOMY 
tomatic issue of import licenses to keep  Steel Plan Extended 
track of such products. The issue will 
not apply  across  the  board as  in  the 
past, but after examination of the eco-
nomic situation in  the country in-
volved. 
Conditions under which an appli-
cation for an import restriction can be 
made are also covered. Applications 
for import restrictions increased from 
110 cases in 1976 to 347 in 1979. Most 
were filed  in the textile sector. 
The new procedures were designed 
to retain a degree of control over im-
ports originating in other countries once 
they reach EC markets. A past problem 
was that goods restricted in one mem-
ber state might be deflected to another. 
However, the old system had been 
questioned as being in violation of the 
principle of free trade among EC mem-
bers. 
The EC  steel crisis program has  been 
extended through  1980 by  the EC 
Council of Ministers. 
Like its predecessors, the 1980 plan 
includes both internal price floors for 
certain steel products and import un-
derstandings with major steel supply-
ing nations. The extended plan, how-
ever, will suspend minimum prices in 
1980 for a few steel products that were 
covered under previous plans. 
In another phase of the plan, the EC 
Commission will initiate contacts with 
import steel  producing nations to ex-
tend the self-limitations these countries 
have been applying toward shipments 
to the Community in recent years. Such 
negotiations may take place for as many 
as 18 countries in the coming months. 
The Commission studied the  prob- Jobless Number Six Million 
lem  in the wake of a  1976 ruling by  .  .  . 
the European Court of Justice and de- figures released m mid-No~ember put 
cided that some of the surveillance sys- the n.umber of unem~l~yed  m the Com-
terns established by member states could  ~umt;r ove.r the 6 milhon mark for the 
create unnecessary trade barriers.  first time smce March 1979. 
The result was  that unemployment 
Haferkamp Visits Finland 
The  common  commitment to  resist 
pressures for protectionist measures was 
reaffirmed by  Finnish authorities and 
EC  Commission Vice  President Wil-
helm Haferkamp, in charge of external 
affairs,  during  his  December  visit  to 
Finland. 
It was noted that protectionism would 
jeopardize  the  restructuring of  Euro-
pean  industry  without  solving  the 
problem of unemployment.  Hafer-
kamp and the Finnish authorities also 
agreed that the free-trade agreement 
between Finland and  the Community 
had operated satisfactorily, especially 
in view of the difficult world economic 
picture. They welcomed progress made 
in expanding contacts between the 
as  a percentage of the working popu-
lation rose  from  5.5  per cent in  Sep-
tember to 5.6 per cent by  the end of 
October. The survey found that there 
was a marked deterioration in four EC 
nations with increases above the Com-
munity average. Luxembourg showed 
a 13.8 per cent increase in redundan-
cies; France rose by 3.9 per cent; Ger-
man unemployment climbed by 3.4 per 
cent; and Italy increased 2.5 per cent. 
Reductions  in  unemployment were 
registered in three countries: the Neth-
erlands by 2.4 per cent; Belgium with 
a 2.1  per cent drop; and Britain with 
1.9 per cent. 
The percentage for  male  unem-
ployed  fell  by  .2  point while  women 
without jobs increased by  .3  per cent 
during the year. 
INVESTMENT 
Funds for the Ortoli Facility 
The EC Commission recommended in 
late January an increase to 500 million 
European units of account  (EVA)  of 
funding available in 1980 for the new 
Community loan program known  as 
the "Ortoli Facility"-named after 
Commission Vice  President Franc;ois-
Xavier Ortoli, in  charge of economk 
and financial affairs. 
The plan approved last year is  de-
signed to channel large-scale invest-
ment financing  for  major projects of 
importance to the Community. EUA 300 
million was approved in 1979 in a first 
series of projects. The remaining proj-
ects will be announced in coming 
months. 
The  Commission  proposed that in 
the first year of operation, the emphasis 
be on energy and major infrastructure 
projects. The concept of infrastructure 
should  be  enlarged  to  include  urban 
renovation projects, it said, with spe-
cial consideration also given to prefab-
ricated factories, plants, and housing. 
Nuclear Loan Signed 
Following negotiations between the EC 
Commission and a Luxembourg bank-
ing syndicate, a contract was signed in 
early December for the issue of a Eu-
ratom bond loan on the Luxembourg 
capital market. 
Proceeds of the loan will be used to 
finance investment projects relating to 
the construction of nuclear power sta-
tions and industrial nuclear fuel  cycle 
installations. 
The loan is  for  500 million  Lux-
embourg francs  for  eight years  at an 
annual interest rate of 9.75 per cent. 
The banking syndicate is managed by 
the Banque lnternationale a  Luxem-
bourg S.A. Application has been made 
for official listing on the Luxembourg 
stock exchange. 
Regional Fund Creates Jobs 
Some  53,000  jobs  were  created  as  a 
result of financial  grants awarded in 
early January by the EC Regional Fund 
to less  prosperous regions of the  Eu-
ropean Community. 
For 335 industrial or service projects 
and for  1,5 56 infrastructure projects, 
the total granted for the latter part of 
1979 was 538 million European units 
of account (EUA).  This aid brought the 
total allocated for the 1979 budget to 
EUA  966 million-the largest amount 
ever spent in one year since the creation 
of the fund in 1975. 
Coal and Steel Investments 
A report on investments in the coal and 
steel industries, released late last year, 
showed that in  1978  there  was  in-
creased spending in coal but a decline 
in steel expenditures. 
The  annual survey  indicated that 
capital investment in coal reached nearly 
1 billion European units of account 
(EUA)  and that the increase was partic-
ularly marked in the United Kingdom, 
but modest in  the  Ruhr.  Despite  the 
increase in investment, said the survey, 
extraction potential continues  to  de-
cline and is expected to fall below pro-
jected plans. 
A drop in  capital expenditures for 
steel from EUA 3.3 billion in 1976 and 
EUA  2.4 billion in 1977 to EUA 2.1 bil-
lion in 1978 was reported. The survey 
noted, however, that substantial in-
vestments have been made to modern-
ize and increase efficiency and output. 
Production potential in finished prod-
ucts is expected to increase in the next 
few years, the survey said. 
ECSC Loan Floated 
A contract for the issue of a $100 mil-
lion  loan  for  1979-86 was  signed  in 
December between the EC  Commis-
sion and a banking syndicate. Proceeds 
of the loan will be used to finance in-
vestment in the coal and steel industrial 
and conversion programs. 
The loan is  in  10,000 bonds  of 
$10,000 each offering an initial interest 
rate  of 12  per cent per annum.  The 
interest is to drop by .25 per cent every 
year. The issue price was S$!t  at 98.85 
per cent. 
The loan is  to be  launched on the 
international capital market in the form 
of a private placement. It was under-
written by  a  banking syndicate man-
aged by  the Societe Generale.  An  ap-
plication is to be made for official listing 
on the Luxembourg stock exchange. 
ENERGY 
EC Oil Bulletin 
The Community's average increase in 
free-on-board  prices  of crude  oil  be-
tween December 31, 1978, and Janu-
ary 21, 1980, was  114 per cent  as  a 
result of decisions taken by the oil-ex-
porting countries. 
The pre-tax prices  of the  principal 
oil  products  (crude  oil  and imported 
finished products) increased by an av-
erage of around 89  per cent over the 
same period. If these prices  had been 
in line with the Rotterdam spot prices, 
the  figure  would  have  been  115  per 
cent rather than 89 per cent. 
The EC Commission publishes weekly 
bulletins in order to make Community 
oil  markets more transparent, partic-
ularly in regard to price information. 
Energy Saving Moves Ahead 
The next phase of proposals made last 
summer  by  a  group  headed  by  Jean 
Saint-Geours  in  "In Favor of an En-
ergy-Efficient  Society"  have  been ap-
proved by the EC Commission. 
The study indicated that with exist-
ing technology and new, nondisruptive 
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cent or more of the energy now con-
sumed could be saved.' These changes, 
however, would require important pol-
icy  and investment shifts  that would 
have to be thoroughly planned and 
debated. 
The next phase in the application of 
the recommendations, the Commission 
announced, would involve major pub-
lic  information campaigns,  the  orga-
nization of a commercial and trade fair 
based around the theme, "The World 
in  the  Post-Petroleum Era," regular 
reviews of energy taxation and pricing 
policies, and the preparation of a data 
bank on energy. In addition, the Com-
mission plans to set up an expert group 
to study the questions of investment 
and employment connected with  en-
ergy savings. 
Other studies will concentrate on such 
areas as the means of transferring en-
ergy-saving technology and special 
problem sectors that would be  seri-
ously  affected  by  reduced energy de-
pendence and consumption. 
Nuclear Material Protection 
After two years of negotiations, the EC 
Commission has approved a  commu-
nication to the Council of Ministers on 
an  international  convention for  the 
physical protection of nuclear material. 
The Commission negotiated on be-
half of Euratom  in  the  International 
Atomic Energy Agency's headquarters 
in Vienna. The Community can adhere 
to the  convention either by  signature 
or by  accession the same as  any sov-
ereign state. 
The convention was to open for sig-
nature in early March and would enter 
into force  after ratification by  21  sig-
natories.  Fifty-eight other states  par-
ticipated in  the negotiations alongside 
the Community. 
The  Commission's  communication 
to the Council suggests that it would 
be  appropriate for  the  convention to 
be signed by the Commission on behalf 
of Euratom and by the member states 
simultaneouslv. It also asks authori-
zation for Ener.gy Commissioner Guido 
Brunner to sign the convention. 
Energy Pact Proposed 
A major new proposal for international 
energy and economic cooperation was 
proposed by EC Energy Commissioner 
Guido Brunner in a speech in late Jan-
uary. 
Brunner's plan would include an in-
ternational  pact  originating with  EC 
member states and open to 0ther coun-
tries  wishing to cooperate on conser-
vation of energy and raw material sup-
plies.  Another step proposed was the 
introduction of an EC tax on oil  im-
ports  to  encourage  and  help  finance 
domestic energy production. 
In  addition, Brunner suggested  set-
ting  up  a  world  security  council  for 
economic affairs, and he also proposed 
an energy conference among East and 
West European nations, as part of the 
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Helsinki accord on European security 
and  cooperation.  Brunner then  rec-
ommended that Europe develop a spe-
cial cooperation effort that included 
energy matters with Middle East coun-
tries. 
Energy Bus Goes to Europe 
A  memorandum of understanding on 
collaboration in  the continued devel-
opment of an "energy bus" was signed 
between the Community and Canada 
when the Canadian-EC joint commis-
sion met in  Brussels late last year. 
Of Canadian design, the energy bus 
is  a  vehicle containing measuring 
equipment to gauge  the  efficiency  of 
energy consumption in industrial plants, 
office buildings, and other facilities. 
Following its arrival in Europe, an en-
ergy bus will tour several countries in 
the Community with Canadian experts 
demonstrating the  capabilities  of the 
bus. 
Double for Coal Projects 
The EC Commission has proposed to 
double the funds  available for dem-
onstration projects in coal liquefaction 
and gasification  from  50  million  Eu-
ropean units of account  (EUA)  to  EUA 
100 million. 
Justification of the increase pointed 
to the rise in oil prices since the amount 
was originally set last April, and to fur-
ther rises expected. Coal technology is 
receiving growing attention because of 
the need to reduce dependence on oil. 
Member states and industry had al-
ready shown great interest in the first 
call  for  tenders.  Four projects  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  Germany,  and  Bel-
gium received  nearly  EUA  16  million 
worth of support. 
ENVIRONMENT 
Environment Ministers Meet 
A major new Community control on 
the amount of sulphur dioxide in  the 
atmosphere has  been  adopted by  the 
EC environment ministers. 
The proposal, hailed as an important 
step in public health, will require Com-
munity countries to apply new allow-
able minimums to harmful sulphur 
dioxide and other suspended particles 
in the air by 1983. 
Another important issue covered was 
the Community's decision to reduce 
the  use  of fluorocarbons  in  aerosol 
sprays. Fluorocarbons are considered 
harmful to the earth's ozone layer,  a 
protective shield against the sun's rays. 
Destruction of this  layer could result 
in  such  ailments  as  skin  cancer.  The 
ministers set in  motion a program de-
signed to reduce the use of fluorocar-
bons by  as  much as  30  per cent,  the 
present target in  Germany. 
The  ministers  also  discussed  pro-
posed reduced levels of lead to be al-
lowed in the air;  further studies on 
dealing  with  maritime  oil  pollution 
accidents, such as  the Amoco Cadiz 
disaster; and proposed new controls 
and inspections to prevent major in-
dustrial pollution accidents, such as the 
one a few years ago in Seveso, Italy. 
Dutch and French representatives also 
talked about the current controversy 
over France's failure to ratify an inter-
national convention aimed at reducing 
the amount of salt wastes from potash 
mines being dumped in the Rhine River. 
COMPETITION 
Journals Refuse Advertising 
Two Belgian journals in- common own-
ership  who  refused  to  accept  British 
advertisements in March last year told 
the Commission they  will  accept ad-
vertisements  from  0utside Belgium  in 
the future,  it was announced in  early 
February. 
The special  interest publications in 
boating equipment had refused adver-· 
tisements for boating equipment froin 
a  British  supplier after  Belgian  com-
petitors had claimed to be  competing 
under significant cost and tax disad-
vantages. 
The British  supplier argued the  ac-
tion had endangered his Belgian sales. 
In addition, boi:ltirtg equipment cus-
tomers in  Belgium  had been deprived 
of price and choice advantages avail-
able in another member state. 
Competition Rules Enforced 
The  EC  Commission  announced  in 
December a  decision  on cane sugar 
supplies and the results of a  1977 de-
cision  involving  Breton  vegetables  as 
part of its enforcement of EC compe-
tition rules. 
Fourteen contracts for the supply to 
the United Kingdom of raw cane sugar 
produced in  11  African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific countries, Belize, St.  Kitts, and 
India were given a favorable decision. 
The sugar is imported by purchasers -
Tate & Lyle Refineries Ltd. and Manbre 
Sugars  Ltd. -and refined  for  sale 
within the Common Market. 
Although the selling and purchasing 
obligations were considered similar to 
a  reciprocal  exclusivity  arrangement, 
the  Commission  said  the  agreements 
have little impact on the marketing or 
sources  of supply  for  third  parties. 
Within the Comrrmnity the only other 
major suppliers of raw cane sugar are 
the French overseas departments, which 
mainly supply French refineries. 
The Commission also announced in 
December that groups concerned in a 
1977 decision on conditions imposed 
by  vegetable growers and dealers in 
Brittany  had  amended  their  regula-
tions. The infringements concerned the 
marketing of cauliflower,  artichokes, 
and early potatoes. Exclusive purchas-
ing  obligations  at auctions  had  been 
removed and  deaiers  were  no  longer 
required to own a  packing facility  in 
the area. 
The Commission also announced that 
it had completed its investigation into 
a complaint regarding the transport of 
cauliflower to Germany. The com-
plaint concerned  an  agreement be-
tween the Comite economique regional 
agricole fruits et legumes and the Union 
des expediteurs et exportateurs du nord 
Finistere, on the one hand, and the 
Societe  franc;aise  de  transports et en-
trep6ts frigorifiques, on the other, re-
quiring their members to use refrigerated 
railway trucks at certain times of the 
year. 
These measures constituted restric-
tions  on competition,  said  the  Com-
mission, in that dealers were deprived 
of freedom of choice in transportation. 
The required transport also made 
products  more  expensive  and  pre-
vented  competition.  Following  i:he 
Commission's intervention, the parties 
terminated the agreement and replaced 
it with a system of trade incentives. 
Fertilizer Makers Fined 
Three leading French fertilizer manu-
facturers have been  fined  85,000 Eu-
ropean  units  of account each  for  in-
fringing competition rules. 
Societe Generale des Engrais SA, 
Compagnie  Franc;aise  de  I' Azote  SA, 
and Societe Chimique des  Charbon-
nages SA  had concluded in  1968  co-
operation agreements setting up a joint 
company- Floral  GmbH- to  dis-
tribute their compound fertilizers  in 
Germany. 
The Commission established that, 
although there was no exclusive agree-
ment, all  fertilizers  produced by  the 
three  French  firms  were  exported  to 
Germany through Floral.  This meant 
German buyers were offered the same 
products at identical prices and terms, 
the same as an export sales agency. 
Fines were imposed on the grounds 
that the infringement was, if not delib-
erate, then at least negligent. The par-
ties were aware that their activities were 
in breach of the Community's rules on 
competition, said the Commission. The 
French manufacturers would have faced 
heavier  fines  except their turnover in 
Germany was fairly low, accounted for 
a  small proportion of their fertilizer 
sales,  and they had relinquished their 
holding in  Floral in  October 1979. 
Paint Makers' Exemption 
Medium-sized marine paint manufac-
turers in the Community and elsewhere 
belonging  to  the Transocean  Marine 
Paint Association got a renewal of their 
exemption from the EC prohibition ort 
restrictive practices. The arrangement 
was continued until the end of 1986. 
The association's object is to help its 
members remain competitive interna-
tionally on the specialized market for 
marine paints.  This entails stocking 
marine paints manufactured by the same 
process at the largest possible number 
of ports. Members have agreed to make paints  of the same  quality  using  the 
same formulae and to distribute them 
under a single Transocean trademark. 
Each  member is  given  a  territory 
where it must concentrate its market-
ing efforts,  but the  members  are  not 
allowed to hinder parallel imports from 
other territories. The association holds 
a combined Community market share 
of about 10 per cent. 
The Commission concluded that co-
operation within Transocean is  eco-
nomically justified. Medium-sized firms 
are enabled to compete with other major 
suppliers of marine paints and thereby 
improve overall market activity. 
Japanese Hi-fi Firm Fined 
A total of nearly 7  million  European 
units of account in fines were levied in 
mid-December  against  various  affili-
ates  of- the Japanese  multinational 
company Pioneer and other European 
firms for practices judged to be illegal 
by the EC Commission. 
The practices  reportedly involved 
understandings by the various firms that 
products made by Pioneer and sold in 
their markets would not be  exported 
to  other Community countries.  Such 
a ban on parallel imports outside the 
company's regular sales network re-
sulted in  a wide discrepancy in  prices 
for the same product in  different EC 
member states. 
For example, the same Pioneer hi-fi 
amplifier in 1975 cost 27-to-38 per cent 
less  in  Britain  and Germany  than  in 
France.  The  companies  involved  had 
agreed not to allow the product to be 
bought in Britain or Germany and then 
be  re-exported  to  France.  This,  ac-
cording to the Commission, was a vi-
olation of the  EC  treaty  provisions 
against  restraints  on  trade  between 
Community nations. 
New Synthetic Fibers Accord 
European  manufacturers  of synthetic 
fibers  agreed to a new joint program 
at a meeting in  Paris in late January. 
An  agreement signed  in  1978  had 
been  judged incompatible with  EC 
competition rules involving production 
quotas and market arrangements by 
industrial cartels. The new agreement 
was an attempt by  manufacturers  to 
comply with the Commission's objec-
tions. 
It aims at the  orderly  reduction of 
excess  production  capacity  while 
avoiding production quotas. 
Coop Arrangements Ended 
The  EC  Commission  acted  in  early 
December to end restrictions imposed 
on members of a  Dutch cheese  man-
ufacturing cooperative. 
The  Cooperatieve  Stremsel-en 
Kleursefabriek produces on behalf of 
its  members- most  Dutch  cheese 
manufacturers - almost all  the ren-
net, an enzyme used to curdle milk, arid 
coloring agents used for cheese-making 
in the Netherlands. In addition, it im-
posed a purchase obligation on  mem-
bers tpl:my all their rennet and coloring 
agents from the cooperative.  and the rest in  food aid:  12,000 tons 
Since  the  cooperative  accounts  for  of cereals, 300 tons of powdered milk, 
over 90 per cent of the Dutch market,  and 1,000 tons of sugar. This, added 
the purchase obligation prevented pro- to earlier shipments arid aid offered by 
ducers of rennet and coloring agents  individual member states, brings the 
from other member states from pene- total EC contribution to over $20 mil-
trating the  Dutch market. The Com- lion. 
mission  felt,  in addition, that the ad-
vantages of the cooperative's  joint EIB  Loans for Development 
production could  still  be  obtained  if  Thirteen  European  Investment  Bank 
members w_ere  allowed greater free- (EIB) loans were approved late last year 
dom of choiCe.  for a variety of industrial development 
projects in Third World countries. 
Two loans amounting to 26 million 
•••••••••••••••  European units of account (EUA)  were 
approved for forestry development and 
HARMONIZATION 
Securities Directive Adopted 
The sixth  EC  company law  directive 
coordinating the listing particulars to 
be  published  when  securities  are ad-
mitted to official stock exchange listing 
has been  adopted by  the EC  Council 
of Ministers in  mid-December. 
The directive is designed to eliminate 
obstacles to the listing of securities and 
to facilitate  access  to  different  stock 
exchanges in  the member states.  It  is 
an  important addition to an earlier 
directive  coordinating  the  conditions 
for  admission  of securities  to official 
stock exchange listing. 
construction of a saw mill  and paper 
mill  on  the  Mediterranean  coast  in 
southern Turkey.  The forestry  phase 
should  lead  to the  creation of 5,000 
jobs, while the mills  would require a 
work force of more than 1,200. Total 
cost of the project will exceed EUA 220 
million. 
Tourism  development in  Mali  will 
get  a  boost of EUA  2.5  million  to go 
toward the construction of two hotels 
and the purchase of transport and com-
munications equipment needed to  set 
up tour circuits. The hotels, scheduled 
to go into service in  1981, would em-
ploy 90 people. Overall investment cost 
of the  project is  estimated at EUA  5 
million. 
The EIB  also lent EUA  15  million for 
small and medium-scale industrial and 
tourism ventures in  Egypt. 
Greater equality in safeguards of-
fered  to  investors  should  result  from 
the directive.  In  addition, it will  con-
tribute to the  establishment of a  Eu- A loan of EUA 25 million was granted 
ropean capital market, an essential as- to Mauritania for opening up iron ore 
pect of economic and monetary union.  deposits.  The project consists of an 
open-cast mine to start in 1983 and the 
New Tax Directive Proposed  commissioning of an enrichment plant. 
Permanent  jobs  for  760 workers are 
expected to result.  A draft directive to eliminate tax dis-
advantages hindering the free  move-
ment of nonresident employed persons 
in the Community has been proposed 
by the EC Commission. 
Provisions in  the proposal include: 
taxation of frontier workers in  the 
member state· of residence, with credit 
given  for  any tax withheld at source 
by  the member state of employment; 
taxation of other nonresident  em-
ployed persons in the member state of 
employment, where the tax applied may 
not be less favorable than that applied 
to residents; tax relief, where appli-
cable,  in  respect to  certain  payments 
made  by  an  individual, whatever the 
member state of the recipient of such 
payments. 
For developing clinker and cement 
production, Cameroon was granted an 
EUA  6.6  million loan. The project is 
designed  to raise production capacity 
at a clinker crushing works and a ce-
ment works. 
To help expand fertilizer production 
in the Ivory Coast, the EIB lent EUA 5. 72 
million. The improvements should in-
crease fertilizer output to 120,000 tons 
a  year. This will  promote economic 
cooperation between different states and 
help  raise agricultural productivity in 
three countries served by the Ivory Coast 
fertilizer industry. 
A feasibility  study on iron ore de-
posits in Senegal will benefit from  an 
EIB  loan for nearly  EUA  1 million. The 
loan is  to be  repaid only if a decision 
to mine the deposits is  made. 
•••••••••••••- Two loans  totaling  EUA  25  million 
were granted to finance agro-industrial  AID  ventures  and  agricultural  investment 
--------------- in  Greece. 
Construction of an industrial estate  Aid to Afghan Refugees  near Amman, Jordan, will  be  helped 
A total of $17.7 million was proposed by a loan for EUA 5 million. This amount 
by the EC Commission in late January will  go  toward the  first  phase of de-
as  aid  for  refugees  from  Afghanistan velopment covering  a  portion of the 
arriving in  Pakistan.  total acreage and including 95  stand-
EC  aid  is  part of an estimated $72 ard factories,  roads, water supply, 
million  needed  this  year for  500,000 drainage,  electricity,  telecommunica-
Afghan  refugees.  The  Commission tions, and buildings. 
proposed $14 million  in  financial  aid  More than  EUA  1.6  million  for  in-
vestment to exploit national energy 
resources was approved for projects in 
Madagascar and Senegal.  In  Mada-
gascar the loan will help finance a study 
on  developing  bituminous  sandstone 
deposits;  in  Senegal,  the loan will  be 
used for constructing a factory to pro-
duce solar collectors and insulated tanks. 
The  EIB  also  lent  EUA  10  million. to 
the Lebanese  Gov~rnment to increase 
the  country's  electricity  output.  Spe-
cifically, the funds will go toward three 
additional generating sets at a thermal 
power station near Beirut. 
Aid to Nonassociated States 
The third 1979 installment of aid proj-
ects for nonassociated developing 
countries has be.en approved by the EC 
Commission. 
A total of over 40 million European 
units of account (EUA)  for  16 projects 
was allotted, leaving EUA  30 million 
still  available under the 1979 budget. 
The  projects  include  livestock  devel-
opment in  Baluchistan,  Pakistan; 
drainage and pilot crop development 
in two regions of Indonesia, as well as 
funds for irrigation studies there. 
Thailand receives  a  grant for  crop 
development;  the  Philippines  was 
awarded aid for  the Bicol  river basin 
development program;  Laos  gets  aid 
for seed propagation centers. Funds for 
a  technical assistance program were 
granted the Asian Development Bank; 
and the Association of South East Asian 
Nations receives  funds  for  rural agri-
cultlir~ studies.  Aid  for  technical  as-
sistance goes to the Mekong commit-
tee, as well. 
Bolivia receives grants for two proj-
ects  in  agriculture,  and Ecuador gets 
aid for an irrigation program. Peru was 
awarded monies for a pilot afforesta-
tion project, and India receives aid for 
anti-hurricane and flood shelters in two 
regions. 
Stabex Transfers to Africa 
Compensation for  export earnings 
losses  in  1978 were granted .  to three 
African nations in December under the 
Stabex plan of the Lome Convention. 
Benin was granted over 4  million 
European  units  of account  (EUA)  for 
losses in palm oil and cotton. Also for 
cotton revenue losses, the Central Af-
riqn Republic was granted EUA  3 mil-
lion and Chad, EUA 4.7 million. These 
transfers total  EUA  12.3 million bring-
ing the total under Stabex for 1978 to 
EUA 149.1 million. Of this figure, 51.3 
per cent has gone to the least developed 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific coun-
tries in the form of grants. 
Aid to Troubled Countries 
The Commission decided in early Jan-
uary to grant 100,000 European units 
of account  (EUA)  toward helping vic-
tims of an earthquake in the Azores-
in the latest in a series of EC emergency 
aid decisions. 
Disaster aid of EUA  400,000 was 
granted to help victims of recent floods 
in  south Wales  and southwest Eng-
EUROPE March-April  1::1~0  57 land. The Commission agreed that the  Davignon also rejected charges that  Minister  Adolfo  Suarez  to  the  EC  of its  industries for  sufficient time  to 
aid would be distributed directly to those  EC  trade and import policy was pro- Commission in December. Suarez met  undertake  restructuration,  especially 
with no alternative source of compen- tectionist.  He cited examples in  the  with EC  Commission President Roy  in the automobible sector. 
sation.  footwear, textile, steel, and shipbuild- Jenkins  and Vice  Presidents  Lorenzo 
EUA 20 million in emergency aid was  ing sectors where the Community mar- Natali, Fran\=ois-Xavier Ortoli, Finn 
granted by the Commission to the pea- ket had remained open to imports from  Olav Gundelach, and Industrial Com-
pie of Kampuchea last November, and  developing countries, despite growing  missioner Etienne Davignon. 
in  early  December  the  Commission  economic problems in these European 
decided  to  allocate  an  EUA  2  million  sectors. 
reserve included in the original figure. 
The reserve was to go  to  nongovern- North/South Talks to Go on 
mental organizations f.or a medical team  A  move  toward  resuming  the  inter-
of 120 people t~  ~hailand; c?nvoys of rupted  "North/South  Dialogue"  was 
foo~stuffs, medtcmes,  sup~hes t~  t~e  made in  late January when the  EC 
That~and-Kam~~chea  fro?-tter; an  t  e  Commission recommended the  Com-
sendmg o~  medtcmes, equtpment, food,  munity participate in  United Nations 
and .clothmg to Phnom Penh.  (UN)  preparations for new talks. 
.  Atd to several o.ther troubled coun- A call to resume the dialogue toward 
EC, Portugal Sign Protocol 
With the signature of a new protocol 
governing  their relations,  the  Com-
munity and Portugal have entered into 
a phase designed to pave the way for 
the eventual entry of Portugal into the 
Community. This new arrangement, 
supplementing the bilateral accord of 
1972, entered into force on January 1  . 
The protocol will also help with cur-
rent economic difficulties.  It allows 
Portugal to continue protection of some 
Greece Renews Olympic Bid 
"To preserve the Olympic idea we must 
rid the games of politics and commer-
cialism," said Greek Prime Minister 
Konstantin Karamanlis in renewing the 
Greek proposal to site permanently the 
Olympic Games in  Athens.  Greece  is 
to become an EC member in  1981. 
Karamanlis  spoke on the occasion 
of the inauguration of a new Olympic-
size athletics stadium in the Greek cap-
ital in January. 
The proposal is  based on the belief 
that the return of the games to Greece 
would restore their former spirit of pure 
athleticism,  free  of commercial  and 
political exploitation. 
tnes was g:a?ted m December by  t~e improving economic relations and con-
EC  <;ommtsston.  ~~ergency food  atd  ditions in  both the industrialized and 
to Ntcaragua conststmg of ~0,000  tons  developing countries was made by the 
of cereal.s,  500 tons of mtlk  powder,  UN General Assembly in early Decem-
along  ~~~h other products  all  worth  her. A resolution at that time forecast 
EUA 2 mtlhon were sent as a supplement  that world  negotiations  on intern  a-
t~ meas~res alrea~y taken .. The total  tiona! economic cooperation would be 
at? ~o Ntcaragua smce July IS  EUA 6.25  taken up again in 1980. Focus would 
mtll~on.  .  be  on raw  materials, energy,  trade, 
SCHOLARSHIPS, GRANTS, CONFERENCES 
Ttmor was. granted  EUA  50,000  m  development, and finance. 
emergenc! at.d  to help  refu~ees as  a  The  Commission  recommendation 
result of ftght~ng there. The atd wa~ to  was meant to formalize EC participa-
supply essentials  and send  a  medt~al  tion in the UN planning sessions. 
team.  Last August the Communtty 
granted 90 tons of milk powder to the 
same regwn. 
Food aid in the form of cereals, milk 
powder,  and  butteroil  worth  EUA  1 
million in all was provided in response 
to a request by the Honduras Govern-
ment for aid for 26,000 flood victims. 
The Dominican Republic was granted 
further emergency aid of EUA  300 for 
seeds, fertilizers,  tools, and building 
materials. These supplies are in  addi-
tion to allocations of EUA 300,000 since 
Hurricane David. 
Exceptional  aid  of EUA  2.5  million 
was granted to Malawi to finance the 
air freighting of 9 million litres of fuel 
to help ease local shortages. EUA 150,000 
for  the supply of insecticides  and lo-
gistical support for locust control was 
also decided for Cape Verde. 
The Commission decided  in  late 
November in response to a request for 
emergency  food  aid  from  the  United 
Nations to contribute a first shipment 
of dairy products to Botswana, Uganda, 
Pakistan, Somalia, and Zambia. A sec-
ond shipment was also planned. 
Industrial Investment Viewed 
The Community is  ready  to intensify 
consultations on industrial investment 
in developing countries, EC Industrial 
Commissioner Etienne Davignon told 
a  meeting  of the  United  Nations  In-
dustrial  Development  Organization 
(UNIDO)  in New Delhi in late January. 
The Commissioner pointed out the 
need.  to address areas of mutual con-
cern, such as  developing the raw ma-
terials and mining sector. He noted that 
the  Community imports about three-
fourths of its raw material needs, largely 
from other industrialized nations, and 
that the mining investment in the Third 
World should be stimulated. 
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AGRICULTURE 
Lamb War Continues 
The  EC  Commission  announced  in 
January that it had filed  suit in  the 
European Court of Justice in regard to 
France's failure  to allow imports of 
sheep. 
The British Government might also 
seek damages from France over the lat-
ter's  restrictions  on British  lamb im-
ports, it was reported. 
Late last year, the Court had ruled 
that France's import restrictions con-
flicted with the Community's free trade 
provisions;  however,  France had not 
acted to remove trade barriers by mid-
January. 
Farm Spending to Be Cut 
EC  agriculture  ministers,  meeting  in 
late January, agreed  to begin  cutting 
agricultural expenses at the same time 
the debate on new farm prices started. 
There was also general agreement 
for  policies that would reduce excess 
dairy and sugar production, but a va-
riety of views on how to do it. 
ENLARGEMENT 
Spanish Talks Move Ahead 
Leaders of the Community and Spain 
have pledged to aim for completion of 
the  bulk of enlargement negotiations 
by the end of 1980. 
This  pledge  took place  in  Brussels 
following a  visit by Spanish Prime 
Marketing Seminars 
The University of Michigan is  spon-
soring international marketing man-
agement seminars in  March, June, 
September, and October. 
Topics to be covered during the 
five-day sessions include developing 
international market strategy; intelli-
gence; entry; distribution channels 
and logistics; policy and pricing; ad-
vertising. 
For further information, write 
Mary Kenyon, Division of Manage-
ment Education, The University of 
Michigan, 1735 Washtenaw Avenue, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109. 
Radioactive Waste Meeting 
The first EC international conference 
on radioactive waste management 
and disposal has been set for May 
20-23 in Luxembourg. 
Papers will be presented by scien-
tists involved in  EC contract studies 
and members of the Commission's 
scientific staff. Simultaneous interpre-
tation will be provided in  English, 
French, and German. 
For further information, contact 
the European Community Informa-
tion Service, 2100 M St., NW, Suite 
707, Washington, DC 20037. 
Ispra Courses in  1980 
The Ispra Establishment of the EC 
Joint Research Center presents a reg-
ular series of courses and seminars at 
its facilities in Varese, Italy. 
The program for  1980 includes 
courses in  computer science, chemical 
sciences and techniques, health phys-
ics, reactor safety, nuclear science, 
engineering. 
For details write: Secretariat, Ispra-
Courses, Centro Comune di  Ricerca, 
1-21020 Ispra (Varese), Italy. 
European Waste Management 
The EC  Commission will sponsor a 
conference on waste management 
throughout the Community to com-
plement the International Solid 
Wastes Congress in  London in  1980. 
The Community's conference is  to 
be held June 17-19 in  London and 
will  focus on topics including waste 
paper, packaging, hazardous waste, 
utilization of waste in agriculture, 
and energy from waste. These are 
areas in which the Community is  de-
veloping policies. 
For further information write, The 
Conference Organizer, European 
Conference on Waste Management, 
London Conferences, 44, Kendal 
Steps, St.  Georges Fields, London, 
W2 2YE, England. 
International Studies 
The International Studies Associa-
tion's twenty-first convention was 
scheduled for March 19-22 in  Los 
Angeles. This year's theme is  "Guid-
ing Hands Versus Hidden Hands: 
Managing Security, Welfare, and the 
Environment Within and Among Na-
tions." 
For more information, contact: 
].A. Kuhlman, Executive Director, 
International Studies Association, 
Gambrell Hall, The University of 
South Carolina, Columbia, South 
Carolina 29208 (803/777-2933). 
Integration Studies Grants 
Fifteen grants for European integra-
tion research are available from the 
EC Commission for the 1980-81 aca-
demic year. 
Awards will go to young university 
teachers who individually or as a 
team are doing research on integra-
tion. Applications must be submitted 
by March 31, and grants will be 
awarded in July. The final  text must 
be submitted to the Commission be-
fore October 1981. 
Applications may be obtained from 
the European Community Informa-
tion Service, 2100 M St., NW, Suite 
707, Washington, DC 20037. Recent Books
Europe periodically lists books dealing witb Community and Atlantic  top-
ics. Prices are also giuen when known. This presentation  does not indicate
approual or recommendation  of these publications,  which can be purchased
or ordered  from most booksellers.
The European Parliament and the
National Parliamens.  Edited by Val-
entine Herman and Rinus van
Schendelen. Saxon House, Westmead,
Farnborough,  Hants, 1 978. Available
from Renouf usA, Inc., Brookfield,
VT 05035. 304 pages including  index.
$25.50.
Explores the relationships  between
the European Parliament and the na-
tional parliaments of member  states;
discusses  changes in these relation-
ships since the 1973 enlargemenr.
Basics of Antidumping and Other
Import Relief Laws: Multilateral
Trade Negotiations  Update.
Edited by Harvey M. Applebaurn
and A. Paul Victor.  Practicing  l.aw
Institute,  tl | 0 Seventh Avenue, New
Y<rrk, | 979. 296 pages. $20.00.
Updates  the rnultilateral trade ne-
gotiirtions  with a review of existing
antidumping  and countervailing  duty
laws and their revision  under the
Trade Agreements  Act of 1979, its
well as other impclrt  relief actions.
Household Income and Expenditure
Statistics  No. 3. 1968-1976.  Inrerna-
tional l-abour Office, Geneva, 1979.
Available  from I[-O, Washington,
I)C. 4U9 pages. $19.95.
Collection  of statistics based on
household expenditure  surveys  con-
drrcted  between 1968 and 1976, c<>v-
ering 87 countries and territories
thror.rghout the world.
for the diplomatic missions ac-
credited to thc Community.
Women at Work. International l.rr-
bour Office, Geneva.  Available fronr
ll.O, Washin[4t()n,  DC. Annual Sub-
scription: $7.4-5.
lliarrnual  news bulletin giving in-
formation on trends and devekrp-
rnents concerning women workers.
The Cost of Social  Security. Inrernir-
tional l.abour Office. Geneva. 1979.
Available  from ll-O, \ilashington,
I)C. l 1.3 pages. $19.95.
The ninth of a series of intern:r-
tional inquiries  into the social secu-
ritv schcmes of various  c<luntries;
covers  the years 1972-74;  includes
comparative  tables, national accoultts
data, population data, and consumer
price indexes.
Beef and Veal in Europe.  Edited  by
Jean Paul Chauvet.  European  News
Agency, Brussels, 1978. Three vol-
umes: 321 pages, 222 pages,757
pages. $336.00.
Study of the beef and veal market
in turope, covering  the regulation  of
the market by the L,uropean  Commu-
nity, the structure  and prospects f<lr
the L,C and world markers, and h,u-
rope's trade in beef and veal.
Europe's Energy (from Coal to Oil).
By Jack Gleason and Stephen  13.
Hahn. European News Agency, Brus-
sels, 1979. 215 pages.
Studies  European energy policy to
1974, examining  the gradual  switch
from coal to'oil; reviews the history
of turatom  from its beginnings;
kr<lks at nuclear power policies in
separate  ItC countries  and lruropean
c(x)peration  in this field.
Multinational Collective  Bargaining
Attempts. By Herbert R. Northrup
and Richard L. Rowan.  Universitv of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphh,  | 979.
580 pages including index. 527.50.
Study of the role of international
union federations'  actions on multi-
national corporate  activiry;  reviews
history of this relationship; as well as
prospects for the future; examines
social costs and benefits and the role
of national and intergovernmental
agencies in multinational  industrial
relations.
Slow Growth in Britain.  Edited  by
Wilfred  Beckerman. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, New York, 1979.237
pages including index. $23.50.
Collection of papers addressing the
causes  and consequences  of Britain's
slow growth rate; includes an opin-
ion on the necessary application of
strict import  controls to strengthen
the economy.
A History of Germany 1815-1945.
By William Carr. St. Marrin's  Press,
New York, 1979. 414 pages includ-
ing index. $18.95, cloth; $8.95, pa-
per.
Revised edition of Dr. Carr's firsr
text on the same subject;  incorpo-
rates his own findings as well as re-
cent findings  on the period previ-
ously uncovered.
To order  the publications  listed
below, please check the desired  items
and fill out the order blank. Mail to
the European Community Informa-
tion Service,  2100 M Street, NW,
Suite 707, Vashington,DC  20037,
(202) 862-9540.  In the New York
area copies  can be ordered from the
European Community Information
Service,  245 East 47th Street, New
York, NY 10017, (212) 371-3804.
Telephone orders are also welcome.
n  Energy Analysis.  As an Economic n  Meeting on Industrial processes:
Tool. EUR 6387 EN, Commission, Energy Conservation  R&D. EUR
Luxembourg,1979,  64 pages. $14.30  6236 DEIEN/FR, Commission,  Lux-
B.y M.Sle-sser; paper on the state of  emb.urg, 1979,622 pages ... $34.50
the art of energy analysis - 
hou en- Meeting  held in Brusie{, Nouember
ergy .enters the economic process and 23-24, 1978, to reuiew tbe results of
can .be used to supplement economic energy conseruation proiects funded'
5r,iiC"if . ;Fi;;;ffi J'nr..*i"r ii 1!',1: !'.1r',*,b 
orger s, o r gani.c
Appliances, prices 
"'; il;ffi''i;l  l::1::,Slctc 
engines,  combustion.
and boilers. the United Kingdom and the Republic
of Ireland. Euolution of concentration  J  chemical and Physical Valoriza-
and competition series No.28, Com- tion of Coal. EUR 6576 DEIEN/I.R.
mission, Brussels,  1979, 238 Commission,  l,uxembourg,  197 9,
pages .  .. ..$9.20 154 pages  . $21.50
By MLH Consultants Ltd., Dublin
and London.
n  The European Community Re-
sponse to the Afghanistan  Crisis. Ea- n  Childhood Deafness in the Euro-
ropean Community Nerzs No. 3/  pean Community.  EUR 6413 DAI
1 9 80, lnformation  Service, Washing-  O El F,N I t' Rl ITINL, Commission,
ton, DC, January 18, 1980,  3 Luxembou  r g, 197 9, 250 pages.  S 12.20
analysis.
n A Srudy of Concentration  in the
tional Sugar Agreement.
I  The EEC and the Developing
Countries: Outside  the Lom6 Con-
vention and the Southern Mediterra-
by the Community; papers couered
energy analysis, heat recouery tech-
Papers presented at a round table
meeting, Brussels,  Nouember  9,
197U.
on the need to elaborate some meth-
odology to et,aluate the effectiueness
and ualue of Community  RllcD pro-
grams.
Please send me the free items  checked.
Please send me the sales irems checked
and
I  Bill me
n My check for $
is enclosed.
I 
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European communities Yearbook  Textiles and clothing in Europe and
1979. Hditi'ns Delta, Brussels, 1979. the world. By Jean paul chauver.
Available  fr'm Unipub, New Y'rk.  European News Agency, Brussels,
607 prges. $4,5.00.  1979. 156 pages.
(iuidc to the structure, operrltion,  Survey of the textile and clothing
and irctivities of the European Com- industries worldwide with separate 
-
munitv with inf<lrmation  on institr.r- sections  on developed, developing,
ti<lns and departments, m()vements  and Eastern bloc countries;  examines
:rncl rrssocia'ions  f<lrmed within the  trends in technology,  production, and
E(. context, l,td names and acldresses  trade in this sector.
pages .  ... free tsy J.A.M. Martin and W.J. Moore;
Summary of Community actions on  result of an epidemiological  inuesti-
trade with the Souiet IJnion and text  gation in the nine member countries
of the European  Parliament  resolu-  to determine  the preualence  of chiltl-
tion of January 16 on Afghanistan. hood deafness.
n  Sugar, The European Community E The Evaluation of Research  and
and the Lom6 Convention. Europe  Development:  Summary of the Rec-
lnformation No. 19179, Commission, ommendations  and Main Contribu-
Brussels, 1979, 12 pages ...........free  tions. EUR 6346 F.N, Vols. I and Il,
Note on the world and Community Commission,  Luxembourg, 8.1 pages
sugar markets and trade, tbe operi-  and 456 pages .  ...... $ l5.tl0 set
tion of the sugar protocol  of the  l'roceedings  and papers of a seminar,
Lom6 Conuention,  and the Internd_  Copenhagen,  June 29-July 1, 1978,
4rru  frle  uuurtrlrrr  rvlluttgltd- 
il-r 
------_ 
_I_  _
nean. F,urope  Information:  Deuelop- I  ^ ment, Commission,  Brussels, 1979, i Ofdgf  Blank
21 pages  ........free
Outline of the Community's policies
for nonassociated deueloping coun-
tries; couers  the trading regime and
assistance, food aid, financial and
technical assistance,  emergency  aid,
and member state aid efforts.
n  Yugoslavia  and the European
Community. Europe  lnformation
No. 20179,  Commission,  Brussels.
1979,6 pages .  ........free
Summary of deuelopments in EC-Yu-
goslauia relations,  the 1973 agree-
ment, textile arrangements, scientific  I
and technical  cooperation,  and the  !
negotiation of a new cooperation  I
Add ress
Ito Frr-r----E-rr
L,uRot,t, March-April 1980 59
agreement.